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The Association of Regional Observatories
exists to promote the best data and
intelligence for England’s regions. 
The work of the Association is directed 
by a board consisting of representatives 
from each region – and from across 
the range of regional organisations. 
The work of the Association is supported 
by subscription from each region – with 
the bulk of resources coming from the
English Regional Development Agencies. 
The aims of the Association are to: 
Champion regional data requirements to
ensure that the necessary high quality data
and intelligence are available to support and
inform any and every regional policy; 
Help observatories bring together the best
data and intelligence from government,
academic, and private sector sources, 
to encourage fresh thinking and create a
robust understanding of the English regions; 
Provide an exemplary forum for 
inter-regional collaboration in order to 
allow for benchmarking, exchange of best
practice in research, and the building 
of a national understanding based on
regional knowledge;
Work closely with policymakers to ensure
that regional research and intelligence is
readily accessible, well understood, and
used appropriately;
Promote the observatory movement
and its core values of partnership and
accessibility in research. 
Further information on the Association 
of Regional Observatories, and each
individual regional observatory, is 
available from the ARO portal at
www.regionalobservatories.org.uk
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Copyright resides with individual authors or
publishers. Data reproduced from Office for
National Statistics, Crown Copyright, 
Click-use licence number C02W0004645.
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Regions are becoming more significant in England.
Referendums on devolution are planned for three
northern regions, more institutions have regional tiers
and it is increasingly seen that national policy needs 
to be sensitive to regional differences. In economics,
‘new economic geography’ has rediscovered the
importance of place and proximity in business activity.
It has never been more important for regional theory
and practice to be brought together.
Regional Observatories, or Regional Intelligence Units,
work to provide the best data and intelligence to
support policies and strategies in the English regions.  
In many instances, this, rightly, involves a careful study
of the ‘home region’. But any such study would be
incomplete without being put in the wider context 
of how regions work. The themes of this reader –
productivity, enterprise, skills, quality of life, disparities,
governance and research – reflect the current regional 
agenda, and can help provide that context for regional
decision-making. The chapters cover both academic
research and applied research in Regional
Observatories.  
This document is intended for researchers and policy
makers in England both at the regional and national
level. We hope that it is interesting and informative 
for those who already work in the regions, and an
accessible introduction for those new to this
expanding field.
P.N.J. Tucker
Chair of the Association of Regional Observatories
Director of the South West Observatory Core Unit
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Introd
uction
Regions play an important role in a number of policy areas in the UK. 
With a number of responsibilities exercised at the regional level, and a growing 
amount of national activity expected to be assessed for impact on different regions, 
a thorough understanding of regions becomes increasingly important.
Regional observatories are partnerships established by Regional Development 
Agencies and their partners to create, share, and disseminate regional data and 
intelligence. Working together through the Association of Regional Observatories, 
the observatories have put together this reader on the state of regional research. 
In publishing this reader we seek to achieve three things – first, to promote an 
awareness in the policy community of some of the latest academic thinking 
about regions and regional development; second, to support the use of rigorous 
research and evaluation in regional policymaking; and third, to raise awareness 
of the rich range of exciting research and intelligence produced by regional 
observatories and others.
The State of Regional Research is a collection of extracts from larger articles 
and research reports. Individual articles all stand alone, and can be read in any 
order, although there is a certain thematic progression through the document. 
The extracts chosen have been selected to present ideas and techniques 
in an accessible way. The extracts from individual regions attempt to give a taste 
of the range of work observatories are involved in, but the selection is necessarily 
somewhat arbitrary. Likewise, it goes without saying that the extracts reproduced 
here – particularly given the sometimes brutal editing articles have been subjected 
to – do not necessarily represent the views of individual authors or regional bodies; 
readers are encouraged to access full articles where they are interested in seeing 
extracts in context or fuller descriptions of methodology. To aid those tempted 
to refer to original articles, references within each extract have been left in their 
original format.
It just remains now to thank those who have helped in preparing this publication. 
The regional observatories have supplied material, valuable support, and numerous 
helpful comments. Much of the support for observatory – and ARO – work comes 
from the English Regional Development Agencies. The Yorkshire and Humber 
Assembly provided early support for ARO, and guidance for this project. 
The Office for National Statistics, ippr, and Catalyst have all provided material. 
Finally, the Regional Studies Association, and the publisher of their journal 
Regional  Studies – Taylor & Francis – have gratefully allowed us to reproduce 
a number of extracts. The Regional Studies Association play a significant role 
in advancing research into regions, and it has been a real pleasure to work with 
Sally Hardy and the rest of their team in the course of this work.
Joby Blume
Association of Regional Observatories
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Development
The Economic Performance of Regions
Michael E. Porter
Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness,
Harvard Business School
The Rise, Fall and Rise Again 
of Industrial Location Theory
Philip McCann and Stephen Sheppard
Department of Economics, University of
Reading; and Department of Economics,
Williams College
Productivity in the South West
Eric McVittie
South West Observatory Business 
and Economy Module at the 
University of Plymouth
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This extract was taken from an article
originally published in Regional Studies
(37.6/7 549-578), Journal of the Regional
Studies Association and is reproduced
here with the permission of the Publisher,
Taylor & Francis Ltd.
Further information on the Regional
Studies Association, and the Regional
Studies journal, is available online from
www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk. 
Studies of competitiveness and economic
development have tended to focus on 
the nation as the unit of analysis, and 
on national attributes and policies as 
the drivers. As regional scientists and
economic geographers have long
understood, however, there are substantial
differences in economic performance
across regions in virtually every nation. 
This suggests that many of the essential
determinants of economic performance 
are to be found at the regional level.
The distribution of economic activity by
industry over geography reveals three
different broad types of industries, 
with very different patterns of spatial
competition and different drivers of
locational behavior. Distinguishing them 
is essential in testing hypotheses about
regional performance. 
The first type of industry in regional
economies is local industries. In these
industries, employment that is evenly
distributed across all regions – that is,
employment is roughly proportional to
regional population. Local industries 
provide goods and services primarily to 
the local market, or the region in which 
the employment is located. Such industries
compete in only a limited way with other
regions. Most are services including local
health services, most utilities, retailing and
many types of construction. A few goods
producing industries are revealed as local,
including bottled and canned soft drinks,
newspapers, concrete products and 
ready-mixed concrete. 
A second type of industry is resource
dependent industries. Employment in 
these industries is located primarily where
the needed natural resources are found, 
but these industries compete with other
domestic and international locations.
Examples of such industries include 
uranium ore, logging, beet sugar, and 
freight transportation on the Great Lakes. 
The third type of industries in regional
economies is traded industries that are not
resource dependent. These industries sell
products and services across regions and
often to other countries. They locate in a
particular region based not on resources but
on broader competitive considerations, and
employment concentration varies markedly
by region. Examples of traded industries
10
The Economic Performance of Regions
Michael E. Porter
Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness,
Harvard Business School
In this extract, Michael Porter uses the 1997 US
Economic Census to examine the impact of traded
industries, and clusters, on regional economic
performance. The correct policy approach, he argues,
is to attempt to improve productivity in those clusters
in which a region already has a ‘meaningful position’,
and not to try to shift to hi-tech clusters. 
State of Regional Research NEW  22/10/04  5:05 pm  Page 10
include aircraft engines and engine parts,
motion picture and videotape production,
and automobile assembly.
Local industries prove to account for 
by far the largest share of US private
employment, or 67%, which is perhaps
surprising in an era where geographic
borders are seen as having limited economic
significance. Even in a global economy 
and in a nation (the US) with completely
open internal borders, two-thirds of
employment is heavily tied to the local
market. The ownership of the parent
company in local industries may be based
elsewhere, but almost all these jobs are
inherently local. It should be noted that 
while the designation as a local industry
always reflects the vast majority of industry
employment, there are a relatively few cases
where a small segment of a local industry is
traded. The disproportionate position of
Delaware in commercial banks (SIC 6060),
for example, reflects Delaware’s role as the
state of incorporation for many national
companies. Our data do not account 
for these cases. 
Traded industries account for about 32% 
of employment (see Table 2). Natural
endowment dependent industries account
for only about 1% of employment. In a highly
advanced economy such as the US,
industries heavily dependent on natural
endowments have declined to a minor part
of employment, unlike the case in many
developing economies.
While local industries account for the
majority of employment, however, traded
industries are fundamental to prosperity. 
The average traded industry wage is
$45,040 in 2000 versus $27,169 for local
industries. Traded industries also have
higher wage growth, much higher
productivity and much higher patenting
rates (see Table 2).
We calculated average productivity by
industry, defined as sales/receipts/
shipments per employee, using data from
the 1997 Economic Census. While the data
is imperfect due to some data suppression
and is only available for 1997, traded
industries are revealed to have much higher
productivity than local industries, consistent
with their higher patenting rates and higher
wages. Resource dependent industries fall
in between.
Traded industries, then, appear to heavily
influence the relative prosperity of regions.
Competitive success in traded industries
creates demand for local industries serving
commercial customers, while the higher
wages paid by traded industries heavily
influence local house-hold demand.
The rising proportion of local employment
may be the result of several factors,
including the higher productivity growth 
of traded industries and the fact that
demand for local services tends to go up
with prosperity (the 1990s were especially
prosperous). An ageing population 
may also play a part. Also, the trend 
to greater outsourcing of services 
arbitrarily shifts the classification of some
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Table 2. Composition of the US economy by type of industry
Natural
endownment
Traded Local department
industries industries industries
Share of employment (%) 31.8 67.4 0.80
Employment growth
1990-2000 (CAGR)(%) 1.7 2.8 -1.0
Average wage ($) 45,040 27,169 32,129
Relative wage 137.0 82.6 97.7
Wage growth 1999-2000 (CAGR)(%) 5.0 3.6 1.9
Relative productivity 144.1 79.3 140.1
Patents per 10,000 employees 21.1 1.3 7.0
Number of SIC industries 590 241 48
Note: 2000 data, expect relative productivity which is 1997 data. Relative wage equals the average wage of the class relative to the
overall average (average=100). Relative productivity equals productivity of the class to overall average productivity (average=100).
Source: Cluster Mapping Project, Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Harvard Business School.
While local industries
account for the majority
of employment, however,
traded industries are
fundamental to
prosperity. 
State of Regional Research NEW  22/10/04  5:05 pm  Page 11
employment from manufacturing to services.
Since many services are local, this boosts
local share. Finally, overly broad industry
definition may bury traded services in
aggregates involving industries that are
predominately local. For example,
semiconductor chip design, which is traded
and highly concentrated geographically, 
is part of ‘engineering services’, much of
which is geographically dispersed. 
The average level of local wages in a region 
is strongly associated with the average 
level of traded wages, as shown in Fig. 17. 
On average, local wage is 66% of traded
wage. Yet, the proportion of traded
employment to total employment has a 
weak relationship with the regional average
wage. This suggests that the average wage
achieved in a region’s traded industries
tends to determine the local wage and hence
drives the region’s overall average wage.
Hence the causality appears to go from
traded wages to local wages, not vice versa.
Clusters of Traded Industries
One of the most striking features of regional
economies is the presence of clusters, or
geographic concentrations of linked
industries. We define a cluster as a
geographically proximate group of
interconnected companies, suppliers,
service providers and associated institutions
in a particular field, linked by externalities 
of various types. Examples of clusters are
financial services in New York (Wall Street),
medical devices in Boston, and IT in Austin,
Texas and Silicon Valley. Clusters are
important because of the externalities that
connect the constituent industries, such as
common technologies, skills, knowledge
and purchased inputs. Note that a given
industry can be part of more than one cluster
based on different patterns of externalities.
Software, for example, is connected with
other IT industries in terms of technology 
and demand, but also linked with medical
devices because software is embedded 
in many types of devices and software
development is crucial to medical device
product development. 
Recent academic and practitioner literature
has placed increasing emphasis on industry
clustering as a basic feature of regional and
national economies, with an important
influence on innovation, competitiveness 
and economic performance.
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The average wage
achieved in a region’s
traded industries tends
to determine the local
wage and hence drives
the region’s overall
average wage.
Fig. 17. Average local wages vs. average traded wage by economic area, 2000
Sources: County Business Patterns; Cluster Mapping Project, Harvard Business School.
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The industry may not be the appropriate 
unit of analysis because of the externalities
across related industries within clusters. 
The relevant knowledge spillovers that 
affect innovation and performance should
be strongest within cluster and among
related industries. Hence, specialization in
clusters, not in industries per se, should 
lead to higher performance. Diversity of
clusters in a region rather than diversity of
industries may also be a more meaningful
diversity measure (KETELHÖHN, 2002). 
A diverse array of over-lapping clusters 
(see below) should be associated with 
better performance than a diversity of
clusters that are unrelated.
A major constraint to the analysis of clusters
has been the lack of a systematic approach
to defining the industries that should be
included in each cluster and the absence 
of consistent empirical data on cluster
composition across a large sample of
regional economies. Lack of large sample
empirical data is understandable, since
knowledge spillovers and other positive
externalities are difficult if not impossible 
to measure directly.
We proceed indirectly, using the locational
correlation of employment across traded
industries to reveal externalities and define
cluster boundaries. For example, if computer
hardware employment is nearly always
associated geographically with software
employment, this provides a strong indication
of locational linkages. Such a methodology
exploits the unique characteristics of the 
US economy which is by far the largest
economy in the world, in which virtually 
every industry and cluster in any economy 
is present, and which consists of a large
number of distinct but interdependent
regions. This approach is not feasible in 
most if not all other countries.
This process resulted in 41 traded clusters 
in the US economy, with an average of 
about 29 industries each. Each cluster has a
different geographic pattern of employment.
Clusters often contain both manufacturing
and service industries as well as industries
from various parts of the SIC system.
Clusters, then, represent a different way 
of dividing the economy than is embodied 
in conventional industrial classification
systems that are based primarily on product
type and similarities in production.
We expected overlap of industries across
clusters, and such overlap was indeed
present empirically. Total cluster
employment including overlap is 204% 
of total traded employment in 2000. So that,
on average, each industry is part of about
two clusters. Fig. 18 provides a schematic
representation of those clusters with
substantial overlap. Some clusters are
linked with several others, such as
education and knowledge creation
(significant overlap with eight other clusters)
and analytic instruments (significant overlap
with seven other clusters). Other clusters
(e.g. textiles forest products, distribution
services) are relatively independent. 
Clusters normally designated as ‘high-tech’
– aerospace engines, aerospace vehicles
and defence, analytical instruments,
biopharmaceuticals, communication
equipment, information technology and
medical devices – account for just 8·9% of
traded employment and 2·8% of total US
private employment. The average high-tech
cluster wage is $63,972 versus $43,183 for
other clusters. The proportion of high-tech
employment has a meaningful impact on 
a region’s average wage, which explains
27·0% of the variation in regional average
wages. However, high-tech share explains
12·5% of the variation in the average wage 
in non-high-tech clusters, and 14·4% of the
variation of local wages. Hence success 
in high-tech clusters does not just raise
wages directly, but signals an ability to
compete productively and sustain higher
wages elsewhere in the economy. 
We found that regional high-tech share had
no meaningful relationship with employment
growth. Also, regions that are growing their
high-tech share do not have higher wage
growth in the region as a whole, nor is
growth in high-tech share associated with
higher wage growth in non-high-tech
clusters. (…) Rather than focusing solely on
developing ‘high-tech’ clusters, then, our
data reveal that regions need to upgrade 
all the clusters that are present.
A given cluster can register substantially
different average wages in different regions,
due to differences in its sophistication and
productivity, patterns of unionization and
cost of living. In the automotive cluster, for
example, Michigan’s 296,002 workers in
2000 earned an average wage of $58,799
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We define a cluster 
as a geographically
proximate group of
interconnected
companies, suppliers,
service providers and
associated institutions
in a particular field,
linked by externalities 
of various types.
A major constraint to
the analysis of clusters
has been the lack of a
systematic approach to
defining the industries
that should be included
in each cluster and the
absence of consistent
empirical data on
cluster composition
across a large sample
of regional economies.
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versus $34,655 in California, $32,814 in
Tennessee and less than $30,000 in Georgia
and Alabama (…). Regional sophistication is
revealed in part by the particular subclusters
in which the region is strong.
Variation in regional
specialization over time
To explore whether regions are becoming
more or less specialized by cluster, we
calculated GINI coefficient measuring the
inequality of the employment distribution
among the 41 traded clusters within states
and EAs. The majority of states (35) had
a positive change in the GINI coefficient over
the 1990–2000 period signifying greater
specialization, while 16 had a negative
change. 
States that are becoming more specialized
have higher wage growth, with the
proportion of explained variance 25·5% 
(the results are similar for EAs). This provides
provocative though not definitive evidence
that specialization of a region in an array of
stronger traded clusters boosts regional
performance. 
The Las Vegas EA provides a striking
demonstration of the two effects.
Competing disproportionately in the cluster
with the lowest average wage, hospitality
and tourism, Las Vegas is ranked 171 
out of 172 regions on the cluster mix 
effect. However, Las Vegas significantly
outperforms the national average in
hospitality and tourism cluster average
wage, contributing to a high level effect 
for the region (ranked tenth nationally).
A region’s ability to compete in its array of
clusters with higher productivity (e.g. better
product quality, more advanced service
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Th
e 
S
ta
te
 o
f R
eg
io
na
l R
es
ea
rc
h
Many regional economic
development initiatives
focus heavily on shifting
the mix to more
‘desirable’ clusters. 
An equally if not more
important policy 
focus is to upgrade 
the productivity of 
all the clusters in which
the region has a
meaningful position.
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Fig. 18.  Schematic diagram of cluster overlap in the US economy
Note: Clusters with overlapping borders or identical shading have at least 20% overlap (by number of industries) in both directions
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delivery) has the decisive influence on the
region’s prosperity. This finding carries
important implications of economic
development. Many regional economic
development initiatives focus heavily on
shifting the mix to more ‘desirable’ clusters.
An equally if not more important policy 
focus is to upgrade the productivity of 
all the clusters in which the region has a
meaningful position.
The importance of leading
clusters and regional
performance
It is widely believed by practitioners and some
economic development thinkers that reliance
on a few clusters is dangerous for regional
economic development because it exposes 
a region to shocks and business cycles. 
Many regions, then, set a goal of diversifying
the clusters present. Fig. 23 reveals that this
hypothesis is not borne out by the data, at
least in its simplest form. There is no clear
relationship between the importance of 
the leading clusters (measured by the
employment of the top three clusters as a
percentage of total traded employment), and
average wages. The same is true of wage
growth, employment growth and patenting. 
The results are nearly identical using 
the top five clusters.
Our findings suggest that regional analysis
must become far more central to research
and policy formulation in competitiveness
and economic development. Our results
reveal the need for much of economic policy
to be decentralized to the regional level.
Since many of the essential determinants of
economic performance appear to reside in
regions, national policies will be necessary
but not sufficient. The importance of regions
may explain why countries with greater
economic decentralization, such as
Germany and the US, have been historically
successful. It may also explain why
countries such as India and China are
making notable economic progress in
particular states or provinces relative 
to others.
Our findings highlight the need for regional
economic development policies to be
particularly attuned to traded clusters,
because these not only support higher
wages but also appear to drive local
employment and especially local wages.
Regions should focus on upgrading the
productivity of all clusters in which they 
have a meaningful position, rather than
attempting to migrate to more ‘desirable’
clusters. 
15
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The importance of
regions may explain 
why countries with
greater economic
decentralization, 
such as Germany 
and the US, have been
historically successful.
Fig. 23. Average wages vs. the importance of leading clusters by economic area, 2000
Sources: County Business Patterns; Cluster Mapping Project, Harvard Business School.
KETELHOHN N. W. (2002) The Role of Clusters as
Sources of Dynamic Externalities. DBA dissertation,
Harvard University.
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This extract was taken from an article
originally published in Regional Studies
(37.6/7 649-663), Journal of the Regional
Studies Association and is reproduced
here with the permission of the Publisher,
Taylor & Francis Ltd. 
Further information on the Regional
Studies Association, and the Regional
Studies journal, is available online from
www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk.
Terms such as ‘industrial clustering’ or
‘agglomeration’ are now used more or less
interchangeably by many commentators,
with little real understanding of the origins,
differences or actual meanings of these
terms. Similarly, concepts such as ‘new
industrial areas’, ‘innovative milieux’ or
‘competitive clusters’ are applied to different
situations without any real consideration of
the different empirical methods required in
order to test whether such claims are
justified. At the same time, there is often an
inherent bias in the analytical perspective, 
in that the focus of such discussions is
primarily on the advantages of industrial
clustering, whereas the forces encouraging
industrial decentralization are largely
ignored. 
From an analytical perspective this bias
poses a real problem. The reason for this 
is that firm clustering and dispersion is a
natural outcome of a random process 
in geographical space (ELLISON and
GLAESER, 1997; GABAIX, 1999a, 1999b);
even in a spaceless world, the distribution 
of firms is not even but random. Therefore,
how are we to know whether observed firm
location behaviour is a result of
microeconomic responses to particular
cost and revenue signals or simply a 
random outcome which is unrelated to 
the local economic environment? From 
both an analytical and public policy
perspective, the most important issue 
is this: to be able to distinguish between the
conditions under which industrial spatial
concentration will take place and the
conditions under which it will not. While the
stylized models in favour of industrial
concentration, such as agglomeration,
clustering, new industrial areas, etc. can be
very instructive, these models themselves
require very careful interpretation in order 
to confirm that what we are observing is
indeed what we are arguing. Without such
interpretation, we cannot know the
conditions under which the countervailing
phenomenon of industrial dispersion will
take place. In other words, we cannot
specify a null hypothesis. Unfortunately,
such careful interpretation is usually lacking,
because the analytical limitations of these
various models are typically overlooked, as
are the empirical requirements needed to
substantiate them.
This movement towards providing an
analytical framework which is intended 
to be generally applicable to all sectors and
locations has most evidently been observed
in the recent work of the ‘new economic
geography’ research programme (FUJITA 
et al., 1999) and also the recent literature on
industrial clustering (PORTER, 1990, 1998).
Both of these analytical frameworks are
based on the crucial assumption that 
there are many situations in which it is
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The Rise, Fall and Rise Again 
of Industrial Location Theory
Philip McCann and Stephen Sheppard
Department of Economics, University of
Reading; and Department of Economics,
Williams College
Cluster theory is ill defined, and often postulated in
such a way that it cannot be tested. The result is 
that terms such as ‘agglomeration’, ‘cluster’, and
‘network’ are often used interchangeably, and regional
policies are often built on weak analytical frameworks,
this piece argues. This extract – from an article rich 
in economic theory – tries to identify the assumptions
in cluster theory, define different types of industrial
clusters, and look at how information technologies
have made high-value industries the most sensitive 
to logistics costs.
Even in a spaceless
world, the distribution 
of firms is not even 
but random.
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advantageous for firms to group together 
in space. However, unlike classical or
neoclassical theory, what neither of these
frameworks is able to do is to explicitly
distinguish between the situations 
in which it is advantageous for an 
individual firm to locate close to other 
firms from the circumstances in which it is
disadvantageous for the individual firm to 
do so. Nor does either framework provide 
a means by which we can identify which
particular type of firm will benefit from which
particular clustering behaviour. The reason
for this is that neither the new economic
geography nor the clustering literature
explicitly discusses the production function
nature of the individual firm; nor does either
literature distinguish between the nature of
the spatial transactions costs faced by the
firm from those production costs which are
location-specific. Finally, in tandem with
both classical and neoclassical location
theory, neither the new economic
geography nor the clusters literature raises
the issue of the hierarchical definition of 
the firm, and the problem of whether
transactions should be external or internal to
the firm. Yet, in discussing the questions of
industrial clustering from a microeconomic
perspective, these are actually the central
issues.
The apparent lack of microeconomic
definition and rigour in both the new
economic geography and the clusters
literature means that there is at present a
whole range of microeconomic problems
which current thinking on agglomeration
and clustering is largely unable to deal with.
The result of this is that terms such as
‘agglomeration’, ‘cluster’, ‘milieux’,
‘localization, ‘complex’ and ‘network’ are
frequently used in much of the modern
geographical literature in a more or less
interchangeable manner, without any real
consideration of the microeconomic
underpinnings of these different concepts. 
It is simply assumed ex ante that clustering
or co-location is beneficial, and this has led
to such arguments being viewed as a
panacea for all regional problems (MARTIN
and SUNLEY, 2001). As such, regional
policies formulated on the basis of these
arguments, which are explicitly intended to
influence firm location behaviour, are often
built on very weak analytical frameworks.
Yet, underlying these various analytical
models there are indeed specific
assumptions concerning the nature of the
firm, its production and organizational
characteristics and the nature of the
transactions costs it faces. Unfortunately,
these assumptions are largely unspecified,
yet from the perspective of location theory, 
it is necessary to make these assumptions
explicit in order to define the terms of
reference within which the location problem
can be set.
The Micro-foundations 
of Industrial Clustering
In order to explain the implicit assumptions
concerning firm interdependencies and
spatial transactions costs which underlie the
various theoretical descriptions of industrial
clustering which are currently popular, it is
necessary to adopt a transactions costs
approach of a type proposed by
WILLIAMSON, 1975. However, in our
geographical-structural framework it is 
not sufficient to distinguish between the
transactions which are internal to or external
to the individual firm, as in the original
Williamsonian framework. In adopting the
methodological approach of classical
location theory it is necessary to distinguish
between the transactions which are
location-specific from those which are not.
In other words, we must explicitly distinguish
between the transactions which are internal
to, and external to, the spatial industrial
cluster. In order to do this we can present
three stylized sets of geography-firm-
industry organizational relationships evident
in situations where firms are clustered 
or co-located (SIMMIE and SENNET, 
1999; GORDON and MCCANN, 2000;
MCCANN, 2001a) which we term the pure
agglomeration model, the industrial complex
model and the social network model. 
These three stylized characterizations of
industrial clusters are distinguished in terms
of the nature of firms in the clusters, the
nature of their relations, and transactions
undertaken within the clusters. What we are
not doing here is presenting a new theory 
of clustering. Rather, our reason for this
characterization is to categorize the different
transactions cost and firm behavioural
assumptions which are implicit in each of 
the various analytical frameworks which are
currently popular. In reality, all spatial clusters
or industrial concentrations will contain
characteristics of one or more of these ideal
types, although one type will tend to be
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ex ante that clustering
or co-location is
beneficial, and this 
has led to such
arguments being viewed
as a panacea for all
regional problems.
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dominant in each cluster. Understanding
what are the dominant features of a
particular cluster is essential in order to 
work out how we are to analyse it either
theoretically or empirically. 
The characteristics of each of the cluster
types are listed in Table 1, and as we see,
the three ideal types of clusters are all quite
different. Firstly, in the model of pure
agglomeration, inter-firm relations are
inherently transient. Firms are essentially
atomistic, in the sense of having no market
power, and they will continuously change
their relations with other firms and
customers in response to market arbitrage
opportunities, thereby leading to intense
local competition. As such, there is no
loyalty between firms, nor are any particular
relations long term. The external benefits of
clustering accrue to all local firms simply by
reason of their local presence. The cost of
membership of this cluster is simply the local
real estate market rent. There are no free
riders, access to the cluster is open, and
consequently it is the growth in the local real
estate rents that is the indicator of the
cluster’s performance. This idealized type 
is best represented by the MARSHALL,
1920, model of agglomeration, as adopted
by the new economic geography models
(KRUGMAN 1991; FUJITA et al., 1999). 
The notion of space in these models 
is essentially urban space, in that this 
type of clustering only exists within 
individual cities. 
Secondly, the industrial complex is
characterized primarily by long-term stable
and predictable relations between the 
firms in the cluster, involving frequent
transactions. This type of cluster is most
commonly observed in industries such a
steel and chemicals, and is the type of
spatial cluster typically discussed by
classical (WEBER, 1909) and neoclassical
(MOSES, 1958) location-production
models, representing a fusion of locational
analysis with input–output analysis (ISARD
and KUENNE, 1953). Component firms
within the spatial grouping each undertake
significant long-term investments,
particularly in terms of physical capital and
local real estate, in order to become part 
of the grouping. Access to the group is
therefore severely restricted both by high
entry and exit costs, and the rationale 
for spatial clustering in these types of
industries is that proximity is required
primarily in order to minimize inter-firm
transport transactions costs. Rental
appreciation is not a feature of the cluster,
because the land which has already 
been purchased by the firms is not for sale.
The notion of space in the industrial complex
is local, but not necessarily urban, and may
extend across a sub-national regional level.
In other words, these types of complexes
can exist either within or far beyond the
boundaries of an individual city, and depend
crucially on transportation costs. 
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Table 1 Industrial clusters
Characteristics Pure agglomeration Industrial complex Social network
Firm size Atomistic Some firms are large Variable
Characteristics of relations Non-identifiable Identifiable Trust
Fragmented Stable and frequent trading Loyalty
Unstable Joint lobbying
Frequent trading Joint ventures
Non-opportunistic
Membership Open Closed Partially open
Access to cluster Rental payments Internal investment History
Location necessary Location necessary Experience
Location necessary but not
sufficient
Space outcomes Rental appreciation No effect on rents Partial rental capitalisation
Example of cluster Competitive urban ecomony Steel or chemicals production New industrial areas
complex
Analytical approaches Models of pure agglomeration Location-production theory Social network theory
Input-output analysis (Granovetter)
Notion of space Urban Local or regional but not urban Local or regional but not urban
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The third type of spatial industrial cluster is
the social network model. This is associated
primarily with the work of GRANOVETTER,
1973, and is a response to the hierarchies
model of WILLIAMSON, 1975. The social
network model argues that mutual trust
relations between key decision-making
agents in different organizations may be at
least as important as decision-making
hierarchies within individual organizations.
These trust relations will be manifested by a
variety of features, such as joint lobbying,
joint ventures, informal alliances and
reciprocal arrangements regarding trading
relationships. However, the central feature 
of such trust relations is an absence of
opportunism, in that individual firms will not
fear reprisals after any reorganization of
inter-firm relations. Trust relations between
key decision makers in different firms are
assumed to reduce inter-firm transactions
costs, because when such trust-based
relations exist, firms do not face the
problems of opportunism. 
This social network model is essentially
aspatial, but from the point of view of
geography, it can be argued that spatial
proximity will tend to foster such trust
relations over a long time-period, thereby
leading to a local business environment of
confidence, risk-taking and cooperation.
Spatial proximity is thus necessary, but not
sufficient to acquire access to the network.
As such, membership of the network is only
partially open, in that local rental payments
will not guarantee access, although they will
improve the chances of access. In this social
network model, space is therefore once
again local, as with the complex, but not
necessarily urban, and often extends over a
sub-national regional level. Once again, in 
this case, both information transactions
costs and transportation costs may play 
a role in determining the importance of
geographical peripherality. The major
geographical manifestation of the social
network is the so-called ‘new industrial
areas’ model (SCOTT, 1988), which has
been used to describe the characteristics
and long-term growth performance of areas
such as the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy
(PIORE and SABEL, 1984; SCOTT, 1988).
As we see, each of these different model
types has a different notion of geography, 
a different notion of the production-
organizational arrangements of the firms,
and a different notion of the transactions
costs faced by the firms. It is important 
for us to be aware of these fundamental
differences, because the techniques that 
we should adopt to analyse each of these
cluster types are quite different. Although in
reality many observed spatial groupings of
activities will exhibit characteristics of more
than one of the stylized characterizations
here, it is still necessary for us to decide
what is the dominant nature of the cluster,
because this will determine the appropriate
empirical technique for us to use. 
For example, the financial services of the
City of London exhibits primarily the
characteristics of the pure agglomeration
model, although there are also some
secondary characteristics associated with
the social network model (GORDON and
MCCANN, 2000). In this case, real estate
capitalization techniques and aggregate
production function methods will probably
be the most appropriate tools of empirical
analysis, supported by various case study
techniques. A second example of this
concerns the PORTER, 1990, 1998,
description of clustering. Although Porter
assumes that the dominant competitive
effects of clustering are mediated by
information flows between firms and
individuals within the urban sphere, the
primary effect of which is to stimulate local
competition by increasing the transparency
associated with competitive improvements,
he also acknowledges that such information
flows are mediated by strong interpersonal
networks which may well extend beyond 
the urban scale in situations where such
trust-relations exist. As such, the clustering
description of PORTER, 1990, 1998, can
also be argued to fit primarily into the pure
agglomeration model but also appears 
to exhibit secondary characteristics
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The financial services 
of the City of London
exhibits primarily the
characteristics of the
pure agglomeration
model.
State of Regional Research NEW  22/10/04  5:05 pm  Page 19
R
eg
io
na
l E
co
no
m
ic
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
tT
he
 R
is
e,
 F
al
l a
nd
 R
is
e 
A
ga
in
 o
f I
nd
us
tri
al
 L
oc
at
io
n 
Th
eo
ry
associated with the social network category.
The empirical techniques used to analyse
the Porter model will therefore be similar to
those used to analyse the City of London.
On the other hand, a third example is the
case of Silicon Glen in Scotland. In this
particular spatial grouping of firms, the
dominant characteristics of the cluster are
that of the industrial complex, with some
secondary aspects of the social network
model embedded within the system. 
Here, traditional location theory techniques 
and input–output analysis will be most
appropriate, allied with some case study
work. In each of these cases, although 
we acknowledge that the spatial industrial
groupings are highly complicated, what 
we are doing is to determine the dominant
characteristics of the inter-firm relationships
in order to determine how we are to most
appropriately analyse the group empirically. 
Logistics Costs
There have been fundamental changes in 
the nature and levels of spatial transactions
costs which have become very evident over
recent years. Yet, rather than reducing the
importance of location problems it can be
argued that in many cases these changes
have actually increased the importance of
location as an economic issue. 
Since the 1980s we have seen dramatic
improvements in the ability of decision
makers and planners to coordinate activities
across space. The primary reasons for these
improvements have been the enormous
technological developments in information
technology, and also the advent of
widespread usage of these technologies.
On the other hand, however, there are 
some other arguments which suggest 
that over time the development of these
information technologies is actually leading
to increases in the costs of transmitting
information across space, thereby increasing
the relative importance of geographical
centrality. The argument here is that an
increase in the quantity, variety and
complexity of information produced itself
increases the costs associated with
transmitting this information across space.
This is because much of the information will
be of a non-standardized tacit nature, and
the transmission of this type of information
essentially requires face-to-face contact. 
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The costs of
geographical distance
are far higher than 
has previously been
supposed.
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Meanwhile, transportation technologies
have improved dramatically over recent
years. Obvious examples of this include 
the growth in roll-on roll-off trucking,
containerization, rapid-turnaround shipping,
and the increased efficiency and frequency
of airline services. On the other hand, the
quantity, variety and complexity of market
information generated in the modern
economy is increasing. This also implies 
that in many industries which involve the
production or shipping of goods across
space, the variety and complexity of the
logistics operations being undertaken will
also increase. 
In production sectors in which the demand
lead-times have fallen dramatically, or
in industries in which the variety and
complexity of information generated has
increased significantly, spatial transactions
costs would appear not to have fallen over
recent decades, and in some cases will
actually have increased. 
On the basis of these arguments it is clearly
necessary for location theory to develop
models which better incorporate issues
such as time, financial costs, delivery speed
and frequency into the location-production
problems than do previous models.  
One direction of this research has focused
on the role played by the total logistics costs
faced by firms producing goods, rather 
than simply the total transport costs that
they face (MCCANN, 1993, 1997, 1998).
This logistics costs approach incorporates
transport costs plus all of the industrial costs
associated with inventory holding within the
classical Weber-Moses type of framework,
and allows for a whole series of new
location-optimization conclusions to be
generated. In particular, we see that the
costs of geographical distance are far higher
than has previously been supposed. This is
because the inventory capital and space
costs faced by firms are co-determined
within the transport cost optimization
problem (MCCANN, 2001b). An outcome 
of this is that firms which produce very high
value-weight ratio products are actually
more sensitive to locational issues than 
are firms producing low value-weight ratio
products. This conclusion is completely
opposite to the perceived wisdom which
assumes that location is largely irrelevant 
for firms producing very high value-weight
ratio goods. Moreover, the logistics-costs
framework also shows that industrial
clustering is often a natural outcome for 
firms producing high value goods, even in
situations in which information spillages 
play no role whatsoever.
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ratio products are
actually more sensitive
to locational issues than
are firms producing low
value-weight ratio
products.
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This extract is taken from State of the
South West 2004, published by the South
West Observatory, and reproduced with
permission.
In this chapter we examine the causes and
implications of the apparent ‘productivity
gap’ between the South West and the more
prosperous UK regions.   
The South West ranked 10th among the UK
Government Office regions, and last among
the English regions, in terms of the standard
productivity measure - GVA per hour worked
- during 2001. Productivity was only around
90% of that for the UK as a whole according
to this measure.
Improvements in ‘productivity’ are at the
centre of the Government’s agenda for
increasing prosperity in the UK and its
regions. Differences in labour productivity
account for most of the differences in
average incomes between the UK and 
its more affluent competitors. Moreover,
‘significant and persistent’ productivity
differences are seen to underlie the long-
term ‘underperformance’ and relatively 
low living standards of some of the UK’s
poorer regions and sub-regions, relative 
to London and the South East of England,
according to HM Treasury in 2001.
Understanding the 
Productivity Gap
Productivity in the South West has been
consistently below that in other English
regions in recent years (Table 14.1), at
around 90% of the level for the UK as a
whole. Regional differences in productivity
have been fairly stable since 1996 (with 
the notable exception of the North East).   
It could be argued that the outstandingly
high productivity levels in London distort 
the UK average. London’s productivity has
been consistently around 20% above the
UK average (and around 50% higher, if GVA
is measured according to the region of 
work (workplace) rather than the region of
residence). Productivity is below the national
average in all other regions except the 
South East and, more recently, the East of
England. Productivity in the South West is
substantially closer to, although still below,
that in the UK outside London.
According to the Treasury, differences in
productivity between regions stem from
differences in five ‘productivity drivers’ –
skills, investment, innovation, enterprise and
competition. Regions do not benefit equally
from these productivity drivers because of
widespread ‘market and coordination’
failures that have prevented the spread of
economic prosperity from the richer to the
poorer parts of the country. Market and
coordination failures arise in the location
decisions of firms and workers which tend 
to reinforce existing regional patterns of
production. These market failures have to 
be addressed if the UK and all of its regions
are to meet their economic potential: 
The challenge for Government is therefore 
to help to tackle these failures, so as to allow
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Productivity in the South West
Eric McVittie
South West Observatory Business 
and Economy Module at the University 
of Plymouth
Productivity in the South West is only around 90% 
of that for the UK as a whole, and this article attempts 
to explore why, when in terms of the Treasury’s five
drivers of productivity the region does not perform
badly. The answer lies in the number of highly-skilled
residents employed outside the region, not employed
at all, or only working part-time. Some of this effect 
is a result of the older population, and peripheral
location, of much of the South West. Written for State
of the South West 2004, this article demonstrates
how local knowledge can help to explain phenomena
apparent in publicly available statistics. 
It could be argued that
the outstandingly high
productivity levels in
London distort the 
UK average.
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those less successful regions to build the
conditions for economic success, whilst
ensuring that more successful regions 
and countries continue to flourish
(HMTREASURY, 2001).
Regional productivity differences are also
likely to be linked to regional differences 
in industry and firm structures. Data for the
UK as a whole show substantial differences
in productivity levels for different industry
groups. Studies at the level of individual
firms also show substantial variations in
productivity between businesses, even
within the same industry group, and related
to factors such as foreign ownership and
firm size. Regions with relatively large shares
of low productivity industries and firms will
tend to have low overall productivity as a
result. We might also expect productivity
levels to be influenced by regional patterns
of ‘functional’ specialisation: i.e. the extent
to which regions are specialised in ‘high-
level’ research & development or managerial
functions as compared with lower level
operational and production functions.
Research into the determinants of
productivity differences among UK regions
is severely hampered by the quality of
available data. There is widespread concern
over the quality of ONS estimates of regional
GVA (as reported in the recent report on the
quality of regional statistics by Christopher
Allsopp). This is, clearly, a major factor in 
the precision of productivity measures. 
This suggests that it may not be sensible 
to read too much into small differences in
measured productivity between regions.
Data problems also limit the sorts of 
analysis that can be carried out in trying to
understand the reasons for any differences. 
The South West also presents a particularly
difficult case. Understanding what is driving
productivity for such a highly diverse region
requires sub-regional analysis, since
economic performance is highly variable
between different areas of the South West.
Data problems are, however, even more
serious at a sub-regional level. These
concerns mean that a definitive analysis 
is not possible at present. 
Nevertheless, the poor productivity
performance of the South West is
somewhat puzzling, since the region 
does not appear to suffer substantial
disadvantage related to any of the 
Treasury’s productivity drivers:
Skills
Workforce skills are widely regarded as
essential to high and growing productivity
levels. Highly skilled workers are more
productive and allow the use of more
sophisticated production processes. 
Highly skilled workers also tend to be more
innovative, and better equipped to exploit
innovations. We would therefore expect
regions with highly skilled workforces to 
be more productive. The South West has,
however, a relatively highly-skilled
population, but has relatively low levels 
of productivity.   
Investment
Investment in physical capital (buildings 
and equipment) expands the productive
resources of an economy and also generally
results in improvements in technology.
However, rates of investment in the South
West (per worker or as a proportion of total
output) match those for the UK as a whole.
The South West does, however, receive
relatively little foreign investment. Foreign-
owned firms tend to be more productive
than their domestically owned competitors,
and their presence may also stimulate higher
productivity in other local businesses.  
Innovation
Innovation relates to the ability of a region 
to find and introduce new products and
processes. We might expect regions with
higher levels of innovation to benefit from
higher levels of productivity (because of
faster access to new and higher value-
added products and processes and
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Table 14.1 Productivity measures: 1996 to 2001, Index (UK = 100)
GVA per filled job GVA per hour worked
1996 2000 2001 1996 2000 2001
South West 91.3 91.2 89.1 89.4 92.2 90.2
England 100.4 101.0 101.3 100.3 101.0 101.2
Source: ONS Productivity, Q2 2003
Nevertheless, the 
poor productivity
performance of 
the South West is
somewhat puzzling,
since the region 
does not appear to 
suffer substantial
disadvantage related 
to any of the Treasury’s
productivity drivers.
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added activity) and faster rates of
productivity growth. It must be borne in
mind, however, that new ideas may flow 
fairly freely between regions, reducing 
the advantages to innovating regions. 
One measure of the extent of innovative
activity is expenditure on Research &
Development (R&D) as a percentage of total
regional output (GVA). The South West
matches the UK as a whole according to this
measure, although a relatively small share 
of R&D in the South West is undertaken by
businesses, rather than by government 
or universities. Overall, however, it seems
unlikely that low levels of R&D are the primary
cause of the South West’s productivity gap.
Enterprise
Enterprise is normally measured by rates 
of new business formation (as indicated by
VAT registrations). There are substantial, and
relatively stable, differences in start-up rates
across UK regions, with business start-ups
particularly concentrated in the higher
productivity regions: London and the South
East. However, the South West also has a
relatively high rate of business start-ups, 
and a relatively large stock of VAT-registered
businesses.   
Competition
It is widely accepted that healthy competition
acts as a spur to high levels of productivity
and productivity growth. The extent of
competition facing a particular firm will
depend on the number of firms selling similar
products and on the ease with which new
firms can enter the market. Firms selling
widely-traded products will face similar levels
of competition, regardless of where they 
are located. Some products (and particularly
services) which are difficult to transport will,
however, have localised markets and the
extent of competition will vary between
areas. It is plausible that competitive
pressures will be stronger in and around
larger cities, where there are more actual
(and potential) suppliers for any given
product. However, the importance of these
influences for productivity differences
between the UK regions is not known.
The South West economy’s poor
productivity performance cannot be easily
explained in terms of the five ‘productivity
drivers’. A more detailed analysis does,
however, suggest some possible
explanations, related to the region’s
geography and the extent to which its
economy utilizes the skills of its workforce. 
Productivity and skills
Workforce skills are widely regarded as being
central to economic productivity and so to
general prosperity. This raises particular
issues for the South West, which appears 
to be relatively highly skilled.   
Research by the University of Plymouth
(MCVITTIE, 2003) attempted to identify the
role, if any, of skills in determining the South
West’s productivity gap (…) by constructing 
a skills or human capital index based on
qualifications (or other skills indicators) valued
according to the earnings they receive within
the labour market. The South West Economy
Centre constructed a skills index for each of
the UK regions and sub-regions, based on
the average earnings potential in the UK
labour market of each region’s population,
labour force, and workforce relative to the
earnings of low skilled workers. The index
takes account of qualifications, work
experience and a variety of other personal
attributes such as gender, race and health
status.  
The results of this analysis suggest that the
South West has a relatively highly-skilled
population, but that the region’s high skilled
individuals are less likely to be employed
(and are more likely to be employed 
part-time if employed) than similar individuals
in most other regions. In addition, very
highly-skilled individuals were slightly more
likely to be employed outside the South West
(particularly in London and the South East)
than were lower-skilled residents.  
The effect of this was that, whilst the 
average skill level of South West residents is
relatively high, the average skill level of those
individuals who are actually employed within
the South West is lower, and lower than that
of the UK as a whole. This pattern appears 
to be related to the demographic structure 
of the South West’s workforce. Much of the
region’s skills base, or ‘human capital’, is in
the brains and hands of older residents, who
are more likely to be economically inactive or
to work shorter hours.  
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Overall, this analysis suggests that
differences in skills levels explain some 
of the measured productivity differences
between the UK regions, and between the
sub-regions of the South West. Regions
with more skilled workforces do, in general,
have higher productivity levels.   
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Fig. 14.1  Skills indices: 2003
Source: McVittie, E. (2003) Productivity in the South West of England, University of Plymouth.
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Geography and Productivity
An analysis for English sub-regions indicates
that average skills levels tend to decline from
North East to South West across the South
West, and that under-employment of skilled
workers tended to increase.  
The pattern of skills and productivity
observed within the South West – with 
both declining from north east to the south
west – is mirrored in other parts of the UK. 
In general, productivity levels are higher in
and around major cities and lower in more
rural and peripheral areas.    
Large cities are widely recognised as
‘engines of economic activity’. Productivity
may be higher in cities due to savings in
transport and communications costs for
products, inputs and ideas. Concentrated
markets for goods, services and workers
reduce search costs, increase competition
and improve the quality of matches between
buyers and sellers, thus allowing more
efficient utilization of available resources.
These advantages are likely to be more
significant for more specialized products
and skills, thus ensuring a relatively high
concentration of high value-added activities
and high-skilled workers in the larger urban
centres. The dominant performance of the
London economy illustrates this most
clearly, but other provincial cities reap similar
advantages if on a much smaller scale.   
Most parts of the South West are relatively
distant from large cities, with the far south
western counties being especially far
removed. According to a ‘proximity index’
based on the size of population centres in
each county and their distance from other
population centres throughout England (in
terms of either journey times or miles), the 
far south western counties are amongst the
most peripheral in England. Cornwall is the
most peripheral English county on the journey
time measure (out of 46), with Devon 2nd most
peripheral and Dorset 5th. Even the north
western counties were around the middle 
of this ranking. Areas which are nearer to
population centres tend to have more highly
skilled workforces and to pay higher wages
(suggesting higher productivity levels).
Another notable feature of the far south
western counties is that they have very small
local labour markets. Although Bristol is the
8th largest TTWA (Travel to Work Area) in the
UK (after London, Manchester, Birmingham,
Slough & Woking, Glasgow, Edinburgh and
Tyneside), other local labour markets within
the region are relatively small. The median
size of British TTWAs is around 29,000
employee jobs (ONS Annual Business
Inquiry), and around 96% of all jobs were 
in TTWAs of above median size. 
By contrast, only 16 of the South West’s 
51 TTWAs were above the median for the
country as a whole, and these contained
slightly less than three quarters of the region’s
jobs. Indeed, the region has 21 of the 100
smallest TTWAs in Britain, with 16 of these in
Devon and Cornwall. The size of local labour
markets may be important for productivity 
in that larger labour markets permit higher
quality matches between workers and jobs
and may also generate training benefits.
Certainly, there is evidence of positive
relationships within the UK between size 
of TTWAs, skills and earnings.
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Areas which are nearer
to population centres
tend to have more
highly skilled
workforces and to 
pay higher wages.
HM TREASURY (2001) Productivity in the UK 3: 
The regional dimension. HM Treasury, London.
MCVITTIE (2003) Productivity in the South West of
England. University of Plymouth.
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Closing the Regional Equity Gap?
A Critique of the Department of Trade and Industry’s 
Regional Venture Capital Funds Initiative
Colin M. Mason and Richard T. Harrison
Hunter Centre for Entrepreneurship, University of Strathclyde; 
and Centre for Entrepreneurship Research, Edinburgh University
Management School
Differences Between Private Firms Owned by Novice, Serial
and Portfolio Entrepreneurs: Implications for Policy Makers 
and Practitioners
Paul Westhead, Deniz Ucbasaran and Mike Wright
Institute for Enterprise and Innovation, Nottingham University
Business School
Small 
Business and
Entrepreneurship
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This extract was taken from an article
originally published in Regional Studies
(37.8 855-868), Journal of the Regional
Studies Association and is reproduced
here with the permission of the Publisher,
Taylor & Francis Ltd.
Further information on the Regional
Studies Association, and the Regional
Studies journal, is available online from
www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk. 
The government’s intention is to create a
minimum of nine regionally based funds
in England (i.e. at least one in each RDA
region). Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland already have their own mechanisms
for venture capital support (DTI, 1999b; 
see HOOD, 2000, for an account of the
development of public sector support for
venture capital in Scotland). These funds 
will specialize in making investments in
amounts of less than £500,000: they are
permitted to invest up to £250,000 as an
initial investment in a company and may
subsequently invest up to an additional
£250,000 in follow-on funding. They will also
be required to observe certain conditions
relating to the types and mix of investment
instruments (primarily in the form of equity)
and certain industry sectors are excluded
(DTI, 1999b).
The rationale for this initiative is the belief
that many SMEs are prevented from
exploiting growth opportunities because
appropriate funding is not available. Young,
fast-growing SMEs typically have negative
cash flows in their early years of trading 
as a result of the need to: invest in R&D,
product development and testing; acquire
facilities and key equipment; recruit staff;
spend on raw materials, components, sales
and marketing; and build up inventory.
Indeed, the faster the company grows the
greater the cash flow problems that it is likely
to encounter (BINKS and ENNEW, 1996).
Such businesses would find it difficult to
service loan repayments. Accordingly,
banks are reluctant to lend, particularly if
there are no personal or business assets
available to serve as collateral. In the event
that a loan is made available, the need to
service this debt imposes a burden on a
company which may restrict its ability to
grow. Adding to the existing cash outflows
may also create a source of potential
financial instability that could threaten the
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Closing the Regional Equity Gap? A Critique
of the Department of Trade and Industry’s
Regional Venture Capital Funds Initiative
Colin M. Mason and Richard T. Harrison
Hunter Centre for Entrepreneurship,
University of Strathclyde; and Centre for
Entrepreneurship Research, Edinburgh
University Management School
Do new SMEs have difficulty obtaining finance to fund
their expansion? This article argues that to the extent
that they do, it is amongst those looking for between
a quarter of a million and a million pounds. So-called
‘business angels’ offer a good supply of capital to 
new SMEs looking for under a quarter of a million
pounds that isn’t recognised in British Venture Capital
Association statistics, as well as skills in assisting 
new ventures. Business angels, the article argues,
often complain that rather than there being a problem
with the supply of venture capital, there aren’t enough
attractive ventures to invest in.
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viability of the business in the event of any
downturn in its trading position. By taking an
equity position, venture capital is likely to be
a much more appropriate form of financing
for businesses where the degree of risk and
the potential rewards are both high or where
the available assets do not provide the
desired security for providers of loan
finance. However, it is widely believed that
there is a lack of venture capital for SMEs 
at their start-up and early growth stages 
and evidence of unsatisfied demand for
external equity amongst growth-oriented
SMEs (BANK OF ENGLAND, 2001, p. 43).
The Cruikshank Report on competition in
the UK banking sector concluded that:
‘there is clearly a mismatch between the
needs of firms requesting small scale equity
investments and the supply of these
investments. Venture capital deals tend to
be too large and business angel finance is
underdeveloped. This gives rise to the long
recognized market failure known as the
‘‘equity gap’’ ’ (CRUIKSHANK, 2000,
chapter 6).
On this evidence the case for supporting 
the establishment of regional venture 
capital funds may seem to be compelling. 
However, we remain to be convinced. 
Are there sufficient ‘classic’
venture capital skills?
The Consultative Document emphasizes
that it will only support funds that are
managed by ‘fund managers with
experience of successful investment in 
the equity gap’. This is because it is ‘only 
by utilizing proven experience will funds
stand a strong chance of attracting private
investment and succeeding in making
positive returns for those investors’ (DTI,
1999b, para. 2.1). Evidence from other
contexts suggests that relevant fund
management expertise is crucial. 
Providing finance to new and young
entrepreneurial companies is just one 
part of what classic venture capitalists do. 
Their effectiveness is ultimately contingent
upon the value-added inputs and support
services that venture capitalists can provide
either directly or through their networks
(FLORIDA and KENNEY, 1988). One early
stage venture capitalist interviewed by
HARRIS and BOVAIRD, 1996, p. 192,
commented that whereas later stage
investors ‘usually succeed through good
deal selection – [only] thirty per cent of our
success comes from this, the other seventy
per cent comes from managing the deal
afterwards’. (…) Specifically, classic venture
capitalists bring a wide range of business
skills and resources, both directly and
indirectly via their networks, to their investee
companies, and have a significantly closer
involvement than venture capitalists who
specialize in later stage investments.
Moreover, companies seeking early stage
venture capital typically want ‘smart money’
(CRESSY and OLOFSSON, 1997;
LINDSTROM and OLOFSSON, 2001) from
investors who can contribute value-added
skills that will help the business to grow. 
However, such competence is based on
experience; classic venture capitalists
cannot be hired straight out of MBA courses
or consulting firms, so there is limited scope
for quickly increasing the supply of classic
venture capital skills. Moreover, experienced
venture capitalists with classic investing
skills are unlikely to be attracted to the
Regional Enterprise Funds because of this
unattractive level of remuneration. In these
circumstances, and given that there is a
considerable degree of political capital
invested in this initiative, there is a risk that
fund managers will be appointed whose
competence is predominantly in financial
engineering and who have little ability to
provide these value-added skills to support
young growing firms, or even to identify 
promising new and early stage ventures. 
Two possible outcomes are likely to follow.
The first is a poor investment performance.
HARRIS and BOVAIRD’s, 1996, detailed
study of early stage venture capital firms
concludes that attempts to provide finance
without support to investee businesses is
likely to result in failure. The second – which
may follow from the first – is a concentration
on investments where such investors have a
greater ‘comfort’. The experience of other
funds that have been established with
similar remits to close regional equity gaps
(e.g. Midland/HSBC Enterprise Funds,
Hambros Northern Ireland Fund) reinforces
this pessimism, in that they have been
subject to significant degrees of ‘investment
drift’, making progressively larger
investments and seeking out businesses
with an established track-record. Indeed, in
the context of the Regional Venture Capital
Funds initiative, there is some concern that
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Classic venture
capitalists cannot be
hired straight out of
MBA courses or
consulting firms, so
there is limited scope
for quickly increasing
the supply of classic
venture capital skills. 
It is widely believed 
that there is a lack of
venture capital for
SMEs at their start-up
and early growth stages
and evidence of
unsatisfied demand for
external equity amongst
growth-oriented SMEs.
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one consequence of the investment of
public monies in the funds, and the
consequent need for fund managers to 
be accountable for the use to which it is
put, will be to encourage even more risk
averse behaviour, with the result that there
will be much less likelihood of investment 
at seed stage (ALLEN, 2001, p. 86). 
The greatest repository of classic venture
capital skills in the UK is found in the
business angel community. Their
aggregate investment performance is 
at least as good as that of early stage
venture capital funds (MASON and
HARRISON, 2002b). Accordingly, a more
appropriate approach would have been 
to invite business angel syndicates that
have a degree of formal organization and
can meet the requirements of financial
probity to tender for the management of 
these funds.
Can regional enterprise funds
achieve financial viability?
The government’s intention is that
ultimately the public sector will be able 
to withdraw its support from the funds
having demonstrated the viability of early
stage venture capital investing, leaving 
the private sector to invest in such funds
without further support. In other words,
regional enterprise funds are expected to
achieve financial viability in due course.
MURRAY, 1999, argues that the critical
factor in achieving financial viability is fund
size. The funds will vary in size, ranging
from £15 million in the North East to £50
million in London (Financial Times, 2001).
The funds in the North West and South
East are each of £30 million (EDGE, 2001). 
MURRAY, 1999, estimates that the
minimum viable size for a specialist
technology-focused early stage venture
capital fund is approximately £20 million.
Conversely, a fund with less than £15
million under management will encounter
significant difficulties in generating
commercial returns, even with a 2:1
government leverage. The small size of
early stage funds creates a number of
sources of vulnerability (ibid.):
• Their small size means that they can only
make a limited number of investments.
The narrow spread of investments
increases risk because of limited
diversification.
• The fund may be unable to provide
follow-on finance to those firms in their
portfolios that require a second (and
subsequent) round of investment
(probably successful and consequently
cash consuming investee companies),
either because they have run out of 
money or because of constraints on the
proportion of the fund that is invested in
one company. In such circumstances the
fund will need to invite a larger fund as 
co-investor. However, the fund will be in 
a weak bargaining position and may have
to accept a low equity revaluation and
consequent dilution of its original
investment (MURRAY, 1994a). 
• There is a strong probability that the funds
will run out of money before they can
‘harvest’ their existing investment
portfolio, but without an investment 
track-record are unlikely to be able to raise
additional finance from private investors. 
The management costs involved in
running a venture capital fund creates a
further difficulty for small funds to achieve
financial viability. These costs are paid out
of the capital that the fund has raised from
its investors: because many of the costs
are fixed, this means that the smaller the
fund the greater the proportion of the
capital raised that is accounted for by
these costs.
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The greatest repository
of classic venture
capital skills in the UK 
is found in the business
angel community.
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Aiming at the wrong target
The creation of Regional Venture Capital
Funds is based on the government’s 
view that there is ‘a market failure in the
provision of finance in amounts below
£500,000 for SMEs with growth
aspirations’ (DTI, 1999b, para. 1.11).
However, this view is based on the
assumption that the statistics on
investment activity published by the BVCA
provide a comprehensive coverage of
venture capital activity in the UK. In fact,
the supply of ‘classic’ venture capital
is much greater than reflected by the
BVCA’s statistics. 
First, by only reporting the investments 
of fund managers who are full members 
of the BVCA and who respond to the
request for investment statistics, it
excludes a significant amount of small-
scale investment activity which typically
goes unreported.
Second, BVCA statistics also under-report
corporate venture capital investments.
Although investments made by
companies in venture capital funds are
included, minority investments by large
companies directly in small businesses 
are not counted.
Third, the BVCA does not monitor
investments made by business angels.
However, this is an extremely significant
source of funding for businesses seeking
small amounts of finance. It is impossible
to accurately assess the scale of business
angel investing because of the invisible
nature of most of their investment activity.
MASON and HARRISON, 2000, have
estimated that there are between 20,000
and 40,000 business angels in the UK
who invest £0·5 billion and £1·0 billion
annually in 3,000–6,000 companies.
Moreover, there is considerable potential
to expand the level of investment activity
amongst active business angels, as 
most say that they cannot find enough
investment opportunities (MASON and
HARRISON, 1999; 2001), and to increase
the population of business angels
(MASON and HARRISON, 1993). 
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The supply of ‘classic’
venture capital is much
greater than reflected
by the BVCA’s statistics.
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The DTI’s proposal to establish regional
venture capital funds is therefore based on
an inaccurate view of the market for early
stage venture capital. The availability of
small amounts of early stage venture capital
is much greater than indicated by BVCA
statistics. Although it is impossible to
accurately assess the true size of this
market, the evidence from Scotland
suggests that the scale of early stage
venture capital investment activity may be
four times that reported in BVCA statistics,
with business angels, on account of their
low, and limited sensitivity to, transaction
costs, supplying much of this finance.
However, below £250,000 the supply 
of venture capital is unorganized and
uncoordinated and so this market suffers
from high information asymmetries.
Amounts in excess of £1 million are also
well-served by venture capital funds
because of the potential for attractive
commercial returns (HARDING, 1999).
Thus, the real equity gap is for amounts 
in the £250,000 to £1 million range rather
than for amounts of under £250,000 which
are effectively met by business angels and
small venture capital funds. Moreover, the
existence of this gap is threatening the
viability of the sub-£250,000 investors. 
For example, the Chief Executive of one of
the University Challenge Funds has noted 
a substantial problem in trying to secure
follow-on funding from the investment
community for its portfolio of companies
(CONNECT, 2002).
The implication is that the Regional
Enterprise Funds are aiming at the wrong
target. The real need is for an expansion of
suppliers providing amounts in the
£250,000 to £1 million range rather than
providing smaller amounts which are
effectively met by business angels and small
venture capital funds. Furthermore, although
the initiative is designed to operate with the
same conditions, in terms of investment
ceilings, in all regions, there is evidence
(HARDING, 1999; ALLEN, 2001) that the
‘equity gap’ may vary regionally (with a figure
of £1 million plus in Greater London and £2
million plus in the South East being quoted).
If so, the impact of the initiative on closing
the perceived equity gap will vary regionally:
a regionally-differentiated problem calls for 
a regionally-differentiated solution. 
Failure to address demand
side constraints
The proposal to establish regional enterprise
funds is based on the assumption that the
equity gap reflects supply side problems.
The DTI’s Consultative Document cites
evidence on unsatisfied demand for external
equity-based investment which is attributed
to supply side constraints (DTI, 1999b, 
para. 1.7). The possibility that the equity 
gap reflects demand-side deficiencies is
never considered. However, studies of UK
business angels consistently report that they
are unable to find sufficient investment
opportunities (COVENEY and MOORE,
1998; MASON and HARRISON, 1999,
2001, 2002c). In other words, early stage
investors are opportunity constrained.
Some existing early stage funds also report
an over-supply of finance (HARDING, 1999).
For example, East of Scotland Investments
(ESI), a £7 million venture capital fund set 
up to address Scotland’s low business 
birth rate, has returned £1·5 million to its
investors because it has been unable to 
find sufficient investment ready companies
which justify investment (The Scotsman, 26
September 2001). This suggests that simply
increasing the supply of finance may have
little or no effect on reducing the equity gap. 
There are three aspects to demand side
constraints. First, the population of
businesses capable of generating the
returns that are sought by venture capital
investors is relatively small in the UK. 
The 37 country Global Enterprise Monitor
(GEM) report for 2002 indicates that
entrepreneurial activity in the UK is about
two-thirds of that achieved by the most
entrepreneurial OECD nations (HARDING,
2002) and is manifest in a lower business
start-up rate and a smaller proportion of
rapidly growing businesses. Moreover,
regional variations in business start-up 
and growth (KEEBLE and WALKER, 1994)
mean that in some regions the demand 
for venture capital will be particularly low.
Second, although harder to quantify, there 
is a high level of equity aversion amongst
SMEs (HOWORTH, 2001). This means 
that entrepreneurs either forgo significant
growth in order to retain 100% ownership 
of their business or else they seek to grow
on the basis of either insufficient finance 
or inappropriate forms of finance, often 
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The Regional Enterprise
Funds are aiming at 
the wrong target. 
The real need is for an
expansion of suppliers
providing amounts in
the £250,000 to 
£1million range.
UK business angels
consistently report that
they are unable to find
sufficient investment
opportunities.
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with disastrous consequences. Third, a
significant proportion of the SMEs which put
themselves forward as candidates for equity
capital are unsuccessful in raising venture
capital because they are not investment
ready (MASON and HARRISON, 2001;
DOUGLAS and SHEPHERD, 2002). 
This describes projects which may intuitively
have merit but which are either not
sufficiently developed or are inappropriately
structured to be taken forward by investors.
The clear implication is that simply creating
pools of venture capital will not, of itself, lead
to an increase in the amount of early stage
venture capital that is invested. Indeed, the
likely effect of creating an additional supply
of early stage venture capital, operating on a
less than fully commercial basis as a result of
government financial support, in a situation
in which there is a restricted supply of viable,
high potential businesses, will be to create
distortions in the market which over the
longer term could drive out existing private
sector venture investors.
A supply side approach is therefore
insufficient to solve the equity gap. 
The proposal to support regional venture
capital funds requires to be complemented
by initiatives that address these demand-
side constraints. In addition to the range 
of initiatives that were flagged up in the
Competitiveness White Paper to promote
entrepreneurship (DTI, 1998) there is a
specific need for expertise on how to
become ‘investment ready’ to be made
available to SMEs. This need has been
belatedly recognized by government (HM
TREASURY/ SMALL BUSINESS SERVICE,
2001). In 2002 the Small Business Service
funded six investment ready demonstration
projects. In due course these will be
evaluated in order to inform and shape 
the design of any future national rollout of 
an investment ready programme (SMALL
BUSINESS SERVICE, 2001a). However,
there are serious concerns that the scope 
of investment readiness, and the form that
intervention should take, are not fully
understood (MASON and HARRISON,
2001). 
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This extract was taken from an article
originally published in Regional Studies
(37.2 187-200), Journal of the Regional
Studies Association and is reproduced
here with the permission of the Publisher,
Taylor & Francis Ltd. 
Further information on the Regional
Studies Association, and the Regional
Studies journal, is available online from
www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk.
The entrepreneurial process involving all the
functions, activities and actions associated
with the perception of opportunities
(BYGRAVE and HOFER, 1991), and the
ownership of organisations to pursue them,
has generated considerable interest from
academics as well as policy makers and
practitioners (GAVRON et al.,1998). 
It is widely believed that the entrepreneurial
function is a vital component in the process
of economic growth (BAUMOL, 1968;
CASSON, 1982; REYNOLDS et al., 1994).
This viewpoint is supported by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). In 1998, the OECD
published a document entitled Fostering
Entrepreneurship which stated that: 
Entrepreneurship is central to the
functioning of market economies.
Entrepreneurs are agents of change and
growth in a market economy and they 
can act to accelerate the generation,
dissemination and application of innovative
ideas. In doing so, they not only ensure that
efficient use is made of resources, but also
expand the boundaries of economic activity.
(p. 12)
The promotion of entrepreneurship is 
also seen as a means of combating
unemployment and poverty (STOREY, 
1982, 1994). 
Policy makers and practitioners seeking 
to raise the total stock of businesses
(SCOTTISH ENTERPRISE, 1993, 1994) 
are increasingly recognizing that habitual
entrepreneurs (i.e. entrepreneurs with prior
business ownership experience) own a
sizeable proportion of new business start-
ups. Studies conducted in the UK have
highlighted that the proportion of habitual
entrepreneurs reported ranged from 12% 
to 36%, with the proportion in Scotland
being at the lower end of this range (i.e. 12%
and 15% reported by CROSS, 1981, and
TUROK and RICHARDSON, 1989). SCOTT
and ROSA, 1996, have asserted that
habitual entrepreneurs need to be
considered as an important sub-group of
entrepreneurs who make a fundamental
contribution to the process of wealth
creation in society. Resources may be more
effectively utilized if they were targeted
towards this group of entrepreneurs, rather
than in the form of additional initiatives to
increase the pool of pure nascent
entrepreneurs (i.e. individuals considering
business ownership for the first time) and
novice entrepreneurs (i.e. with no prior
business ownership experience).
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Novice, Serial and Portfolio Entrepreneurs:
Implications for Policy Makers and Practitioners
Paul Westhead, Deniz Ucbasaran and Mike Wright
Institute for Enterprise and Innovation, Nottingham
University Business School
How best to increase the number of successful
businesses in UK society? The answer might not, 
this article argues, come from trying to persuade more
people to start businesses. Successful entrepreneurs
are often those who have owned more than one
business at a time, and these might be the best 
focus of policy. Experienced entrepreneurs looking 
to start a third or fourth business are more likely to 
be successful than those considering starting a first
business. Those who have already started their first
businesses should be helped by business survival
policies, and encouraged to bring more experienced
entrepreneurs on-board as equity partners.
Habitual entrepreneurs
need to be considered
as an important 
sub-group of
entrepreneurs who
make a fundamental
contribution to the
process of wealth
creation in society.
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Policy makers and practitioners have
assisted the supply of entrepreneurs and the
development of firms through the provision
of two broad inputs to businesses – ‘hard’
(i.e. financial) and ‘soft’ (i.e. technical
support to enhance the skills or capabilities
of entrepreneurs) assistance to firms
(BRIDGE et al., 1998). Habitual and novice
entrepreneurs may differ with respect to
both their initial access to finance and their
capabilities to exploit their business
opportunity. From the outset, it needs to be
recognized that habitual entrepreneurs are
not a homogeneous group. Some habitual
entrepreneurs may own multiple businesses
simultaneously (i.e. portfolio entrepreneurs)
which may provide access to wider sources
of finance and involve differing kinds of skills.
Other habitual entrepreneurs may own
multiple businesses sequentially (i.e. serial
entrepreneurs), and may have been
successful or have failed in their previous
business (WRIGHT et al., 1998). To inform
the development of policy towards 
different types of entrepreneur, systematic
information is required surrounding their
differential access to initial financial
resources and their different capabilities.
Policy makers and practitioners also require
information on output measures relating to
the size and performance of firms owned by
the three types of entrepreneurs. Individuals
contemplating differential support for
different types of entrepreneur require
information relating to the similarities and
differences among novice, serial and
portfolio entrepreneurs.
Policy makers and practitioners need 
to more fully appreciate the resources,
behaviour and needs of various types of
entrepreneurs, when they are formulating
policies to encourage new firm formation
and business development (WESTHEAD
and WRIGHT, 1999). This study has
detected that portfolio entrepreneurs 
have more diverse experience and more
resources than either serial or novice
entrepreneurs. (…) On average, portfolio
entrepreneurs may offer more attractive
growth prospects than other entrepreneurs.
Financiers may seek to target ‘hard’ financial
support to independent businesses with
regard to the prior business ownership
experience of the owner(s). Presented
evidence suggests that they need to
consider the provision of ‘soft’ assistance
because of concerns about the ability 
of some experienced entrepreneurs 
(i.e. serial entrepreneurs) to identify a
potentially successful investment the
second time around.
Portfolio entrepreneurs were more likely to
exhibit several competencies that provide
greater understanding surrounding why 
and how they own several businesses 
at the same time. The fact that portfolio
entrepreneurs own more than one business
may explain their greater focus on
managerial competence and human 
capital resources than serial or novice
entrepreneurs. At the start of the surveyed
business, they had significantly more equity
partners than novice or serial entrepreneurs.
Portfolio entrepreneurs also gave greater
importance than novice or serial
entrepreneurs to the following organizational
capabilities: innovation; cost reduction;
product/service differentiation; and business
growth. They emphasized the importance 
of investing heavily in R&D; increasing
employee and operations productivity 
and efficiency; strict quality control; using
novel marketing techniques; and growth
through acquisitions. Moreover, portfolio
entrepreneurs may develop synergistic
relationships between the ventures they 
own to gain competitive advantages for
individual ventures (ROSA, 1998). Portfolio
entrepreneurs can utilize this distinct
advantage to ensure the survival and
development of ventures they own. 
Portfolio entrepreneurs reported higher
percentage growth of sales as well as 
full-time and absolute employment growth
than novice and serial entrepreneurs. 
A skewed pattern of absolute employment
growth was particularly prevalent in
businesses owned by portfolio
entrepreneurs. This evidence suggests
policy makers and practitioners need to 
be aware that relatively few entrepreneurs
have the inclination, or the ability, to be
significant wealth creators.
Presented evidence suggests that there is 
a case to target policy assistance towards
portfolio entrepreneurs, if the objective 
of policy is to maximize returns on
investments. These individuals are relatively
easy to identify. Policy makers and
practitioners may divert scarce resources
away from inexperienced entrepreneurs,
who own under-performing businesses,
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Policy makers and
practitioners need to 
be aware that relatively
few entrepreneurs have
the inclination, or the
ability, to be significant
wealth creators.
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towards portfolio entrepreneurs with
potential to generate jobs. Evidence
suggests that there is a need to encourage
inexperienced novice entrepreneurs to 
take-up and exhibit the methods of best
business practice displayed by experienced
habitual entrepreneurs, particularly portfolio
entrepreneurs. Rather than ‘blanket
support’ available to all entrepreneurs,
irrespective of their need or ability, there 
is a case to target entrepreneurs with
potential who face barriers to business
development that can be addressed by
appropriate and sensitive ‘soft’ professional
external support. 
Support targeted towards serial
entrepreneurs who have held equity stakes
in businesses that have closed, but have
surmounted their personal difficulties to
subsequently own a successful venture,
may encourage other serial entrepreneurs 
to have another (more successful) foray 
as an equity stakeholder in a venture. 
There is some evidence that suggests 
that individuals may learn more from ‘failure’ 
than ‘success’ (SITKIN, 1992). A further
policy initiative would be to provide both
serial and portfolio entrepreneurs with 
‘hard’ financial incentives through changes
in the tax regime. These changes would
seek to encourage the investment of 
profits, or funds realized from the sale of 
a business, into subsequent ventures with
growth potential.
Policy makers and practitioners seeking 
to encourage wealth creation, as well as
addressing social and regional inequality,
may seek to target serial entrepreneurs 
who require external support to address 
the liabilities associated with owning a
previously unsuccessful venture, and 
who can learn from their prior business
ownership failure. Serial entrepreneurs
generally own younger firms than other
entrepreneurs, and these organizations 
may be associated with the ‘liabilities of
newness’. Initiatives should be designed 
to ameliorate the problems faced by owners
of newer organizations. Policy makers
should consider why serial entrepreneurs
repeatedly exit from their businesses.
Repeated exit may be a signal of an
entrepreneur’s willingness to establish new
ventures (STOKES and BLACKBURN,
2002). It may also signal that this
entrepreneur has insufficient managerial
skills and resources to grow a business. 
By communicating with serial entrepreneurs
who are seeking sales and employment
growth from their ventures, policy makers
and practitioners can consider providing
targeted support to address their 
specific needs.
To increase the stock of businesses in a local
community, policy makers and practitioners
can introduce measures that encourage 
the survival and development of existing
businesses owned by novice and habitual
entrepreneurs, rather than trying to identify
(and support) nascent entrepreneurs who
are likely to have a high probability of owning
businesses that close within three years of
operation. If a business survival policy is
pursued, it is critical that resources are
targeted to entrepreneurs (and businesses)
with significant growth potential, rather than
ensuring the survival of a large number 
of uncompetitive businesses which will 
close after the period of subsidy, because 
a market cannot be found for their goods 
or services.
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Policy makers and
practitioners may divert
scarce resources away
from inexperienced
entrepreneurs, who 
own under-performing
businesses, towards
portfolio entrepreneurs
with potential to
generate jobs.
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Policy makers and practitioners need to
appreciate that some entrepreneurs go 
into business with only one business idea.
Unlike habitual entrepreneurs, novice
entrepreneurs cannot draw upon their 
prior business ownership experience. 
Policy makers and practitioners should
consider introducing schemes that address
the following obstacles to business
development highlighted by inexperienced
novice entrepreneurs. 
First, since there is evidence from elsewhere
that businesses associated with higher levels
of initial capitalization have a higher
probability of business survival (BRÜDERL et
al., 1992), and from our survey that novice
entrepreneurs invest significantly less initial
capital, some ‘hard’ financial initiatives 
may be appropriate for novice as opposed 
to portfolio entrepreneurs. 
Second, inexperienced novice
entrepreneurs seeking to address hurdles 
to business formation and development
need to consider the team aspect of
business ownership. With reference to total
amounts of initial finance invested, novice
entrepreneurs, on average, invested more
external rather than internal finance. It can 
be reasonably inferred that firms owned by
inexperienced novice entrepreneurs were
initially more highly geared. If owners of
highly geared firms are unable to keep up
with the interest repayments, their firms may
be associated with markedly higher closure
rates than firms that have utilized more
internal finance. To address this issue, 
novice entrepreneurs should seek to identify
additional equity partners who can provide
resources as well as entrepreneurial and
managerial capabilities. A number of
inexperienced novice entrepreneurs should
consider ‘selling’ some of their good ideas 
to experienced habitual entrepreneurs, to
ensure that they are converted in businesses
that generate real wealth for the ‘teams’ 
of owners. 
Third, there is a need to encourage novice
entrepreneurs to focus upon the following
organizational capabilities highlighted by
habitual entrepreneurs: the need to grow the
business using internal profits, to focus upon
new product/service development and lower
production costs via process innovation.
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Novice entrepreneurs
should seek to identify
additional equity
partners who can
provide resources as
well as entrepreneurial
and managerial
capabilities.
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Reproduced with permission from
Hidden Unemployment in the East
Midlands, a report for the East 
Midlands Observatory. 
A simple and widely accepted way of
portraying the intra-regional variation 
[in employment] in the East Midlands 
is as a ‘North/South divide’: 
• The North is mainly characterised by
higher than average levels of claimant
unemployment and labour market
detachment, lower wages and incomes,
older housing, slower jobs growth in
buoyant sectors, concentrations of
deprivation, and overall a relatively 
high degree of labour market slack. 
• The South features higher than average
employment rates, faster jobs growth
(especially in services), an occupational
structure more biased towards higher level
non-manual occupations, more complex
commuting patterns, greater prosperity,
more expensive better quality housing,
some planning restrictions which may
thwart the nature and location of further
development, and a tight labour market. 
The grouping of districts (…) provides a
fuller picture of intra-regional variation:
• Cities - the three main cities ( Nottingham,
Leicester, Derby ) may have seen recent
employment growth but this has occurred
alongside continuing unemployment and
deprivation. New jobs have often drawn 
in people with the requisite skills and
attributes from a wider catchment 
area rather than from the local resident
labour force. 
• Suburban – this group encompasses 
the main areas of private housing on 
the fringes of the three main cities. 
The residents of these areas tend to be
more prosperous than average and more
mobile in their search for work. While the
local economic base of these areas may
be fairly weak, the suburbs provide good
access to opportunities in the cities and
other neighbouring areas. 
• Former Coalfields – key features here are
high levels of claimant unemployment 
and labour market detachment, lower
skills and incomes and higher levels of
deprivation. There is some employment
growth but the new jobs are often in 
a restricted range of sectors and
occupations, and often part-time,
precarious and low wage. Some former
coalfield areas (for example North West
Leicestershire) appear to be adjusting
better or more quickly than others and
some of the more attractive parts of
coalfield districts have seen in-movement
of workers who commute elsewhere. 
• Industrial Towns - these cover a range 
of circumstances, with some towns 
(such as Northampton, Kettering and
Wellingborough) faring well and
overcoming the loss of traditional
industries by the attraction of new
services. Others (for example Corby 
and Lincoln) are tending to lag behind. 
The scale of new investment and
development is smaller, and location 
away from the main growth corridors 
does not help. 
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Regional observatories often act as an interface
between the policy and academic communities. 
This report was commissioned from the Centre for
Regional Economic & Social Research to fill a gap 
in understanding of hidden unemployment in the 
East Midlands. Using a scenario-based approach, 
the extract from the report reproduced here looks 
at the possible trajectories for employment and
hidden unemployment in the East Midlands in the 
next decade. 
Hidden Unemployment 
in the East Midlands
Christina Beatty, Stephen Fothergill, 
Tony Gore and Anne Green
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• Mainly rural – some of these districts
feature tight labour markets with virtually
full employment. However, the nature 
of labour demand across rural areas in 
the East Midlands varies. In parts of
Lincolnshire there is evidence of
continuing joblessness with the
agricultural sector for example
characterised by seasonal fluctuations 
in demand for labour and low wages. 
In the south of the region there are often
labour shortages, attributable in part to the
housing market and planning constraints.
Future scenarios
The recent experience of the East
Midlands economy is one of relative
success. Regional employment has 
been growing more quickly than the UK
average for the last twenty years, with only
the South East, the Eastern region and 
the South West enjoying faster growth.
The employment rate for persons of
working age is slightly higher than the UK
average, although its rate of increase was
below the UK average over the period
from 1997 to the end of 2001. On both 
the claimant and ILO unemployment
measures the regional unemployment rate
has been, and remains, lower than the UK
average. Adding in hidden unemployment
does not change the region’s ranking... 
The position on some other economic
indicators gives cause for concern. 
GDP per capita remains lower than the UK
average. Levels of educational attainment
and workforce skills are lower than the UK
average. Average wages are relatively low.
Indeed, as highlighted by the State of 
the Region’s Economy report, there is
evidence of a ‘low pay, low skill
equilibrium’, and the sustainability of 
this equilibrium is questionable.
Projections for the East Midlands suggest
a continuing shift in employment away
from manufacturing and traditional
primary industries in favour of services.
The dominant feature is the projected loss
of 75,000 jobs in manufacturing over the
period from 1999 to 2010. In relative
terms, this represents a slightly greater
loss than for the UK as a whole.
Nevertheless, the East Midlands is
projected to retain a greater share of
employment in manufacturing than the 
UK average. Textiles, footwear & clothing
account for the largest projected job
losses in manufacturing over the period 
to 2010, although substantial job losses
are also expected in engineering.
Manufacturing job losses contrast with
projected gains over the same period of
around 125,000 jobs in business and
miscellaneous services. Smaller, but
substantial increases are projected in
public services such as health and
education, and in distribution, transport
and communications.
Projected job losses are expected to 
fall disproportionately on male full-time
employees. Between 1999 and 2010 
a loss of 55,000 male full-time jobs in the
East Midlands is projected, contrasting
with an expected increase in female 
full-time employees of nearly 50,000. 
For both males and females increases 
of about 50,000 part-time employees 
are projected.
Industrial change influences occupational
change. Over the medium-term, the single
largest projected increase in employment
in the East Midlands is for personal service
occupations. Women are expected to
account for the majority of this net
increase, with many of the employment
opportunities being for part-time
employees. The next largest projected
increases are in professional, managerial
and other white-collar jobs. Projected job
losses are concentrated in skilled and
trade occupations with an expected
decline in employment of 35,000. These
job losses are expected to fall almost
entirely on males. Further losses of over
10,000 jobs are expected for process,
plant and machine operatives. Here
women are expected to bear the brunt 
of the projected job losses. So while on
the basis of employment projections men
in manual jobs may be expected to be
most vulnerable to job loss, some groups 
of women may also find their jobs
disappearing. Overall, the projected 
shifts in the industrial and occupational
structure of employment suggest
increasingly difficult circumstances 
for those with poor skills.
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East Midlands suggest
a continuing shift in
employment away 
from manufacturing 
and traditional primary
industries in favour 
of services. 
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A ‘scenario building’ approach provides
alternative views of the future, as illustrated
by the four scenarios summarised below:
• Free Market Future – In this scenario
employment in low value-added industries
and services declines as the East Midlands
fails to compete with low-cost locations
elsewhere in the world. There is an
increasing share of employment in high
value-added products and services, and a
premium on highly skilled workers. Workers
in the low value-added industries, and
particularly those with few transferable skills,
would be most vulnerable to joblessness. 
In those local areas where there is a high
reliance on such industries, the highest
levels of job loss might also be expected.
• Social Interventionist Future – A relatively
high degree of labour market regulation is
central to this scenario as part of a policy
framework to offset the polarising effect of
unregulated economic growth. This might
include positive discrimination in favour 
of disadvantaged groups coupled with
strong local economic development and
regeneration policies to narrow the gap
between less favoured areas and the rest 
of the region.
• Successful Future – In this scenario the 
East Midlands might be characterised by
high levels of economic activity, high levels 
of educational attainment and a skilled and
adaptable workforce. Nevertheless, labour
market opportunities for those with poor
skills might be expected to continue to
diminish, especially as they have difficulty 
in gaining a foothold in the knowledge
economy.
• Failing Future – There is minimal if any job
growth as companies in the region fail to
keep pace with the changing demands of
the global economy. Mobile investment
seeks alternative destinations. The region
haemorrhages more highly skilled people
with ambition who move away to pursue
careers elsewhere. Spatial and social
divides are exacerbated.
It is clear that although these four scenarios
display some distinctive features, they 
also share aspects in common. The first
concerns the role of knowledge and
technological change. Competitive
companies recognise, and act upon, the
need to invest in expanding their knowledge
base and reap the benefits of technological
change. Technological change offers 
potential for job losses as well as gains – 
with the losses concentrated amongst the 
less skilled, particularly in manufacturing. 
The second message concerns polarisation.
In some scenarios, and in current labour
market projections for the East Midlands,
there is potential for growing disparities at
several levels. 
So what implications can be drawn for the
future of unemployment – particularly hidden
unemployment – in the East Midlands? 
Four strategic observations can perhaps 
be made. 
The first is that the trajectory of future
unemployment is likely to be sensitive to 
the emerging scenario for the region and
indeed for the UK economy as a whole. 
The ‘free market future’ and the ‘failing future’,
in particular, imply substantial economic
dislocation in which only some of the men 
and women made redundant by declining
sectors are absorbed by growth in the rest 
of the region’s economy.
The second point concerns the balance
between claimant and hidden unemployment.
The employment projections for the region
point strongly to declining job opportunities 
for men, compared to women. Men’s
unemployment is more likely to be ‘visible’ 
in the claimant count, but the specific groups 
of men who are likely to find themselves in
the weakest labour market position – the 
older, less skilled and less healthy – are prone
to dropping out of claimant unemployment 
into various forms of hidden unemployment,
particularly as sickness claimants and to a
lesser extent as early retirees. The continuing
growth of job opportunities for women, on 
the other hand, would suggest falling hidden
unemployment among this group, especially
as claimant unemployment among women 
in almost all of the region is already low. In
particular, many of the ‘extra ILO unemployed’
– women who are looking for work but not
included in the claimant count – may be 
among the first to be drawn into employment. 
If women’s labour market participation
continues to increase, however, the impact 
of additional employment on real levels of
unemployment among women may be much
more muted, as seems to have been the case
in the East Midlands between 1997 and 2002.
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In some scenarios, 
and in current labour
market projections 
for the East Midlands,
there is potential for
growing disparities 
at several levels.
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The third point concerns the geography
of unemployment. Aspects of the ‘free
market future’ and ‘failing future’ scenarios
especially point to pressures for greater
polarisation within the East Midlands. 
The ‘free market future’, in particular,
suggests that the already tight labour
market in southern parts of the region may
grow still tighter, as there is presently little
unemployment (claimant or hidden) in most
of these areas. Rising demand for labour 
in this part of the region could probably be
met only by significant in-migration, with all
the attendant consequences for housing
demand and land use. If serious in-roads are
to be made into the large stock of hidden
unemployment in some northern parts of 
the region, and indeed into the present
stock of claimant unemployment in some
districts, a ‘social interventionist future’
seems the best hope. 
Finally, the scale of current unemployment
should not be ignored. According to the
estimates… five years of sustained national
economic growth between 1997 and 2002
reduced the real level of unemployment in
the East Midlands by 37,000, or about one-
in-six. That still leaves an enormous problem
– an estimated 187,000 claimant or hidden
unemployed, concentrated in particular in 
a dozen or so districts in the northern part 
of the region. While claimant unemployment
might continue to fall if strong economic
growth is maintained, on the basis of 
trends over the last five years the problem 
of hidden unemployment looks much 
more intractable. To bring genuine full
employment to the whole of the East
Midlands might require as much as a
generation of further economic growth.
However, the scale of hidden
unemployment suggests that current
policies, by themselves, are not enough.
There are two key problems. First, 
although the ‘economically inactive’ are 
for the first time beginning to be included in
New Deal programmes, the majority of
labour market interventions are still targeted
mainly at the claimant unemployed. Indeed,
it is apparent that some players in the region
still see ‘unemployment’ and the ‘claimant
unemployed’ as more or less synonymous,
and they are not geared-up in either their
thinking or actions to address the other
groups without work. As a result, the hidden
unemployed continue to be largely
overlooked despite the evidence that they
now outnumber those on JSA. The hidden
unemployed are usually further from
employment and active job seeking, and
they are therefore not an easy group from
which to obtain successful ‘outcomes’. 
But the hidden unemployed – especially the
very large numbers on Incapacity Benefit –
also often require the most intensive support
to re-engage them with employment. 
At present they are mostly not receiving 
this help.
The second problem concerns the neglect
of demand-side factors. The evidence
indicates that where the demand for 
labour is strong enough, as in the south 
of the region, both claimant and hidden
unemployment can be reduced to 
low levels. However, the scale of real
unemployment in other parts of the region,
such as the former coalfield districts in the
north, indicates that unemployment is
unlikely to be eliminated without boosting
the supply of jobs. Indeed, in the absence of
substantial additional employment in these
areas, greater efforts to place people in jobs
will simply shuffle those who are in work 
and those who are unemployed, with little 
or no net impact on the overall level of
joblessness. What continues to be needed
in these places are policies that will deliver
the new infrastructure, new investment and
the new jobs that are still so badly needed.
43
The S
tate of R
egional R
esearch
Where the demand 
for labour is strong
enough, as in the south
of the region, both
claimant and hidden
unemployment can be
reduced to low levels.
State of Regional Research NEW  22/10/04  5:07 pm  Page 43
La
b
ou
r M
ar
ke
t a
nd
 S
ki
lls
Th
e 
R
ea
l N
or
th
-S
ou
th
 D
ivi
de
? 
This extract was taken from an article
originally published in Regional Studies
(38.1 85-95), Journal of the Regional
Studies Association and is reproduced
here with the permission of the
Publisher, Taylor & Francis Ltd. 
Further information on the Regional
Studies Association, and the Regional
Studies journal, is available online from
www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk. 
The performance of the UK labour market
in the second half of the 1990s seems to
have attracted quite favourable notice,
especially in comparisons with the
situation elsewhere in Western Europe.
But probe a little deeper and it becomes
apparent that assessments of regional
labour market conditions in the UK have 
in fact become quite strongly polarized.
There are two intertwined strands of
argument which form the background to
this deep difference of opinion. They are 
a matter of principle – the choice of a
statistical measure to summarize the state
of the labour market (e.g. unemployment
vs. non-employment) – and a matter of
practice – what the measure shows about
regional disparities in labour market
conditions (the relative performance 
of ‘north’ and ’south’).
We have found, first of all, that there is a
statistically significant link between the
size of the non-employment rate and 
the composition of non-employment.
Secondly, we have a series of related
findings about the nature of the
size–composition relationship for 
working age males:  
• a similar share of the non-employed are
ILO unemployed (that is without a job 
and actively seeking work) in the north 
as in the south. 
• a similar share of the non-employed are 
in education and training in the north as 
in the south. 
• a smaller share of the non-employed are
retired in the north than in the south. 
• a larger share of the non-employed are
sick and/or disabled in the north than in
the south. 
Given that the non-employment rate 
has a distinct (and well-known) spatial
pattern – higher in the north than the south
– we can immediately infer the spatial
pattern in its composition.
Moreover the findings about shares of
non-employment can be re-expressed,
quite straightforwardly, as proportions of
the male working age population. Given,
again, that the non-employment rate is
higher in the north than in the south, 
it follows that the unemployed are,
correspondingly, a larger proportion 
of the working age population in the north
than in the south. Less appreciated,
though, is the same implication which
follows from the parallel finding about 
the share of education and training: the
proportion of the working age population
in education and training is also larger 
in the north than in the south. 
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The Real North-South Divide? Regional
Gradients in UK Male Non-employment
Michael Anyadike-Danes
Northern Ireland Economic Research Centre
Most regions use the International Labour
Organisation definition of unemployment in measuring
regional progress. Yet, as this article argues, there 
is a correlation between the number of working age
people who are not working, and the proportion of
these people who are classified as sick or disabled.
The question this article raises then is whether a
shortage of jobs in some regions gives rise to a large
number of people being classified as non-employed
and unable to work, rather than unemployed.
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The non-employment data by age also
reveal quite striking regional contrasts,
particularly with regard to older age groups.
Unsurprisingly, male non-employment rates
rise steadily after the age of 40. But what
might not have been anticipated is that the
north–south gap expands more or less in
proportion to the rise in the rate, and this
implies a dramatic change in relative
composition. Just one-third of the 60–64
year olds non-employed in the South East
are sick/disabled, whilst in the North East it
is closer to two-thirds. Since these are
shares of very different proportions of the
age group population, the sick/disabled
rates themselves are strikingly different: in
the South East just 15% of 60–64 year olds
are not working by reason of sickness or
disability, in the North East the rate is two
and a half times larger at 41%. 
The challenge here to those who would
disregard these findings as irrelevant to 
an understanding of how labour markets
work is simple: is it coincidence that the
composition of male non-employment
across the regions is systematically and
significantly correlated with the size of the
male non-employment rate? Of course,
such a relationship is not evidence of
causality, but it is highly suggestive. So
whilst health/education/ welfare policy 
may well affect the form in which
nonemployment is recorded – whether 
the non-employed are classified as
unemployed/education/sick-disabled/
retired – it need not necessarily be its root
cause. It follows then, by implication, that
health/education/welfare policy may not
necessarily be the appropriate cure. Indeed,
our findings are consistent with 
the view that a shortage of jobs (a ‘jobs gap’)
could well be the key to understanding
some of the most striking north–south
contrasts in labour market outcomes. It is
less obvious how these findings might be
made consistent with the alternative
(‘individual employability’) view. 
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Indeed, our findings 
are consistent with the
view that a shortage 
of jobs (a ‘jobs gap’)
could well be the key 
to understanding some 
of the most striking
north–south contrasts 
in labour market
outcomes.
Just one-third of the
60–64 year olds non-
employed in the South
East are sick/disabled,
whilst in the North East
it is closer to two-thirds.
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Written for this publication by arrangement
with SEE-iN, the South East England
Intelligence Network
Within the UK, the South East of England
stands out as having a dynamic economy
and labour market, a high employment rate,
high skill levels, and high levels of growth
and Value Added in its industries. If the
region is to maintain this position, and
achieve a similarly high status on the
European and world stage, the continual
development of the South East’s skills base
is crucial. Skills Insight’s third Annual Skills
Review for the South East provides an
essential input into this process, by setting
out the critical skills issues in the region, and
the resulting policy implications.
The Review was especially timely in light 
of the Government’s Skills White Paper
published in July 2003 which not only
addressed the sectoral dimension of skills,
but placed a greater emphasis than ever
before on skills development at a regional
level, with particular emphasis on the role of
regional partners in developing the skills
base. Both elements, spatial and sectoral,
are essential ingredients of the analysis in
the South East Annual Skills Review.
The Review also revealed significant
imbalances in the skills market. On the one
hand, to maintain the South East’s position
as a high productivity region, there needs to
be a focus on intermediate and high-level
skills. The Review’s detailed analysis
identified skills gaps and recruitment
difficulties and highlighted their policy
implications. It further identified high demand
for intermediate (level 3) skills and high-level
skills (levels 4 and 5), as well as generic 
and management skills, along with some
pressure in the market for these skills, which
must be addressed if the South East is to
compete globally. On the other hand, there
remain deficiencies in basic skills among
significant parts of the adult population, 
and in lower level skills in sectors such as
construction, agriculture and land transport.
These must also be tackled to ensure a healthy,
balanced labour market in which the workforce
and individuals reach their potential.
The Review revealed that much of the
forecast employment growth in the South
East was in relatively low-paid occupations,
with the associated risk of intensification
across the dual labour market. Skills
shortages in the region were shown 
to be most serious in construction,
manufacturing, health & social work and
agriculture, with the most serious skills 
gaps in the region evident in construction
and manufacturing. The Review also
highlighted that construction and health 
& social work had the worst absolute labour
shortages in the region. Increased demand
for skills across most occupations over the
next five years was expected, but demand
stimulation with respect to management
skills may be required. 
There is also an issue of spatial balance, 
and the Review highlighted the large and
persistent disparities in skills demand and
supply between different parts of the region,
which contribute to significant economic
and social inequities within this generally
prosperous and successful region. 
The Annual Skills Review draws on a wide
range of data sources, including the
Business Needs / Competitiveness Survey
(looking at current and future skill demands
of over 10,000 South East businesses), 
and a Household Survey (Skills Audit)
assessing the skills possessed by the
workforce and how those skills are utilised
by employers. In looking ahead, the Review
has also been informed by the skills
forecasting model, which generates views 
of future skills demand under different
economic scenarios. The Review aims to
help decision-makers in a wide range of
organisations, and to begin to address their
“so what?” questions.  The Annual Skills
Review for the South East region can be
downloaded from the Skills Insight website:
www.skills-insight.org.uk
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Skills in the South East
Joe Clease 
Skills Insight  
In some regions specialist skills observatories work
alongside regional observatories to provide detailed
labour market intelligence.This short article gives a précis
of Skills Insights’ third Skills Review for the South East.
Skills shortages in 
the region were shown
to be most serious 
in construction,
manufacturing, health 
& social work and
agriculture, with the
most serious skills gaps
in the region evident
in construction and
manufacturing.
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Forecasting the Future of the South East
Skills Insight and its partners have developed a forecasting model, designed to enable regional partners 
to plan effectively for the future employment, occupational and skills needs of the region. By enhancing 
skills and labour market intelligence, it provides an essential tool to assist decision makers and support
effective resource allocation to meet the demands of the regional economy. 
The demand side of the model augments regional and sub-regional employment and occupational
forecasts. Results from employer surveys and household skills audits can be used to change the
forecasts of employment by occupation into forecasts of future skills needs. This will offer businesses 
and partners in the region the opportunity to plan for economic and social change.
Additional intelligence on churn, migration, retirements and occupational switching is then used to
convert the forecasts on the stock of occupations and skills into forecasts of future ‘gross’ rather than
‘net’ changes thereby taking in account replacement demand.
It is the supply side of the model, however, which is truly groundbreaking, enabling users to locate
possible demand and supply imbalances for generic skills within the region.
The current version of the model incorporates commuting flows between the South East and London. 
The front end of the model is a user-friendly Excel spreadsheet, enabling easy access to key results at
both the regional and Learning & Skills Council (LSC) sub-regional level. It also has the capacity for both
manual scenario building and more complex scenario building through its inter-linkage with a full regional
input-output model. 
Many users complain that forecasting models simply spit out numbers that they are expected to interpret
for themselves. Future developments will improve the ability of partners to use the model to answer 
“so what?” questions, such as “so what does this forecast mean for provision in Southampton?” and 
“so what does this mean for low skilled people in Kent?”
Supply Side Demand Side
Population by age
Highest NVQ
Qualification by age
Commuting
Household
Survey (skills by
age and NVQ
Household Survey
(skill needs by
occupation)
Employer Survey
(skill gaps by
occupation)
Employment by
Industry
Employment by
Occupation
Adjusted Skills
Needs by
Occupation
Demand for Skills
2001 - 2006
Supply of Skills
2001-2006
Supply v Demand
Skill Needs by
Occupation
Supply Model
Skills supply by age
and NVQ 2001
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Reproduced with permission from
Londoners’ qualifications: Analysis of 2001
Census data, written and published by the
Data Management and Analysis Group of
the Greater London Authority.
Higher-level qualification proportions vary
widely between different ethnic groups 
in London, from 15 per cent among the
Bangladeshi population to 46 per cent in 
the Other White group. However, it should
be kept in mind that variations between
borough of residence are actually wider than
this, ranging from 10 per cent in Barking and
Dagenham to 60 per cent in the City. 
The ethnic groups that have considerably
lower proportions of people with higher-level
qualifications in London are Bangladeshi (15
per cent), Mixed White and Black Caribbean
(19 per cent), Black Caribbean (20 per cent)
and Other Black (22 per cent). The groups
with the highest levels of qualifications are
Other White (46 per cent), Chinese (44 per
cent), Other Ethnic group (41 per cent),
Black African (38 per cent), Mixed White and
Asian (36 per cent) and Indian (35 per cent). 
The reasons why groups such as Chinese
and Indian are well qualified may include
family encouragement and the difficulties
that some ethnic minorities may face in
finding employment. Figures show that in
2003 there was a 23 per cent increase in the
total number of international students at
British Universities, with an 80 per cent rise
among Chinese students and 82 per cent
increase among Indian students, (which is
likely due to a change of intake criteria for
some international applications.) 
Some variations by ethnic group may be
explained by the different age structure of
the populations but this cannot explain all
the differences. A very low proportion of
young people in Black ethnic groups hold
higher-level qualifications. Among 16-24
year olds in Black Caribbean (nine per cent)
and Mixed White and Black Caribbean
(seven per cent) groups, the percentages 
of people with higher-level qualifications are
particularly low, especially when compared
to Chinese (29 per cent) and Indian (23 per
cent) people of the same age. 
The White Irish group are the only group
where there are high proportions of high
achievers amongst young people and very
low levels of high achievers among the older
groups. Black Africans aged 35 and over
stand out as high achievers when compared
to the average meanwhile Black Caribbean
and Bangladeshi groups for older ages are
unlikely to hold higher-level qualifications. 
Among some ethnic groups such as Mixed
White and Black Caribbean, Mixed White
and Black African, Indian, Bangladeshi,
Black Caribbean and Other Black the
difference in qualifications levels between
London and England and Wales is only
small. However, among White British, Mixed
White and Asian, Chinese and Pakistani
groups in particular, London experiences 
far higher proportions of well-qualified
people. In Other Asian, Black African and
‘Other ethnic group’ England and Wales
actually has a higher percentage of people
with higher-level qualifications than London.
The differences relating to ethnic groups
between Inner and Outer London show
interesting variations. Among some groups,
qualification levels in Outer London are 
far lower than Inner, while in other groups 
the opposite is true. For instance 30 per 
cent of the Bangladeshi population in Outer
London possess higher-level qualifications,
compared with just 12 per cent in Inner
London (although there are almost five 
times more Bangladeshis living in Inner
London than Outer London). The same
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Qualifications by Ethnicity in London
Gareth Piggott
Data Management and Analysis Group,
Greater London Authority 
What variations in qualifications are there amongst
London’s many ethnic groups? Using data from the
2001 Census, this article makes plenty of interesting
observations about the differences in qualification
levels between different ethnic groups, and within
these groups, between males and females and 
those of different ages.
The White Irish group
are the only group
where there are high
proportions of high
achievers amongst
young people and very
low levels of high
achievers among the
older groups.
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pattern occurs in Black Caribbean and
Black African groups. However the opposite
is true among White British, Mixed White
and Asian, White Irish, Other White, Other
Mixed and Indian groups, where Inner
London has a far greater proportion of
people with higher-level qualifications. 
In terms of ethnic groups without
qualifications, Bangladeshi (48 per cent)
stands out as the ethnic group with the
highest percentage with no qualifications,
which may be explained by people from
Bangladeshi communities being possibly
more likely to look after the family/ home,
less likely to have their first language as
English (or speak English at home) and
Bangladeshi women are less likely to be in
the labour market, than women from other
ethnic groups. 
The type of employment also may affect
qualifications levels although the level of
cause/effect between the two is not always
clear. Bangladeshis have by far the lowest
percentage of full-time employees in London
but, significantly, the highest part-time
percentage. This group also has amongst
the lowest levels of self-employment, and
the highest levels of unemployment/never
worked (66 per cent are not currently
working compared with the average of 37
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Other Ethnic Group
Chinese
Other Black
Black African
Black Caribbean
Other Asian
Bangladeshi
Pakistani
Indian
Other Mixed
White and Asian
White and Black African
White and Black Caribbean
Other White
White Irish
White British
All People
10 20 30 40 50
England and Wales London
Percent
Fig. 13. Percentage of people aged 16-74 with higher-level qualifications by ethnic group
Source: 2001 Census, Theme Table TT013.
State of Regional Research NEW  22/10/04  5:07 pm  Page 49
La
b
ou
r M
ar
ke
t a
nd
 S
ki
lls
Q
ua
lifi
ca
tio
ns
 b
y E
th
ni
ci
ty
 in
 L
on
do
n
per cent) and an above average percentage
of full-time students (under 25). 
The Bangladeshi group are less likely to hold
higher-level qualifications than any other group,
despite these high levels of participation
among young Bangladeshis. It should be
noted that the majority of these students are
male (57 per cent compared with 44 per
cent female), which is the largest gender
difference of any ethnic group. Furthermore,
although there is relatively high participation
in education, as can be seen from Table 1,
the Bangladeshi population has a low
percentage of people holding higher-level
qualifications in every age group, including
the young age groups. As discussed, rates of
higher-level qualifications are very high among
Chinese people. This is particularly true
among young Chinese people and particularly
in the 25-34 year age group, where 70 per
cent hold higher-level qualifications. 
The Black African ethnic group shows some
interesting characteristics. Black Africans
aged 16-24 are well below average in terms
of higher-level qualifications held, then by
ages 25-34 they are around the average but
over 35, they have very high percentages of
people with higher-level qualifications and
indeed the highest rates of any ethnic group
over the age of 50.
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Other Ethnic Group
Chinese
Other Black
Black African
Black Caribbean
Other Asian
Bangladeshi
Pakistani
Indian
Other Mixed
White and Asian
White and Black African
White and Black Caribbean
Other White
White Irish
White British
All People
10 20 30 40 50 60
Outer London Inner London
Percent
Fig. 14. Percentage of people aged 16-74 with higher-level qualifications for Inner and Outer London by ethnic group
Source: 2001 Census, Theme Table TT013.
Rates of higher-level
qualifications are very
high among Chinese
people. This is 
particularly true among
young Chinese people
and particularly in the 
25-34 year age group,
where 70 per cent hold
higher-level qualifications.
State of Regional Research NEW  22/10/04  5:07 pm  Page 50
Lab
our M
arket and
 S
kills
Q
ualifications by Ethnicity in London
The White British and Irish groups both
show an average level of qualification at
ages under 35 but above this age, these
groups tend to perform worse than most of
the other ethnic groups. For example by age
60, only Black Caribbean and Bangladeshi
have lower levels of qualifications, both of
which have low qualifications levels in all 
age groups. 
The Indian and Pakistani groups both follow
the average fairly closely up to the 50-59 age
group, although Indians aged 25-34 tend 
to do better than average. Above 50, both
these groups possess better than average
levels of qualifications. In the Pakistani
group, the percentage of students aged
under 25 is very high among males but far
lower among females (67 per cent
compared with 55 per cent). 
White Irish (40 per cent), Black Caribbean
(32 per cent), White British (31 per cent) and
Other ethnic groups (31 per cent) also all
have relatively high proportions of people
with no qualifications.
As discussed there are low levels of
qualifications among older people in
general, although the absolute numbers in
some ethnic groups in these age groups 
are actually very low. For example, in the
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Table 1. Percentage of people with higher-level qualifications by ethnic group and age group in London
ALL 16-24 25-34 35-49 50-59 60-64 65-74
All people 31.0 20.6 47.3 32.8 24.3 17.6 14.2
White
British 28.7 21.6 46.1 30.3 21.1 15.1 12.7
Irish 28.0 26.7 49.5 33.9 16.9 13.1 12.1
Other White 46.4 29.0 60.0 48.7 38.3 27.5 23.0
Mixed
White and Black Caribbean 18.5 7.1 27.5 22.4 25.6 19.7 21.2
White and Black African 30.5 13.5 39.9 35.4 29.6 27.7 22.8
White and Asian 35.8 17.8 53.7 38.4 28.7 26.3 22.3
Other Mixed 35.6 16.8 50.5 40.1 36.9 28.7 24.2
Asian or Asian British
Indian 34.4 23.2 56.1 31.5 28.5 25.8 21.4
Pakistani 32.3 19.6 47.3 30.2 32.5 28.4 25.6
Bangladeshi 15.1 10.6 21.1 14.4 18.8 12.0 8.4
Other Asian 31.9 16.5 37.9 33.6 39.1 33.1 27.9
Black or black British
Black Caribbean 20.2 8.9 27.4 22.6 24.8 14.3 11.5
Black African 38.3 13.6 45.3 45.6 42.7 36.7 29.6
Other Black 21.6 9.2 28.3 25.2 31.6 21.6 16.6
Chinese or other ethnic group
Chinese 43.5 28.8 69.6 43.8 34.9 22.1 15.1
Other Ethnic Group 40.8 19.9 51.5 45.0 40.7 30.0 24.6
Source: 2001 Census, Standard Table ST117.
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Bangladeshi group, the lowest qualified
ethnic group at aged 65-74, just four per
cent of the Bangladeshi population are this
age compared with 11 per cent of White
British and 15 per cent of White Irish. Also, 
in the Black African group, which is the most
qualified group at age 65-74, only two per
cent of the population are of this age. 
The chart showing qualifications by gender
shows up some noteworthy differences by
ethnic group. Most ethnic groups have
slightly more males than females with
higher-level qualifications with some notable
exceptions. Chinese, Other Black, most of
the mixed groups, Other White and White
Irish have slightly more females than males
with higher-level qualifications. Moreover,
the Black Caribbean group has a far higher
percentage of women than men with higher-
level qualifications. On the other hand but
equally as notable,arethe Bangladeshi,Black
African, Indian  and Pakistani ethnic groups
where a significantly higher proportion of men
than women hold higher-level qualifications.
These differences between genders are
confirmed in the England and Wales figures,
which demonstrate a similar pattern.
There are two ethnic groups where polarity
is quite prominent. Among the ‘Other ethnic
group’ there are both high percentages of
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Other Ethnic Group
Chinese
Other Black
Black African
Black Caribbean
Other Asian
Bangladeshi
Pakistani
Indian
Other Mixed
White and Asian
White and Black African
White and Black Caribbean
Other White
White Irish
White British
All People
10 20 30 40 50 60
Females Males
Percent
Fig. 15. Percentage of people with higher-level qualifications by ethnic group and gender for London
Source: 2001 Census, Commissioned Tables M244.
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people with higher-level of qualifications and
high levels of people with no qualifications.
Conversely, among the ‘Other Black’ group
there are low levels of people both without
qualifications and with higher-level
qualifications. This may be because these
categories are ‘remainders’ and contain a
mix of different people and not just one
specific group.
The ethnic group with the highest
percentage of ‘other qualifications/level
unknown’ is Black Caribbean, followed by
Other Black and White Irish. The ethnic
groups with the lowest percentages of 
this are in the Asian and Chinese groups.
This may be either because not many
qualifications are held by these groups,
which seems more likely among the
Bangladeshi group, or because these
groups tend to hold unrecognised
qualifications.
It should be considered that some ethnic
groups might have achieved qualifications 
in countries outside the UK, which may have
been difficult to code and compare with
British qualifications. Therefore, people 
with foreign qualifications may be under-
estimated here. A lack of skills in English
may hinder the educational progress of
some people from ethnic minorities and 
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Other Ethnic Group
Chinese
Other Black
Black African
Black Caribbean
Other Asian
Bangladeshi
Pakistani
Indian
Other Mixed
White and Asian
White and Black African
White and Black Caribbean
Other White
White Irish
White British
All People
10 20 30 40 50 60
England and Wales London
Percent
Fig. 16. Percentage of people aged 16-74 with no qualifications by ethnic group
Source: 2001 Census, Theme Table TT013.
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may lead to fewer entering higher education.
It may also be useful to conduct some
further analysis, which combines ethnic
group with country of birth, which may show
that people born in the UK are less likely to
experience this problem.
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Other Ethnic Group
Chinese
Other Black
Black African
Black Caribbean
Other Asian
Bangladeshi
Pakistani
Indian
Other Mixed
White and Asian
White and Black African
White and Black Caribbean
Other White
White Irish
White British
All People
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
England and Wales London
Percent
Fig. 17. Percentage of people aged 16-74 with other qualifications/level unknown by ethnic group
Source: 2001 Census, Standard Table ST117.
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Quality
of Life
Faith in the Northwest
Northwest Regional Intelligence Unit and Churches’
Officer for the Northwest
Social Exclusion in the East of England
Observatories Social Exclusion Partnership
Housing and Services in the North East
North East Regional Information Partnership
Quality of Life in Yorkshire and Humber
Ben Smith
Yorkshire Futures
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Reproduced with permission from the
Northwest Development Agency from
Faith In England’s Northwest: The
Contribution Made By Faith Communities
To Civil Society In The Region, a
publication supported by the Northwest
Development Agency, North West
Regional Assembly, and Churches’ 
Officer for the Northwest.
This survey of more than 2,300 faith
communities across eight faith groups
powerfully demonstrates that they make 
an important contribution to our region’s
social and economic life. Supported by the
Northwest Development Agency and the
Northwest Regional Assembly, this survey is
notable both for the light it casts on faith’s
role in areas that range from neighbourhood
renewal to tourism, and for the high level 
of response it stimulated from those who
were surveyed: more than half of those who
received surveys took the time to complete
and return them.
The Churches Officer for the Northwest and
the Regional Intelligence Unit conducted 
this survey of the region’s faith communities,
which shows that they are actively engaged
in local partnerships and the delivery of
services to the community. Many, for
example, occupy listed buildings that they
maintain, conserve and make available for
the wider use of the local community. Some
larger buildings – and in particular cathedrals
– are important tourism destinations and
increasingly offer refreshment facilities.
Faith communities also provide organised
support services. This survey shows that
almost half of our rural churches were
involved in schemes to counter the Foot and
Mouth crisis, for example, and a number of
respondents stated that they were directly
involved in local regeneration schemes
including the Single Regeneration Budget
(SRB), Sure Start, Learn Direct and their
Local Strategic Partnerships.
More than 5,000 important projects 
were identified in the survey, with faith
communities running or managing schemes
to address homelessness, racism, crime,
drug and alcohol abuse, health, skills
development, art, music and environmental
improvements. Across the survey results 
it was particularly evident that faith
communities are extensively involved in
providing services for older people, children
and the more deprived neighbourhoods of
the region.
How are these services, projects and local
schemes delivered? The survey shows that
almost all of the important work carried out
by faith communities is voluntary, with a
more than 45,000 volunteers working
through faith communities on non-worship
related projects.
Importantly, this contribution to our region’s
quality of life and economy is not confined to
Christian denominations. This survey of faith
communities covers all the key world faiths
including Baha’i, Buddhism, Hinduism,
Islam, Jainism, Judaism and Sikhism.
Amongst the Christian faith community our
survey was sub-divided into nine groupings:
Church of England (Anglican), Roman
Catholic (R.C.), Methodist, Baptist, United
Reformed Church (URC), Quakers (Society
of Friends), Salvation Army, Evangelical,
Charismatic & Pentecostal, and ‘Other
Christian’ communities such as Orthodox,
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Faith in the Northwest
Northwest Regional Intelligence Unit and
Churches’ Officer for the Northwest
Although a lot of regional observatory work goes 
to supporting economic development policy, there 
is a wide and broad remit that reaches as far as 
this research report into the impact of religious 
groups in the Northwest. The executive summary 
for that research, reproduced here, points to some
interesting findings – concentration in deprived 
areas, involvement in regeneration programmes, 
and high numbers of volunteers.
Faith communities are
extensively involved in
providing services for
older people, children
and the more deprived
neighbourhoods of the
region.
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Unitarians, Independent Methodists,
Congregationalists, Church of Scotland 
and Christian Scientists.
As the scope of this survey shows, the ‘faith
sector’ is undoubtedly diverse and for many
working with it or within it, this diversity has
made it difficult in the past to interface or
engage effectively with such a substantial
sector of society. This survey, and plans for 
a future regional inter-faith forum, will help 
to plug a key gap in our regional intelligence
and help those in the public, private and
voluntary sectors to engage effectively with
faith communities. And that engagement 
is essential. Faith communities are a vital
resource. Their diversity, and the fact that
they are composed largely of lay people, 
are important strengths upon which we 
can build new, productive partnerships.
Faith communities can help those working
for regeneration, social inclusion or
sustainable development to reach out to
many of those who could be defined as
‘hard to reach’, or as the Home Secretary,
David Blunkett recently put it: “Every faith
has a ‘development worker’, full or part-
time, paid or voluntary. In other words, the
priest or pastor, the vicar or minister, the
teacher, Imam or Rabbi. This is a resource
available to all areas of our country, even 
the most deprived, the least active and the
most likely to be disengaged from the
political process.”
Key Findings
Faith communities are keen to be 
listened to.
There was a high level of response 
with 54 per cent of the survey’s 4,400
questionnaires being returned. 
The response was particularly good for
minority faith communities, including a
response rate of 68.9 per cent for the Sikhs,
53 per cent for Jews, 50 per cent of Baha’is,
43 per cent for Moslems, and 39 per cent for
Hindus. Christian responses account for 93
per cent of the total with a response rate
ranging from 63 per cent for Anglicans to
22.4 per cent for the Evangelical,
Pentecostal, and Charismatic churches.
Faith communities are strongest where
social need is highest.
The distribution of faith communities 
who responded to this survey matches
population density, with 45 per cent of those
who responded describing themselves as
urban, 27 per cent as rural, and 28 per cent
as suburban. Mapped against the Index of
Multiple Deprivation responses returned
demonstrate that faith communities, whilst
represented in the most affluent areas, are
concentrated in areas of highest social
need. Faith communities also assist some of
the most vulnerable social groups, including
older people and children.
Faith communities are important
custodians of built heritage.
From the total of 2325 faith communities
who responded, 34 per cent stated that
their building was listed, with the majority 
of these coming from Church of England
(63.7 per cent). These buildings are a
significant community resource, too. 
Almost all of those surveyed (2282
respondents) indicated they have rooms
used by other local community groups.
Faith communities bring visitors and
tourists to the region.
A high percentage of faith communities who
responded indicated that they welcome
visitors, and Cathedrals and other more
prominent places of worship stated that they
respond to the needs of visitors, sometimes
with toilets and refreshment facilities
provided. The findings demonstrate
untapped potential in many more
communities, both urban and rural 
for an increased level of ‘faith tourism’.
Faith communities offer social support
services.
Faith communities often play a support 
role, particularly during periods of crisis. 
One example of how the faith network can
mobilise in time of need was the response 
to the Foot and Mouth crisis, where 45 
per cent of rural Christian Churches who
responded indicated an involvement in
support initiatives.
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Faith communities are active delivery
agents of care in their local communities. 
The survey revealed that many faith
communities were engaged in community
projects unrelated to worship or religious
activity. One in ten stated that they were
managing or organising projects addressing
a wide range of social issues including
housing, homelessness, anti-racism, crime
prevention, drug and alcohol abuse,
employment and training, social enterprise
and personal finance. From returns
received, health and fitness, Art, music 
and education also score highly across all
faith communities. 14 per cent of all faith
communities also indicate that they
organise, run or manage environmental
projects. In total 5140 non-worship projects
were identified by the survey.
Faith communities are significant patrons
of arts and sports. 
The survey sought evidence to justify the
claim that faith communities continue to
exercise a significant role in supporting
sports and cultural activities. Responses
indicate substantial engagement in choral
and instrumental music, dance, drama 
and the visual arts. 51 per cent of faith
communities indicate regular and organised
involvement in football and 33 per cent in
fitness training.
Faith communities stimulate
unprecedented levels of volunteering. 
Virtually all activity undertaken by faith
communities is dependent on volunteers
and based on the estimates of those who
responded, the survey demonstrates that
there are 45,667 volunteers in England’s
Northwest involved in activities in the
community other than worship.
Faith communities have an important 
part to play in regeneration programmes.
Faith communities are increasingly
recognised for the important role they 
can play in regeneration partnerships. 
The survey sought to discover the level of
involvement in government sponsored
regeneration initiatives throughout the
region and of those who responded 248 
are involved in Single Regeneration Budget
(SRB) schemes, 224 in Sure Start, 62 in
Learn Direct, and 95 in other regeneration
initiatives.
More could be done to involve faith
communities. 
Government has indicated the value that
faith communities can bring to Local
Strategic Partnerships (LSPs). The survey
findings suggest that the message does 
not appear to have penetrated all faith
communities and all local authorities. 
40 per cent of all Christians who responded
are aware of LSPs, of whom 53 per cent
have been approached by Local Authorities
to participate. Significantly faith
communities who responded from within
non-Neighbourhood Renewal Fund areas
identify themselves as having made the
least progress.
Faith communities are largely 
self-financing. 
Of the faith communities responding to 
the survey 27 per cent indicate they have
received public funding while a majority, 73
per cent, have not. Responses indicate an
almost equal measure of success across all
faith communities in the percentage of each
who have been successful with funding
applications. Local Authorities, English
Heritage and the Lottery top the list of
sources of funding for those who
responded.
Faith communities reach the parts of
society that others can’t. 
Faith communities contribute towards
community cohesion in its widest sense.
The survey findings underline the social and
economic role played by faith communities
and appear to reinforce the claim that the
faith communities are closer to groups that
other agencies find ‘hard to reach’.
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Of the faith
communities
responding to the
survey 27 per cent
indicate they have
received public funding
while a majority, 
73 per cent, have not.
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Reproduced from Social Exclusion in 
the East of England, with permission
from the East of England Regional
Observatory.
Who is excluded in the East
of England?
Social exclusion is not confined to a small
number of people in specific places. 
A significant fraction of the population
throughout the East of England lives with 
a low income, poor skills, in poor housing
and with limited opportunities to fulfil their
potential.
The central feature of social exclusion
under any definition is low income.
Traditionally, the government has defined
low-income households in terms of mean
income, focusing on half-mean income 
in particular. However, since 1998, the
European Union has used a threshold 
of 60% median income for international
comparisons, and this measure is now
widely used by the UK government and
research organisations such as the
Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the
New Policy Institute. Both thresholds are
now used in the Households Below
Average Income (HBAI) survey and in the
Government’s annual report on tackling
poverty and social exclusion. This is a
valid, simple, and consistent measure that
can be used as an indicator of how well we
are doing as a society to minimise and
eradicate such poverty. 
The HBAI survey presents information on
the characteristics of individuals and
households at various points in the
income distribution. The data show that in
the East of England:
• 14% of working age adults are in
households with an income below the
poverty threshold (60% median income)
after housing costs. This represents
448,000 people of working age in poverty.
• 25% of pensioners are in households with
an income below the poverty threshold
after housing costs.
Analysis of PayCheck data for the year
2001 shows that 34% of households in
the East of England have an income of
£15,000 or less per annum.
The distribution of household income,
based on this data, is shown in Figure 1.
These figures provide a snapshot of the
number and proportion of household
incomes at a particular time. However, we
know that some groups of people are
more at risk of poverty and social
exclusion: 
• Individuals in workless families, lone-
parent families, single pensioners, some
ethnic minority households and disabled
people are more likely to be on low
incomes and be persistently poor.
According to the 2001 Census, there are
118,081 lone-parent households in the
East of England and 315,565 single
pensioners living alone. The proportions
vary significantly across the region.
Tendring ranks fourth in the country for
one-pensioner households, which form
more than 21% of its households.
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Social Exclusion in the East of England
Observatories Social Exclusion Partnership
Regional bodies are usually interested in research at
smaller geographical levels, to guide policy decisions
at sub-regional, local authority, and neighbourhood
level. This is easy to understand when considering 
the following extract from Social Exclusion in the 
East of England – not a place commonly associated
with poverty and deprivation. As explained in the
report, there is a clear geographical pattern to social
exclusion, meaning that interventions need to be well
targeted, and that research needs to be fine-grained.
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• Unemployment rates for some minority
ethnic communities and people with
disabilities are over twice the regional rate.
Members of some minority ethnic
communities with any given qualification
level have over twice as much chance of
being unemployed as equally qualified
white people. 
• Beyond the quarter of pensioners in the
region who are living in poverty,
discrimination in employment and reliance
on public transport are also issues that
can affect older people and place them at
risk of social exclusion.
Where are the excluded
people in the East of
England?
Excluded people and populations are 
not evenly spread throughout the region.
Neither are they heavily concentrated
exclusively in certain areas. Hence the
importance for a balance between area-
based initiatives and other, thematically
based, initiatives. 
Although there are pockets of poverty
throughout the region, there is a clear
geographical pattern of these lower
income wards. Those wards with a higher
proportion of households earning below
£15,000 are mostly situated in two sorts 
of area:
• the coastal areas and the north of the
region;
• the urban areas of Luton, Stevenage,
Harlow, Southend and Basildon.
There are 54 wards in the region (out of 
a total of 1192) where half or more of 
the households are earning below the
threshold income, with Golf Green
(Tendring), Nelson (Great Yarmouth), 
Lynn North (Kings Lynn and West Norfolk),
Magdalen West (Great Yarmouth),
Harbour (Waveney) and Central
(Peterborough) having the highest
proportions of such wards. Across the
region, poor wards exist alongside affluent
wards, in both urban and rural areas. 
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Fig. 1. Distribution of household income, East of England 2001 
Source: PayCheck data from CACI Ltd (Ref 12).
Excluded people 
and populations 
are not evenly spread
throughout the region.
Neither are they 
heavily concentrated
exclusively in certain
areas. Hence the
importance for a
balance between area-
based initiatives and
other, thematically
based, initiatives.
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Rural deprivation
The dynamics of deprivation can be different
between rural and urban areas – the IMD
has been criticised for not accurately
reflecting deprivation in rural areas. 
The Countryside Agency’s report on the
state of the countryside in the East of
England includes the following findings: 
• The region’s rural households have poorer
geographical availability of all services for
which this is measured, than the average for
rural England. The region has the highest
average distances from rural households 
to automatic teller machines, primary and
secondary schools, libraries, supermarkets,
banks and building societies, and the
second highest to job centres, petrol
stations and doctor’s surgeries, of any
English region.
• The rural population in the East of England 
is less healthy than its urban counterpart in
terms of the proportion of babies born at low
birth weight (i.e. less than 2500g).
• A rural resident in the East of England with
average earnings would be slightly less
capable of purchasing a typical house 
than their urban counterpart. 
On the plus side:
• The incidence of crime was lower in rural
areas of the East of England than in the
urban areas. 
• In 2002, rural districts had lower levels 
of claimant unemployment than urban
districts. 
These headline figures can mask specific
issues. Many income-deprived wards lie 
to the north of the region, in Norfolk and
along the Suffolk and Essex coast.
Employment opportunities, and access 
to education, can be very different in rural
areas from those in urban wards. Although
claimant count rates are lower, evidence
shows that there are high levels of hidden
unemployment in rural areas (often
prematurely retired individuals and married
women with spouses in employment).
Seasonal and part-time employment are
highest in rural areas. 
Earnings are generally much lower in rural
districts (£322.76 gross weekly pay in 2000
compared with £354.27 in urban areas). 
This difference is even more significant 
against a background of wealthy people
moving from inner city areas to suburban
areas and small towns around larger cities.
Trends in demography are also important. 
The rapid population increase of retired
people, and the sudden trends in migration 
for working people, are changing the social
structure of rural areas, and the service needs
of those living there. Retired couples who 
have moved to a rural area may lose their
personal mobility, their spouse, and their
social networks. This leaves them isolated 
in an area that may suffer from poor public
services (such as public transport) and 
limited care provision nearby.
Barriers to accessing services are felt 
acutely in rural localities. There are greater
distances to travel and poorer public 
transport links. Poor access may not always
be physical - other factors affect access 
to services for different groups across the 
region, such as cultural and linguistic barriers. 
All these factors may have different
implications for income mobility, poverty,
employment transitions and quality of life. 
Any policy to tackle social exclusion needs 
to look beyond the headline indicators, and 
to recognise the specific issues affecting
particular localities. 
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Many income-deprived
wards lie to the north of
the region, in Norfolk
and along the Suffolk
and Essex coast.
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Why does social exclusion
persist in a relatively wealthy
area such as the East of
England?
There are well-recognised risk factors 
that precipitate exclusion. These include
poverty, unemployment, family
breakdown, being in care, school
problems, being an ex-prisoner, being 
a member of particular ethnic minorities,
living in a deprived neighbourhood, mental
health problems, age and disability. 
In practice, there is no single cause of
social exclusion. Rather, past influences
(such as childhood circumstances,
housing, etc.) combine with present
constraints and choices (for example,
problems facing a community or an
individual) to produce outcomes that feed
back into influences.
For example, teenage mothers are less
likely to finish their education, less likely to
find a good job and more likely to end up
as single parents and to bring up their
children in poverty. The children run a
much greater risk of poor health, and have
a much higher chance of becoming
teenage mothers themselves. However,
teenage pregnancy is not in itself a cause
of social exclusion. The circumstances in
which individual decisions are made (e.g.
low expectations and poor education) are
important in understanding the context.
Similarly, the risks of poor health for
children of teenage parents can be caused
by many factors, such as lack of access 
to services and lack of social support. It is
clear that there is no simple explanation for
social exclusion – rather, in each situation
we need to understand and address the
most relevant causal factors. 
In most cases, a main driver of exclusion is
economic. Government policy recognises
that poverty and unemployment are at the
heart of neighbourhood decline and social
exclusion, but are compounded by a
range of social problems (such as family
breakdown, poor health, youth
disaffection, drugs and crime). These 
can in turn erode the community fabric
even further. 
The main factors associated with entry
into or escape from poverty are:
• Labour market events: Employment
and/or change in earnings are the most
important events associated with entry
into and escape from low income. Lack 
of work is an important risk factor for
short-term and persistent low income.
Among those of working age on
persistently low incomes, 60% are in
workless households. Income differentials
are generally increasing, and there is little
earnings mobility for people on low
incomes.
• Family related events: Divorce, marriage
and childbirth are also associated with
changes in income. Sometimes work
events and family related events are
connected; for example, a divorce may
lead to loss of work if a lone parent cannot
make adequate childcare arrangements.
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There are well-recognised
risk factors that
precipitate exclusion.
These include poverty,
unemployment, family
breakdown, being in 
care, school problems,
being an ex-prisoner,
being a member of
particular ethnic
minorities, living in a
deprived neighbourhood, 
mental health problems,
age and disability. 
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Labour market
Within the labour market, in March 2002
there were 59,400 claimant unemployed
across the East of England, of which 12.2%
were unemployed for over 12 months. More
significantly perhaps, there is a large group
of working age people with no qualifications
and poor basic skills (see Table 1).
The areas with the poorest performance 
in terms of educational achievement are
found toward the east of the region,
specifically in areas of Essex and Suffolk.
The districts with the highest percentage 
of the working age population with no
qualifications are: Tendring (28%), Fenland
(23%), Basildon (23%), Harlow (23%),
Braintree (22%), Thurrock (21%) and
Ipswich (20%).
The 2001 Census paints an even bleaker
picture. It shows that the proportion of
people aged 16-74 with no qualifications 
in the region was 28%, ranging from over
38% in Tendring, Fenland and Great
Yarmouth to 16% in Cambridge.
The figures are stark: approximately
700,000 people have poor basic skills and
almost one third of the population in many
parts of the region has no qualifications – 
a total of around 1.08 million people
according to the 2001 Census. 
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Table 1. Population aged 16-60 with poor literacy and numeracy skills, 2001
Poor literacy, Poor literacy,  Poor numeracy, Poor numeracy
numbers % numbers %
Bedfordshire 78700 23.2 78438 23.1
Cambridgeshire 94123 21.3 92826 21.0
Essex 210883 22.1 207062 21.7
Hertfordshire 128670 20.7 125808 20.2
Norfolk 107604 23.8 104765 23.2
Suffolk 89443 23.1 87451 22.6
Source: Basics Skills Agency (Ref4).
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Reproduced from What the Indices 
of Deprivation 2004 Mean for the 
North East.
The Indices show that the North East has
considerable strengths in terms of
housing, the living environment and
access to services. Generally, however,
the North East is more disadvantaged
than the other regions of England, but
there are significant differences and
contrasts within the region. 
Barriers to housing and key
local services
This section provides further analysis of
the barriers to housing and services
domain indices of deprivation between the
nine regions of England and within the
North East. 
The smallest geographical unit for this is
the Super Output Area (SOA), averaging
about 1500 people. We have taken the
national rankings of SOAs within each
domain, as provided by the Government,
and carried out two further analyses for
each domain:
• an Inter-Regional analysis of each domain
examines the range of SOA ranks within
the region, and compares the population
weighted mean rank of SOAs for the North
East with that of the other eight regions in
England
• an Intra-Regional analysis of each domain
aims to illustrate the distribution of SOA
rankings within each district within the
North East. If all English districts were
identical then it might be expected that
each district would have equal numbers of
SOAs in each of the ten deciles of degrees
of deprivation. The deviation from the
national distribution illustrates the
“clustering” of populations in both “highly”
deprived areas and “lesser” deprived
areas. For each domain, a graph is
provided. On each graph, blue diamonds
illustrate the ranks of SOAs, while red
diamonds illustrates the median (middle)
rank position of SOAs in each district.
The purpose of this domain is to measure
barriers to housing and key local services.
The findings for the North East in this
domain are in contrast to those in most of
the other domains. 
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Housing and Services in the North East
North East Regional Information Partnership
The report the following extract is taken from is based
on NERIP’s secondary analysis of the Super Output
Area data from the 2004 Indices of Deprivation 
(ID 2004), and aims to describe the implications of 
the IMD for the North East. This extract is a good
example of the simple ways in which observatories
attempt to widen access to research and statistics,
using graphs and commentary. The ‘Barriers to
housing and key local services’ section of the report 
is re-produced below.
The North East is the
second least-deprived
of all the regions in
England, behind the
North West.
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Inter-Regional Analysis
The analysis of this domain uses the
population weighted mean rankings, 
and shows that the North East is the 
second least-deprived of all the regions 
in England, behind the North West. 
The most deprived region with the lowest
statistics is London with a ranking of 8,103.
Once again all regions exhibit significant
disparities within their boundaries, with all
regions having SOAs ranked in the “most”
and “least” deprived 100 SOAs in England. 
Intra-Regional Analysis
The median rank for the North East on 
this domain is 21,560 – well above the
national average. There are nine districts 
in the region with median statistics below 
the regional median, with Berwick (9,301)
and Tynedale 6,361) being the only 
districts below the fifth decile (12,993 
to 16,241). The best performing district 
is Middlesbrough with a median rank in 
the second least deprived decile, while
another five districts have median ranks 
in the ninth decile (25,986 to 29,234).
The distribution of SOAs within the region 
by district illustrates that although the 
SOA ranks are skewed towards the “least”
deprived ranks, there are still a number 
of districts with SOAs ranked in the “most”
deprived areas. Eleven districts have at least
one SOA in the bottom decile, although in
total there are only 46 of 1656 north eastern
SOAs ranked in this decile on this index.
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1 Alnwick
2 Berwick upon Tweed
3 Blyth Valley
4 Castle Morpeth
5 Tynedale
6 Wansbeck
7 Gateshead
8 Newcastle upon Tyne
9 North Tyneside
10 South Tyneside
11 Sunderland
12 Chester-le-Street
13 Derwentside
14 Durham (City)
15 Easington
16 Sedgefield
17 Teesdale
18 Wear Valley
19 Darlington
20 Hartlepool
21 Middlesbrough
22 Redcar and Cleveland
23 Stockton-on-Tees
IMD2004 Housing & Services Ranking by North East Local Authority District 
Source: IMD2004.
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Reproduced with permission from ‘Key
findings from the Regional Quality of Life
Counts 2002’ - an article prepared by
Yorkshire Futures for the Regional Review.
The purpose of the Regional Quality of 
Life Counts is threefold. First, the report
provides a mechanism for analysing regional
trends and benchmarking Yorkshire and
Humber against other regions and the
England average. Second, the document
aims to meet the demands for more local
information in an easily digestible format.
Finally, the headline indicators help raise
public awareness about sustainable
development and should help monitor
progress against the Regional Sustainable
Development Framework (RSDF). 
The key findings for Yorkshire and Humber
are outlined below:
Crime
More recent data from the Home Office on
crime statistics in 2002/3 (SIMMONS AND
DODD, 2003) reveals an increase in total
recorded crime – 136 per 1,000 population
compared to the national average of 113.
There were more burglaries; 704 per 10,000
population compared to the national
average of 439. In addition, there was more
vehicle crime; 1,365 motor vehicle theft per
10,000 households compared to the
national average of 1,068.  
Crime is a major issue, with the region
having one of the highest levels of recorded
crime per 1,000 head of population in
England. These Home Office crime figures
suggest that this issue has not been
addressed, creating clear economic
implications as well as being a catalyst for
environmental decline and social exclusion.
Road traffic
Infrastructure is a key element in improving
access to education, jobs and recreational
services. Transport, of course, is a
contentious issue, with disagreements
sometimes occurring between economic
development and environmental
conservation camps. Traffic levels on major
roads increased nationally by 18 per cent
between 1993 and 2002. In Yorkshire and
Humber levels increased by 19 per cent, 
the fifth highest percentage-increase of any
of the English Regions. However, the region
has the fourth lowest levels of road traffic
overall. In 2002, Yorkshire Forward and the
Yorkshire and Humber Assembly (YHA)
adopted seven strategic transport priorities
for the region. These are the key themes in
which regional partners believe that
investment is required, and include: Trans-
Pennine links; strategic North-South routes;
Leeds to Sheffield Corridor; development 
of air transportation; ports and waterways;
access to strategic economic zones; and
strategic access to regional centres. These
strategic priorities support the Regional
Economic Strategy (RES) and are consistent
with the review of Regional Transport
Strategy currently being carried out by the
YHA. The RES emphasizes addressing
strategic transport priorities as a key priority
action and Yorkshire Forward has identified
transport as the main risk which could
prevent achievement of the RES targets
(YORKSHIRE FORWARD, 2002).
In addition, ‘Multi-Modal’ transport studies
were completed in Hull and in South and
West  Yorkshire during 2002.  Multi-modal
studies’ prime function is to address specific
problems on the trunk road network, and it 
is therefore likely that solutions may well be
road based. 
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Quality of Life in Yorkshire and Humber
Ben Smith
Yorkshire Futures
Observatories disseminate and explain research, often
by attempting to widen access by placing things into
a regional context. This extract is taken from an article
that picks out some of the key findings from the 2002
Regional Quality of Life Counts, raising the profile of
the sustainable development headline indicators, and
explaining how Yorkshire and Humber is performing. 
The East Coast 
Main Line rail route
contributes £100 million
annually to the regional
economy.
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Investment in the rail network demonstrates
a further economic case for economic
growth. For instance, the East Coast Main
Line rail route contributes £100 million
annually to the regional economy. These
findings have been used to influence funding
bodies to move forward with infrastructure
improvements.  This ongoing research
programme will provide intelligence to
support strategic transport priorities and
inform the review of the Regional Transport
Strategy, which is integral to Regional
Planning Guidance (GOVERNMENT
OFFICE FOR YORKSHIRE AND THE
HUMBER, 2001).  
The region needs to focus on attracting
investment to address strategic transport
priorities and to pursue efforts in reducing
transport’s contribution to Yorkshire and
Humber’s greenhouse gas emissions.
River water quality
River water quality supports wildlife and
recreation as well as being a source of water
for drinking and industry. Both chemical and
biological river water quality has improved
throughout England over the last twelve
years. In 2002, nine tenths of total river
length in Yorkshire and Humber is of good 
or fair chemical quality (the national average
is 94 per cent).  
Although this percentage ranks the region
second lowest in England, Yorkshire and
Humber has shown one of the greatest
improvements in quality since 1990. Water
quality is important both for biodiversity and
tourism, underpinning many aspects of the
region’s economy.
Wildlife
Wildlife is valued for its own sake and
because it is part of our quality of life. Birds
are often used to indicate the state of wildlife
because they are usually at (or near) the top
of the food chain. In 2000, the population
index for woodland bird species in the region
had increased by 50 per cent since 1970,
whilst national levels have decreased by 18
per cent over the same period.
Land use
New houses which are built on previously
developed land help regenerate
communities and protect green belts.  
The 1998–2001 regional average of 53 
per cent of new homes built on previously
developed land represents an increase 
of seven percentage points on the
1989–1993 average.
The Regional Planning Guidance target 
of 60 per cent is challenging and requires
clear focus on the amount of such land
identified as suitable for housing and on 
the process by which such land is deemed
suitable for housing. In comparative terms
only 27.8 per cent of the region’s stock 
of identified previously developed land is
deemed suitable for housing, the lowest of
all the English regions (NATIONAL LAND
USE DATABASE, 2001). 
Regionally Yorkshire and Humber has one 
of the highest totals and one of the highest
proportions of such land that is unallocated,
with no planning allocation or permission.
The announcement by the European
Commission that UK grant support for
decontaminated land and its remediation 
is state aid compliant will provide significant
focus for developer activity, particularly in 
the Yorkshire Coalfields area. As part of the
Regional Housing Strategy 2003, this clearly
represents an opportunity to focus further
housing development on land previously
considered unsuitable to develop
(REGIONAL HOUSING BOARD, 2003).
Q
uality of Life
Q
uality of Life in Yorkshire and H
um
ber
67
The S
tate of R
egional R
esearch
Only 27.8 per cent of
the region’s stock of
identified previously
developed land is
deemed suitable for
housing, the lowest of
all the English regions. 
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Waste
Lowering waste (and increasing recycling)
reduces the negative environmental impacts
of waste disposal. In 2000/1 Yorkshire and
Humber faired well in terms of the total
household waste per person, which was
better than the English average. However,
the region recycled or composted the third
lowest amount per person.  
The region should be working towards 
the Waste Strategy 2000 which aims 
to “recover value from 45 per cent of
municipal waste and to recycle 30 per cent
of household waste by 2010”. This is in line
with the Regional Waste Strategy (YHA,
2003) which has been set up specifically to
give more priority to waste issues and to
develop sustainable waste management
systems for Yorkshire and Humber.
Conclusion
Clearly, Regional Quality of Life Counts 2002
is designed to be a platform to build further
analysis and to produce policy implications.
The region has shown general
improvements in absolute terms with
increases in GDP, river water quality, wildlife
and land use indicators. 
Conversely, crime, road traffic and waste
recycling remain specific areas in need of
improvement. In relative terms, the region’s
performance in comparison to other English
regions is also an important consideration.  
Regional partners need to plan policies
around these indicators as well as
benchmarking Yorkshire and Humber
against the other English regions, especially
the three northern regions.  Regional Quality
of Life Counts provides a basis for Progress
in the Region 2004 (now aligned to
Advancing Together) as a formal
centrepiece of the Regional Monitoring
Framework (YHA, 2004).  Both Regional
Quality of Life Counts and Progress in the
Region (YORKSHIRE FUTURES, 2003)
emphasise the scale of the regional
challenge in raising economic efficiency
and attaching our people to economic
opportunity in a diverse and sustainable
economy.
DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND
RURAL AFFAIRS (2003) Regional Quality of Life Counts
2002, DEFRA, London.
GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR YORKSHIRE AND THE
HUMBER (2001) Regional Planning Guidance for
Yorkshire and the Humber to 2016, TSO, London.
REGIONAL HOUSING BOARD (2003) Yorkshire and
Humber Regional Housing Strategy 2003, Regional
Housing Board, Leeds.
SIMMONS, J. AND DODD, T. (eds) (2003) Crime in
England and Wales 2002/2003 – Home Office Statistical
Bulletin, Home Office, London.
YORKSHIRE AND HUMBER ASSEMBLY (2003) Let’s
take it from the tip: Yorkshire and Humber Regional
Waste Strategy, YHA, Wakefield.
YORKSHIRE AND HUMBER ASSEMBLY (2004)
Advancing Together: The Vision and Strategic
Framework for Yorkshire and Humber, YHA, Wakefield. 
YORKSHIRE FORWARD (2002) Regional Economic
Strategy for Yorkshire and Humber, Yorkshire Forward,
Leeds.
YORKSHIRE FUTURES (2003) Progress in the Region
2003, Yorkshire Futures, Leeds.
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Regional
Disparities
Twenty-Five Years of 
Regional Development
R. Ross MacKay
School of Business and Regional Development,
University of Wales
A New Regional Policy for the UK
John Adams, Peter Robinson and Anthony Vigor
IPPR
An Alternative Regional Strategy
Ash Amin, Doreen Massey and Nigel Thrift
Equilibrium Regional Disparities: 
Theory and British Evidence
Patricia Rice and Anthony J. Venables
Department of Economics, University of Southampton;
and Department of Economics, London School 
of Economics
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This extract was taken from an article
originally published in Regional Studies
(37.3 303-317), Journal of the Regional
Studies Association and is produced here
with the permission of the Publisher, 
Taylor & Francis Ltd. 
Further information on the Regional
Studies Association, and the Regional
Studies journal, is available online from
www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk. 
What has the south of Britain got that the
north really wants? Short answer: the
economic and social stimulus of a London.
What has the south got that it could well 
be rid of? Short answer: the inefficiency 
of a congested central London. 
(The Economist 1962, p. 989)
Government location is a non-market
influence of considerable importance. 
It is a source of well-rewarded employment
and acts as a magnet for other highly paid
jobs. London is the political, administrative,
commercial and financial capital where the
different sources of power interact to
promote the economic growth that the
North needs, but the South can only, 
with difficulty, accommodate.
In 1962 The Economist proposed 
‘a new administrative capital for Britain …
somewhere north of the Trent … [for] 
Queen, parliament and civil service’ 
(p. 989). With this new capital city,
‘Elizabetha’, established, much more 
would follow. The North would have its own
growth magnet whilst the South would see
congestion eased. The Economist proposal
was too radical and imaginative to be
considered other than tongue in cheek, but
it had serious intent. It pointed to a growing
spatial imbalance which added to inflation,
limited national output and reduced
economic well-being.
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Twenty-Five Years of 
Regional Development
R. Ross MacKay
School of Business and Regional
Development, University of Wales
London is the political,
administrative,
commercial and
financial capital where
the different sources of
power interact to
promote the economic
growth that the North
needs, but the South
can only, with difficulty,
accommodate.
Much of the regional agenda is focused on reducing
regional disparities. This short extract hints at some 
of the reasons for the persistence of these regional
inequalities, and argues that they matter not just 
for those in the ‘poorer’ regions but also for those 
in the South.
Table 3. Inner Region Core (IRC) and Rest of UK
1975 1999
IRC % share of UK population (%) 33·4 34·9
IRC % share of UK land (%) 16·4 16·4
1975 1999
IRC Rest of UK GAP2 (%) IRC Rest of UK GAP (%)
Concentration index1
Male jobs 1·048 0·976 107 1·089 0·952 114
GDP 1·108 0·946 117 1·212 0·886 137
Male earnings 1·111 0·944 118 1·255 0·863 145
Adults with degrees n.a. n.a. n.a. 1·307 0·836 156
R&D expenditure n.a. n.a. n.a. 1·528 0·716 213
High income earners n.a. n.a. n.a. 1·656 0·648 256
Notes: 
1. Concentration index    = share of UK jobs etc
share of UK population .
2. IRC Index as a percentage of index for Rest of UK.   
n.a. denotes not available.
Source: Regional Trends, Economic Trends
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Active relocation of manufacturing came 
to an end in the mid-1970s. Over the
following 25 years regional inequalities grew
and the already considerable prosperity gap
between the Inner Region Core and the rest
of the UK increased further. As Table 3
illustrates, by 1999 the concentration index
of male jobs was 14% greater in the Inner
Region Core than in the rest of the UK. The
concentration index of male earnings was
45% greater. The index of research and
development expenditure was 2·1 times
higher, and that of high-income earners 2·6
times higher. In recent years, between 1995
and 1999, value added per head in the Inner
Region Core climbed from 28% above the
level of the rest of the UK to 37% above.
Moreover, by 1999 the Inner Region Core,
with 35% of the UK population, accounted
for 46% of those with degrees (or equivalent
qualifications), for 53% of the expenditure on
research and development and for 58% of
high-income earners.
London has become the richest area in
Europe, even though GDP per head in the
UK is only 1% above the EU average. Career
ladders demand a location close to the
national capital. Table 4 highlights the
importance of London relative to the rest 
of the UK. For example, calculated by
workplace rather than residence, value
added per head in London is 47% above 
the UK average. 
The growing disparity between the
prosperous Inner Region Core and the rest
of the UK is imperfectly understood. It stems
from the decline of manufacturing, the
growing importance of trade within the
European Community, and the growth of
knowledge-based services. The information
revolution has reached all parts of the UK,
but has been skewed towards the capital
and its zone of influence. In attempting 
to explain such regional disparity, a
consideration of the continuing interaction
between government, finance and business
is important. These relationships have made
the City of London increasingly influential.
Moreover, the Inner Region Core dominates
the distribution of both bank credit and
venture capital. Also, as previously noted,
London is the political capital and, as such, 
it is a magnet for those who must deal with
central government in any of its myriad
manifestations. The benefits of the proximity
to government and the dispensers of
government contracts have had an influence
on the location of the new science-based
industries. A dynamic for centralization
emerges and there are few checks and
balances.
Does the increasing gap
between the inner region core
and the rest matter?
The greater the spatial disparity, the greater
the inflationary pressure at any given level of
national demand. Given the way inflation is
generated, a growing gap between a
prosperous one-third (with supply restraints)
and a less prosperous two-thirds (with spare
capacity) is a problem for national output
and national growth. Fear of inflation
dominates macroeconomic policy. The main
policy instrument, the rate of interest, affects
the country uniformly, even though different
regions respond very differently to demand
increases. Inflation generated in tight labour
markets prompts interest rate increases
which limit demand and output in regions
with substantial unused resources
(PHILLIPS, 1958; BROWN, 1972; TAYLOR
and WREN, 1997).
The problems of concentrated development
are exacerbated by congestion costs.
However, the higher productivity of the Inner
Core Region does not necessarily result in
an equally higher standard of living. Reward
Surveys suggest that the income required to
maintain a given standard of living is 22%
above the UK average in Greater London,
whereas housing costs in Greater London
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The greater the spatial
disparity, the greater the
inflationary pressure at
any given level of
national demand.
Table 4. Indices of GDP per head, Inner Regional Core, 1999 (UK= 100)
Residence based Workplace based
London 130·3 147·0
East 116·1 103·5 
South East 116·0 109·8
Source: Economic Trends
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and transport costs for London commuters
are 50% above the UK average. Moreover,
inequalities also exist within London itself,
where wealthy areas are juxtaposed to those
blighted by serious poverty and deprivation.
The high cost of living is a problem for those
on or close to the minimum wage. 
In the same way as not all of high value
added per head is reflected in a comfortable
lifestyle, higher expenditure on public
services does not necessarily produce
higher quality. Between 1975 and 1999, 
the population in the Inner Region Core
increased by over 2 million (11%) and the
number of licensed cars increased by 60%.
Such population growth understates the
pressure on space. Household size falls,
factories, offices, shops and warehouses all
require more space per person employed.
Moreover, pressure on road and rail
produces delays, which add to business
costs and to the cost of living. In significant
and spreading parts of the Inner Region
Core, all forms of development (housing,
industrial, office, warehouse, road, rail) are
more controversial and substantially more
expensive than in the rest of the country. 
A better spatial balance, therefore, may be
important in preserving a way of life that is
prized by those who live in the Inner Region
Core. The spread of wealth and opportunity
to other parts of the UK may not only reduce
environmental damage in the prosperous
South but may also add to the well-being of
those who live and work in London, South
East and East.
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The income required 
to maintain a given
standard of living is
22% above the UK
average in Greater
London.
BROWN A. J. (1972) The Framework of Regional
Economies in the UK. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
PHILLIPS A. W. (1958) The relationship between
unemployment and the rate of change of money wage
rates in the United Kingdom, 1861–1957, Economica
25, 285–99.
TAYLOR J and WREN C. (1997) UK regional policy: an
evaluation, Reg. Studies 31, 835–48.
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This extract from A New Regional Policy
for the UK is reproduced with permission
from IPPR – the Institute for Public Policy
Research.
Further information is available from
www.ippr.org/north.
The ‘North’ is poorer than the ‘South’.
Although some dispute the existence of a
‘North-South’ gap in prosperity, it is clear
that within the UK there is a ‘winners circle’
in the ‘Greater South East’ of the UK
(consisting of London, the East of England
and South East regions and part of the
South West). The rest of the country has
lower levels of prosperity, and three
regions lag significantly: Northern Ireland,
Wales and the North East of England.
There is a growing consensus that these
regional disparities need to be tackled 
and a variety of reasons have forced 
this issue up the political agenda: 
• the gap between the ‘North’ and the
‘South’ has been growing since the
economic recovery began in 1992-93; 
• the enlargement of the EU will mean that
after 2006 the poorer UK regions will cease
to receive the same degree of EU funding
on which they currently rely so heavily; 
• the sustained regional voice provided 
by the Deputy Prime Minister has been
supplemented by the rise of HM Treasury
as champions of Labour’s ‘New Regional
Policy’.
In the Spending Review of 2002, the
Chancellor announced a new Public
Spending Agreement (PSA) target to “over
the long term reduce the persistent gap in
growth rates between the regions”.This is a
highly significant shift in Government policy
and is to be welcomed. However, it only
applies to England when it should apply to
the whole of the UK. Furthermore, it is a
target to reduce the gap in growth rates –
not to close absolute disparities. The
Government might meet this target while
at the same time absolute disparities
continue to grow.
The scale of the challenge
The headline measure of output or Gross
Value Added (GVA) per head is not the 
only useful indicator for analysing regional
economic disparities. 
1 GVA is a function of differences in productivity
and employment, with the relative
importance of each varying from region to
region. In ‘lagging’ regions the numbers
claiming sickness and disability benefits
dwarf those claiming unemployment benefit.
2 There are clearly differences in prosperity
within as well as between regions.
However, GVA is an unreliable measure at
this smaller spatial scale. A more obvious
measure of economic prosperity at this
scale would be levels of employment.
3 GVA is a measure of output, not a measure
of income available to households.
Transfer payments through the tax and
benefit system reduce but do not eliminate
regional economic disparities.
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A New Regional Policy for the UK
John Adams, Peter Robinson and Anthony Vigor
IPPR
Evidence-based policy is currently fashionable, 
but it can often be hard for those engaged in the 
day-to-day development and implementation of policy
to consider not just whether the policies are being
drawn up intelligently but to ask the more fundamental
questions about whether the approach is sensible.
This extract, and the one following it, are taken from
high-profile publications from leading think-tanks,
each trying to generate new ideas and approaches 
to regional policy.
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4 The use of GVA fails to highlight London’s
high levels of child poverty, but tax and
benefit policies are more important than
regional policy instruments in tackling this
problem.
5 Using only GVA does nothing to indicate
an individual’s ‘happiness’, which
depends on such factors as income,
employment and health. Significant
regional disparities exist in each of these
areas so claims that the ‘North’ is poorer
but happier than the ‘South’ are
profoundly mistaken.
6 Using only GVA also fails to take 
account of the condition of the natural
environment. The issues are different in
the ‘North’ and ‘South’, but the need to
boost growth rates should not privilege
economic over environmental concerns. 
The market is not acting effectively to
reduce regional economic disparities.
High costs in the ‘South’ should generate
incentives for firms and people to locate to
disadvantaged regions, but public policy is
currently blunting incentives to relocate by
offsetting the problems faced by
successful congested regions. 
It is as unhelpful to argue that the ‘South
should be left to stew’ as it is to argue that
London ‘drives’ the UK economy. The role
of London in the UK economy needs to be
carefully addressed: most employment in
London is not directly associated with
international markets and there is a
relationship of interdependence with the
rest of the UK. Worrying about whether
London drives the UK economy or vice-
versa is pointless. The housing and
transport needs of the ‘South’ should be
addressed, but these should be paid 
for within the region.
Employment and regional
policy
Levels of employment vary significantly
within and between regions. In the
‘Greater South East’ there is a broad
swath of areas with close to full
employment. Many areas in the ‘North’
have much lower employment rates.
Major cities, including London, also 
have low employment.
The most important dispute in regional
economic policy is to what extent this
reflects ‘demand-side’ or ‘supply-side’
problems. That is, whether there are
differences in employment opportunities
or whether the unemployed are unable 
to get the jobs which do exist. The
Government would emphasise the latter,
and would claim that areas of high
unemployment lie within easy travelling
distance of areas where vacancies are
plentiful. 
However, there are areas with low levels 
of employment not within easy travelling
distance of anywhere with a tight labour
market. For example, Hartlepool borders
Middlesbrough and Stockton and
Sunderland and Durham and similar
observations can be made of Northern
Ireland, West Wales and the Valleys and
industrial West Cumbria.  
On the other hand, the Treasury argument
does carry some force in large metro-
politan areas like London or Glasgow.
Concentrations of non-employment in
Hackney are not due to a lack of jobs
locally. This misunderstands the way that
housing and labour markets work in
London. Individuals who face barriers to
securing employment are concentrated in
certain areas where housing is cheaper or
socially provided. They need support to
help them overcome these barriers.
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Worklessness in
Hackney is different 
to worklessness in
Hartlepool. 
High costs in the
‘South’ should generate
incentives for firms and
people to locate to
disadvantaged regions,
but public policy is
currently blunting
incentives to relocate by
offsetting the problems
faced by successful
congested regions.
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Worklessness in Hackney is different to
worklessness in Hartlepool. There is no
Hackney labour market, but there is a
distinct Hartlepool labour market. The
residents of Hackney need a robust London
labour market and supply-side measures to
help them access jobs across the whole of
the metropolitan labour market. The
residents of Hartlepool require similar
supply-side measures, but combined with
policy instruments designed to create more
jobs within easy travelling distance.
Full employment requires a strong national
economy, a strong regional policy, supply-
side measures and measures to reduce
residential segregation and the links
between segregation and disadvantage.
For those regions with a concentration of
travel-to-work areas (TTWAs) with low
employment rates, the demand for labour
needs to be stimulated. Assisted Areas
should be defined on TTWAs (not wards) -
nearby areas of potential growth should not
be cut off from support. More emphasis
needs to be placed on allocating RSA grants
to service sector companies, to redress the
bias towards manufacturing. There should
be less support for prestige inward
investment projects and more for the
creation and expansion of indigenous
enterprises.
Eastward expansion of the EU after 2006 
is likely to cut the Structural Funds available
to ‘lagging regions’. The UK Government
has advocated a ‘renationalisation’ of
regional policy and has guaranteed that
domestic regional funding would be
increased (although it is unclear to what
extent). The European Commission should
support this approach. The EU target of 
70 per cent of the adult workforce in
employment by 2010 should provide an
important ‘floor target’ for domestic regional
policy. UK Government resources could
then be targeted on those TTWAs with
employment rates at or below 70 per cent. 
The regional skills, education
and training agenda
There is a fairly clear ‘North-South’ gap
across the English regions in terms of
qualifications - London and the South East
have significantly higher proportions of 
the working age population with higher
education qualifications and lower
proportions of the population with 
no qualifications.
This gap is partly a consequence of
differences in educational attainment at 
16 and staying on rates post-16, but are
also a consequence of out-migration of 
the better qualified to more prosperous
regions, where a higher proportion of better
jobs is on offer. 
Recent moves to regionalise the local
Learning and Skills budgets are a red 
herring – it is impossible for the public sector
to match the skills of the workforce to the
demands of employers. Individuals should
make their own decisions over further
education and training. RDAs should focus
on increasing the demand for skills from
employers, in itself a very difficult agenda.
One recent issue flagged up by the
Chancellor is whether the UK has sufficient
regional and local variation in pay. Although
national pay setting is the norm in both the
private and the public sector, in practice
there is much local discretion to reflect local
circumstances. In general the labour market
does not seem to be failing in a profound
way to allocate labour efficiently across 
the regions, although there are specific
problems, including parts of the public
sector. Successful congested regions
should bear the costs of higher pay for
public sector workers. 
Science, innovation and the
regions
Innovation policy has been driven by 
vague concepts, such as the creation of 
a ‘knowledge-based economy’ and by a
small number of individuals who have
become skilled at promoting their ideas –
Michael Porter and ‘cluster theory’; 
Richard Florida and the ‘creative class’ 
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demands of employers.
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and the Boho index; the Work Foundation
and ‘Ideopolis’. 
One of the reasons for this is a paucity of
good evidence from rigorous evaluation. 
A large element of innovation policy should
be focused on dissemination and on what
must seem rather mundane initiatives, 
such as human resource management or
modest improvements in management
practice. At present we do not even have 
a methodology by which to measure 
such things. 
The most common proxy for innovation is
spending on Research and Development
(R&D) and there are clear regional
differences in business, HE and directly
government funded R&D. A different picture
emerges from the UK Innovation Survey,
which concluded that there were few
substantial differences between regions.
This survey is still in its infancy but its results
should not be dismissed as too counter-
intuitive. It may be that firms in the 
‘North’ are not less innovative but that 
there are less of them. 
While it is important to remember that
science policy is not innovation policy, there
are very clear regional divides in science
spending, and although the science base in
all regions needs to be strengthened a key
question is whether the science base should
be “regionalised” – with spending more
evenly spread across the UK? This is not an
easy issue and difficult trade-offs need to be
managed – funding science in the ‘Greater
South East’ might exacerbate regional
economic differentials; regionalising the
science base could harm the standing of 
UK science. There will not always be a 
‘win-win’ situation. A centre-left government 
should prioritise regional policy and 
full-employment. 
Some science institutions should be
relocated from the ‘Greater South East’ 
to ‘lagging’ regions. This would help create
jobs, and it may lead to a culture change 
that would address the South East-centric
bias in the distribution of science spending.
Suggested institutions include the seven
research councils and the Higher Education
Funding Council for England. New
investment in science could also be ‘top-
sliced’ to create a regional science fund. 
Enterprise Policy
In the UK, debates about enterprise are 
too focused on small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs). In truth, enterprise
policy is as relevant to large firms as to 
small firms. While SMEs create a large
number of new jobs, they are also subject 
to large-scale job losses. Notably, a higher
proportion of the workforce is employed in
SMEs in ‘lagging’ Northern Ireland and
Wales than in ‘prosperous’ London. 
There seems little correlation between
employment by firm size and regional
prosperity.
Nearly £8 billion is spent on public sector
support for SMEs: £3 billion by DEFRA on
agricultural support, £2.6 billion by the
Treasury on revenue foregone through 
tax measures, and £2.2 billion on other
initiatives. This £2.2 billion is spent on 
a complicated and inefficient array of
initiatives, particularly external business
advice. A pilot scheme is currently in
operation where four RDAs are leading the
co-ordination and management of Business
Links. It may be too early to judge their
success, but the case for RDAs assuming
responsibility is strong.
A great deal of research has tried to
establish the characteristics of the more
successful entrepreneur. One conclusion 
is that age is an important determinant, and
the easiest way to promote enterprise is to
focus on 30- or 40-something individuals
who are well educated and who have
experience of working in a particular sector.
Social enterprise has moved up the political
and policy agenda in recent years, but it is
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not clear how useful it is in improving
economic activity or creating jobs.
Enterprise Areas are also a recent creation.
Their boundaries are drawn at the ward 
level (postcode level in Scotland). However,
these deprived areas are unlikely to have 
a high proportion of the managers and
professionals likely to make successful
entrepreneurs. A focus on broader TTWAs
would be more likely to ensure that
Enterprise Areas cover potential
entrepreneurs. Those in ‘hard-to-reach’
communities may start a business but,
crucially, they would also be within travelling
distance should other entrepreneurs create
job opportunities.
Public spending and
investment
Despite the significant variations in public
expenditure across the nations and regions
of the UK, there is little political likelihood of
reforming the so-called Barnett formula.
Nevertheless, this debate will not go 
away and there are many other public
expenditure issues which are relevant to
current debates.
The basic principle of fiscal equalisation
must be that any particular area should be
able to offer its residents broadly the same
level of public services as another area –
regardless of economic prosperity or the 
tax base in that area. From each region
according to their means, to each according
to their ‘needs’.
Defining ‘needs’ is an inherently difficult task
but any fair formula would take into account:
- the total population
- well recognised needs such as child
poverty or ill-health
- other needs such as the problems posed
by high levels of mobility and transience
- the higher costs of delivering public
services in rural areas
- more controversially, the higher costs in
delivering public services in congested
regions 
Some elements of higher spending will,
however, reflect conscious policy choices
and these costs should be borne locally, 
for example in relation to free personal care
in Scotland.
It is important to recognise that central
government can ensure fiscal equalisation
without controlling a majority of public
expenditure. It can balance ‘needs’ across
different territories with only 25-30 per cent
of total funding, allowing more revenue to 
be raised locally.
Policy is nudging in this direction, and there
do seem to be moves to get some of the
problems of congestion paid for locally.
Congestion charging in London is the
highest profile initiative, and it has been
suggested that some of the costs of
Crossrail could be funded regionally.
Furthermore, it seems as if ODPM wishes 
to try to capture more of the increased value
of development in housing for the public
purse. Such moves are welcome and 
should be further developed.
Sir Michael Lyons is currently undertaking a
review of public sector relocation for HM
Treasury. This has to be done in a manner
compatible with the needs of the ‘lagging’
regions. As they have a shortage of high-
quality graduate jobs, back-room posts
cannot be all that is relocated. If entire
departments or agencies are moved senior
posts would have to be relocated. ‘Lagging’
regions also need higher levels of R&D, so
institutions which could be relocated include
the Higher Education Funding Council and
the seven Research Councils. This would 
be an important job creation measure, but it
would also help change the cultural attitudes
that disproportionately fund the ‘Greater 
South East’.
Governance Issues
One of the distinguishing features of the
current renaissance in regional economic
policy has been its emphasis on increased
capacity at the regional level: bottom-up not
top-down. This is clearly correct, as regional
policy cannot be run from the centre.
However, it should be noted that regional
institutions are necessary but not sufficient
for reducing economic disparities. 
A bottom-up regional economic policy 
does not mean that central government
does not retain a responsibility for all parts 
of the UK - it cannot merely ‘pass the buck’.
The commitment by central government 
to a target of reducing regional economic
disparities is a welcome recognition of this.
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Policies must be designed and administered
at the best spatial scale if we are to have the
effective delivery of public policy. Otherwise,
services will be poorly delivered and
taxpayers money wasted – square pegs do
not fit round holes. ‘Joined-up government’
has received much attention in recent years.
However, the spatial debate has received
much less attention, and needs to precede
debates over joined-up governance.
For example, it is wrong to try to create jobs
in deprived localities as this misunderstands
the way in which the labour market works. 
It is more effective to create jobs in areas
attractive to employers but within travelling
distance of deprived communities. Good
quality transport links would ensure job
opportunities are available to individuals in
areas with high levels of economic inactivity. 
Whitehall has a reputation for being
regionally insensitive. Its role of balancing
the different and often competing interests
of the different parts of the UK is difficult. 
On balance, it seems as if Whitehall does not
sufficiently prioritise the needs of lagging
regions – although we do recognise the
needs of London particularly in the area of
child poverty. Whitehall must ‘mainstream’
the regional agenda into their spending
decisions so that policies in areas such as
housing, transport and science policy
reduce regional disparities, not reinforce
them. The 2004 Spending Review will be 
the key test as to whether it is moving in the
right direction.
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Ten Point Plan for 
Regional Economic Policy
1 The 2004 Spending Review should set out an unambiguous target to 
narrow disparities in output per head across the UK nations and regions. 
The Joint Ministerial Committee on the Economy taking place later in 2003
should be used to agree a target between the Government and devolved
administrations.
2 Employment should be given equal weight with productivity as the focus 
for regional economic policy. Policies are required to increase the demand 
for labour in the Assisted Areas, which should be re-defined to cover groups 
of Travel-To-Work Areas in ‘lagging’ regions with employment rates at or 
below 70 per cent so that regional policy instruments can be concentrated.
3 The EU should back the UK position of ‘renationalising’ regional policy. 
HM Treasury needs to commit significant additional resources to compensate
‘lagging’ regions for lower levels of EU spending. Regional and local institutions
must decide how that funding is allocated across different areas of spending. 
4 More good quality jobs need to be created in ‘lagging’ regions to retain
graduates. Increasing the proportion of young people and adults with adequate
basic skills and level 2 qualifications are the correct priorities for promoting
employment. A period of stability in the administration of learning and skills
policy is required.
5 The Government should ‘regionalise the science base’ by relocating key
institutions and by ‘top-slicing’ new spending on science for ‘lagging’ regions.
The current concentration of government R&D spending and science
institutions in the ‘Greater South East’ is inequitable.
6 The Government needs to rationalise services for small and medium sized
enterprises as the number of initiatives and bodies in this area are impossibly
complex. In particular, if the current pilots are successful the case for RDAs
assuming responsibility for Business Links will be very strong. 
7 All Whitehall departments need to ‘mainstream’ the regional dimension into
their spending decisions. Decisions in areas such as housing, transport and
science policy need to reduce regional disparities not reinforce them.
8 Prosperous regions and localities should bear more of the costs of extra
spending required to deal with the problems of success. Congestion charging
and capturing increases in land values can only be the start of something bigger
in terms of fiscal reform.
9 Several Departments and Agencies should be relocated from the ‘South’ 
to the ‘North’ – such as the ODPM, the Higher Education Funding Council for
England and the seven Research Councils. The Lyons Review must relocate
senior staff as well as back-room staff. 
10 A central research unit for the RDAs should be created to help promote
evidence-based policy-making. This should be located in one of the 
‘lagging’ regions.
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Reproduced from Decentering the Nation:
A Radical Approach to Regional Inequality
by Ash Amin, Doreen Massey and Nigel
Thrift, published by Catalyst, price £5. 
For more information contact Catalyst 
on 020 7733 2111 or visit
www.catalystforum.org.uk.
A different regional policy framework is
needed, one that sees regions as part 
of a wider set of economic connections
and institutional obligations. This has 
two important policy consequences:
• One is that local effort has to work 
through these broader connections 
and obligations.
• The other is that there can be no simple
division of responsibilities between
national and regional institutions.
Regional action
Turning first to regional-level action, this
should not focus solely on the economics
of endogenous growth geared solely
towards boosting competitiveness, 
but also work with an economics of
circulation and global linkage, that, in
addition, does not reduce the problem 
of capacity-building to competitiveness
goals.
Three brief examples suffice to illustrate
our argument.
1 First, in the area of innovation and
learning, the current policy obsession with
local knowledge transfer (e.g. between
local businesses and local universities)
needs to be reexamined. A perspective on
knowledge as a mobile and relationally
constituted asset of varied spatial reach
(from the workplace to international IT 
and business networks), points in the
direction of focusing on connectivity as a
means of building the knowledge base
and deciding on what works for local
advantage, regardless of how “local” 
the knowledge is.
Such connectivity could include
international exchanges of creative 
people and ideas and school visits
abroad, the offer of higher education
training opportunities out of the region,
start-up opportunities for returning
graduates, and in general a cultural fabric
that sustains and nourishes intellectual
activity and social creativity. What matters
is variety and critical mass – attending to
the regional knowledge base in a broad
and non-utilitarian way, geared towards
building expertise and excellence in
schools, colleges, universities, research
laboratories, workplaces, the media, and
the public culture in general. This is an act
of building knowledge reserves without
guarantees and without local forcings,
recognising that the link between
knowledge formation and economic
returns is non-linear and unpredictable,
but that distributed plenitude improves 
the selection environment for innovation.
2 Secondly, in the area of direct support for
local businesses, an attentiveness to the
economics of circulation might result in
support for a variety of schemes that 
help businesses to boost national and
international competitiveness, without
assuming local externalities.
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such as housing,
transport and science
policy reduce
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not reinforce them.
An Alternative Regional Strategy
Ash Amin, Doreen Massey and Nigel Thrift
Regions, this extract suggests, cannot bring 
about regional inequality without significant national
level action. The key, it is claimed, is a ‘national
commitment to decentre the economy’. As well as 
re-examining some current regional policy – such as
whether knowledge transfer needs to happen locally
or how foreign investment might be better harnessed
– this manifesto argues that national policy needs to
be made far more sensitive to the regional agenda. 
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These could range from facilitating 
access to rapid distribution and logistics
networks, international trade fairs 
and market intelligence on export
opportunities and suppliers, through 
to making available long-term and
developmental funding (to compensate for
a profit-based and audit-based funding
culture) and offering diverse opportunities
to firms to link into wider knowledge and
learning environments (e.g. through
regional applied research laboratories and
databanks). Unlike the past, when regional
policy did very little to extract regional
benefits from inward investors, these
incentives could be traded for certain
guarantees on business conduct, in order
to maximise local value-added. Instead of
forcing local linkages that jar with the
sourcing and support patterns of
incoming firms, the regional agencies
might expect firms (including inward
investors) to contribute to, say, a new
business initiatives fund, engage in
community programmes, or exercise
corporate social responsibility through
profit-sharing and employee-involvement
schemes. In this way, corporate profits
can be used for region building without
assuming that corporate profitability
depends on building intra-regional
alliances.
3 Third, the idea of regions as sites of
circulation might at long last redirect
attention to the reality that the bulk of
regional economic transactions are related
to servicing local demand – from meeting
consumption and welfare needs to
keeping people and objects on the move.
This significantly raises the importance of
demand-led regional growth and
regeneration considerations, over the
contemporary focus on growth through
supply-driven boosts to competitiveness.
It forces attention on how local patterns 
of servicing demand – the unglamorous
everyday that underpins vast circulations
of money, profit and investment in the local
economy – could be harnessed for local
benefit. It highlights the need to look at
ways in which global supply chains can 
be harnessed for local advantage, say
through local sourcing (without assuming
that local sourcing naturally follows from
clustering), tax revenue or employment
standards for retailers, as it does the need
to focus on circuits of provision that could
draw on local resources, for example, in
the welfare economy, the social economy,
farmers markets, local exchange
schemes, second-hand markets, social
needs-led regeneration.
A national regional strategy
Turning to national-level action, it is 
clear that no re-imagination of regional
economic strategy will succeed without
sustained action from the centre to
combat regional inequality and the
London-bias of the national policy
framework.
The heterarchic economy has its own
political economy that rewards the actors
who control the networked economy and
those sites which originate or transmit the
global flows, knowledge, and creativity.
Nothing has changed to suggest that
uneven development is no longer a feature
of the economic system; inequalities in
and between relational networks continue
to map onto existing regional patterns 
of inequality.
This means that a government committed
to a one-nation economics has the
obligation to secure a national policy 
frame that works for the regions.
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And importantly, the case for a new
politics of regional attention must not 
be seen – as both the Tories and New 
Labour have tended to – as an act of
“redistribution” from a centre that is held
rightfully to own the resource or as a
concession from a “governing” centre to a
“supplicant” or “deserving” periphery that
must show gratitude and become less
slothful in the process. Instead, it must be
seen as a way of mobilising the nation’s 
full spectrum of resources, developing a
varied and distributed national economic
base, reducing the cost to the whole
nation of regional inequality and over-
heating in London, and respecting the
right of the geographical majority to earn a
living and lead a decent life in a place of
their choice.
The obligation “to the regions” is a matter
of the equal worth of all in this nation
regardless of where they find themselves,
not a matter of duty to citizens of a North
routinely typecast as a victim or deficient
space. What this requires is a serious
commitment to dispersing national
economic initiative and institutional
capacity.
What is at minimum needed is a genuine,
thorough, regional “audit” and subsequent
adjustment where necessary, of all
macroeconomic, “national”, and nominally
a-spatial policies. The persistent
unacknowledged regional bias to the
South East must be addressed.
Further, the commonplace assumption
that any obstacle to further expansion 
in the South will encourage investment
blight as firms react against freedom 
of locational choice, must be resisted.
There is no reason why a combination of
carefully researched controls on further
expansion in the hotspots (e.g. on new
industrial build), the guarantee of 
an efficient national transport and
communications network, and indirect
incentives to nudge firms to locate in the
North, will not work. Indeed, given the
rising costs of transport congestion,
environmental pollution, labour shortages,
wage inflation, and prohibitive house
prices in the South, the promise of the
North could be welcomed by industry, and
indeed may become necessary for further
expansion of the national economy.
Big national infrastructure projects, 
such as new airports, rail terminals and
telecommunications hubs, properly linked
to an advanced and integrated national
transport and communications
infrastructure, can be scattered all around
this small island without significant
“distance decay” effects from the
country’s most populated areas.
For example, in the context of the current
heated debate on expanding Heathrow 
in preference for other hubs in the South
such as Stanstead or Gatwick, we would
argue that it makes sense to make 
airports in the North the new international
transport gateways instead of forcing yet
more unsustainable expansion of the
South East hubs. Look at the possibilities
that have been opened up in France by the
TGV and by state-sponsored advanced
telecommunications systems, which have
brought hubs of the knowledge economy
located in the South (e.g. Sofia Antipolis)
and in the East (e.g. Grenoble) right into
the centre of the nation’s science and
technology infrastructure. 
And we mean national connectivity, not
simply connectivity with London (or Paris,
in the case of France), because London
should not be returned as the centre-
point, sucking in benefits from a renewed
national infrastructure. The transport and
communications corridors between East
and West, especially across the Pennines,
together with those within the regions are
in a parlous state and need upgrading (as
recognised by EU regional funding which
has become a major source of
infrastructural improvement in the 
Less-Favoured Regions). This will make
for a distributed economy, as mobility 
and contact within and between regions,
without the pressure to go through, or to,
London, becomes possible.
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The naturalised assumption that
London’s growth is good for the nation
must be displaced by the idea that the
development of the regions is better 
for the nation and better for London.
Nothing short of this will tackle the 
regional question.
And, yes, this does mean “special
measures” for the regions, but these need
not be that far from what is already in place
(although one exception, given earlier
arguments, is that controls on how freely
financial incentives are offered should be
tightened).
• One possibility is an extension to the
whole of the North of the Community
Investment Tax, which offers fiscal
incentives for inner city trade, or of
neighbourhood regeneration schemes
which include incentives such as access
to better finance for firms located in
deprived neighbourhoods.
• Another possibility is to reduce sales 
taxes for firms based in the North,
especially struggling smaller firms and
manufacturing firms which remain a staple
source of employment but which have
been very badly affected by high interest
rates.
Over the years, the spatial remit of urban
and regional policy has narrowed more
and more, towards small and ultimately
stigmatised deprived communities. There
should be a “national” approach to the
regional economy. One serious danger 
of the current combination of devolution
with an endogenous growth theory
approach to uneven development is that
regions will end up both competing with
and duplicating each other. A science
park, or some such, in every part of the
country. The result could be that London
and the South East “win” even more
conclusively than they do now.
Rather, what might be better for all regions
is a national-level strategy for the
economy, negotiated perhaps through a
Council of the Regions, in which major
investment decisions with critical mass
could underpin significant sectoral
initiatives. Thus, in a nice reversal of
Daresbury, the North West might become
the focus of major national scientific
investment; Leeds might be favoured for
finance; and so on. It is only with initiatives
of this weight and significance that the
current geographical imbalance can be
countered. Whatever the particular
solution chosen, it is clear that without
serious and sustained government action
to disperse national industrial effort, a
revitalisation of the private sector in the
North will remain all the more difficult.
Beyond regional incentives, an economics
of dispersal aimed at serving the national
interest should include government and
the public sector. This makes political
sense, as we argue in the next section, 
but it also makes economic sense as an
arm of a renewed regional policy.
Unlike previous attempts, such relocation
should do more than transfer only back-
office jobs or non-strategic functions in an
otherwise London-centred bureaucracy.
The local effects of such decentralisation
were limited not only because only lower
grade activities tended to be transferred
while control and power remained in
London, but also because the rationale
remained that of giving “manageable”
chunks of a national division of labour to
the regions, instead of the entire national
remit and responsibility. Now, the logic
should be that of relocating entire
ministries to the North, as well as the civil
service, the judiciary, national bodies such
as the Arts Council, and the Learned
Academies and the Research Councils.
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The North West might
become the focus of
major national scientific
investment; Leeds might
be favoured for finance.
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The geography of research funding in
England is highly skewed, partly in
consequence of the London-centrism of 
the relevant public bodies. The main grant
awarding institutions, including the
Research Councils, Office of Science and
Technology, and the Higher Education
Funding Council of England, are based
in the South, and the distribution of
expenditure to Northern Universities is
disproportionately small. And this situation
is currently being made worse by the New
Labour strategy of extreme concentration 
of research funding. A more dispersed
distribution would considerably strengthen
the hand of individual regions in meeting 
the challenge of building a critical mass of
knowledge resources along the lines
discussed above.
The use of regional policy to disperse state
and public institutions can achieve two
significant economic impacts.
First, it would give the regions the cachet,
institutional resources, the fixed and
recurrent investment, and the full range of
skills, competences, and knowledge and
learning capabilities that goes with the
stewardship of a national resource. The
regions would secure not only security of
employment and income in particular areas
of national significance, but also access to
the range of resources, capabilities and
knowledge in related chains of activity.
Second, it would provide as strong a signal
as any that the national economy can 
work as the amalgam of many sites of
specialisation, with “even” the regions of 
the North capable of carrying a distinctive
role in the national and international division
of labour.
To summarise the foregoing section: 
a reconsideration of the geography of 
the national economy signals multiple
geographies of organisation and flow 
that transcend and disrupt regional territorial
boundaries. Current regional policy thought
and practice seeks to perfect the economics
of sequestered growth, and because of 
this it will fail to reduce regional inequality.
Our alternative rejects the assumption that
regional failure is a regional problem and
recommends a less sequestered economic
regionalism and a strengthened national
commitment to decentre the economy.
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This extract was taken from an article
originally published in Regional Studies
(37.6/7 675-686), Journal of the Regional
Studies Association and is reproduced
here with the permission of the Publisher,
Taylor & Francis Ltd.
Further information on the Regional
Studies Association, and the Regional
Studies journal, is available online from
www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk. 
Persistent regional disparities are a feature of
some, if not all, large countries. While these
have been the subject of much research,
one frequently encounters confusion about
both their origins and their implications.
What sorts of disparities can be sustained in
generally well-functioning market
economies? Why are they not eliminated by
mobility or arbitrage of various sorts? What,
if any, is the welfare cost of disparities? 
Much of the difficulty in investigating these
issues arises from the fact that we observe
spatial variations in average incomes, skill
levels, industrial structure and house prices,
but these variations are all endogenous
outcomes of an equilibrium in which there
are many opportunities for regional trade
and factor mobility. What underlying
(exogenous) differences between regions
create these disparities? What can the
researcher infer about exogenous
differences between regions, or about 
the existence of barriers to equalization,
from observations on the endogenous
outcomes? It is possible that a number 
of different underlying causes of regional
disparities lead to outcomes that are
observationally equivalent and yet it matters
greatly (to the policy maker, for example) 
that the underlying cause of the disparities 
is identified.
Regional disparities may be part of the
equilibrium of the economy, an equilibrium
which possibly includes free mobility of labour
and which could even equalize utility across
regions. Nevertheless, the disparities must
be due to some underlying difference between
regions, and it is important to understand
what these differences are and to investigate
whether they support a case for policy.
A Model of Regional Disparity
What underlying differences must there be
between regions to generate the outcomes
described above? To address this we
develop a simple general equilibrium model
and show how exogenous differences
translate into equilibrium outcomes.
Ingredients of the model are all standard, and
our goal is simply to assemble them into the
logical framework required for analysing and
empirically investigating regional disparities.
The first ingredient of such a model is a
specification of the locations at which
economic activity can occur, and we focus
entirely on cities. The number of cities is
exogenously given (five in the example we
study), but the size and structure of the cities
is endogenous. As is standard, we assume
that economic activity in each city takes
place in a central business district, to which
workers have to commute (ALONSO, 1964).
The cost of commuting is borne directly in
utility units; individuals suffer from travelling,
and suffering is exponential in distance
travelled. Commuting costs determine the
rent gradient and also create diminishing
returns to city size. Thus, a city with some
advantage will typically be larger than
others, this raising land rents and total
commuting costs, and thereby choking
off expansion of the city in response to 
its advantage. 
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Equilibrium Regional Disparities: 
Theory and British Evidence
Patricia Rice and Anthony J. Venables
Department of Economics, University of
Southampton; and Department of Economics,
London School of Economics
What if the regional disparities observed in the United
Kingdom were the result of a well-functioning market
economy, and carried little or no overall welfare cost?
What if tackling regional inequalities wouldn’t actually
increase average welfare in the UK? This extract uses
economic models to shed light on these questions,
and differentiate between different ways in which
regional disparities can come about.
Regional disparities 
may be part of the
equilibrium of the
economy, an equilibrium
which possibly includes
free mobility of labour
and which could even
equalize utility across
regions.
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There are two types of individuals in the
economy – skilled and unskilled. The total
number of each is fixed, and endowments
are chosen such that (in a base equilibrium)
skilled workers have twice the wage of
unskilled workers. Rents are distributed to
workers in a lump sum manner, and it is
convenient to suppose that each individual’s
share of rents is proportional to her wage.
There are no barriers of any sort to workers’
mobility either between sectors or cities, 
so equilibrium utility levels are the same in 
all locations. 
Individuals divide expenditure between 
four categories of goods and services 
with, in our example, expenditure shares
that are fixed and equal. One item of
expenditure is housing, and preferences
imply an income elasticity of demand of unity
and price elasticity of minus unity. Thus, high
income individuals spend more on housing,
and individuals in large cities who face high
rent consume less housing. Remaining
expenditure is divided between three types
of goods, each with a different degree of
spatial mobility. The first good is freely
tradable on international and national
markets and has price unity in all locations; 
it can be viewed as a composite of all 
the internationally tradable goods in the
economy. The second category of goods
can be traded between cities, possibly
subject to transport costs, but cannot be
traded internationally. Examples might be
financial and other services, some retailing
and construction activities, and perishable
commodities. We shall call these goods
‘nationally tradable’. The final category is a
non-traded good that is tradable only within
each city; these are non-transportable
services such as restaurant meals and
haircuts.
Given these ingredients, the equilibrium 
of this model has workers located in each
city, some engaged in non-tradable
production, and others divided between 
a mixture of internationally and nationally-
traded good production. How can regional
disparities arise, and how do they affect the
average incomes, skill levels, industrial
structure and house prices of different cities?
Skill Composition
Suppose first that there are no transport
costs in the nationally-traded goods and 
no regional productivity differences of any
kind. In this case there are no underlying
differences between regions, and the model
contains no geographical forces to induce
clustering of activity in a subset of locations.
Is it then the case that there are no regional
disparities and all cities look the same? 
The answer is, not necessarily. At
equilibrium, prices (of goods, factors of
production and housing plus commuting
costs) are the same in all locations, but the
skill mix of the labour force in each city is –
within bounds – indeterminate. This is a
corollary of the factor price equalization
(FPE) theorem of trade theory. Two cities
with different amounts of skilled relative 
to unskilled labour produce different
quantities of the two traded goods
(internationally and nationally-traded).
However, they have the same factor prices,
providing the ratio of skilled to unskilled
labour in each city, after netting out labour
usage in the non-tradable sector, lies
between the factor intensities of the two
tradable activities. Differences in factor
endowments are reflected entirely in
differences in the composition of production
rather than the techniques used in 
each sector.
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As the city under study is given more skilled
labour, so the sizes of the nationally and
internationally-traded goods sectors
change. The more skilled labour intensive 
of these sectors expands, and the right (left)
hand end of the ‘FPE range’ coincides with
zero production of the unskilled (skilled)
labour intensive good. Although wages are
the same in all cities (so that the
internationally and nationally tradable
sectors are competitive) GDP per employee
differs, being higher in the more skill
abundant city. Since housing has positive
income elasticity of demand, this tends to
raise demand for housing. However, it must
be the case that house prices plus
commuting costs are the same in all cities,
since migration equates utilities. Population
in the skilled labour abundant city is
therefore lower to accommodate the
housing demand of high income skilled
workers, and it is this that causes the 
decline in unskilled labour and overall
population illustrated in Fig. 3. 
The main point about this case is the non-
uniqueness of equilibrium; any point in the
FPE range indicated gives the same level of
utility in all cities and is consistent with free
trade in goods and mobility of labour. It is
therefore possible that every city has a
different skill mix (within the range), different
size, and different GDP per employee. 
Does this economy have a ‘regional
problem’? The simple answer is ‘no’:
moving to a more equal city structure would
not change any individual’s real income.
However, a dynamic model could give a
more nuanced answer. Suppose that
industrial structure is slow to adjust and
each city produces skilled and unskilled
workers in the same proportions. Then the
equilibrium involves migration flows, as part
of each new generation of workers has to
relocate to match the skill mix of jobs offered
by cities’ industrial structures. Some cities
will experience out-migration of skilled
workers and in-migration of unskilled, 
while others have the reverse flow. 
Geographical Advantage 
and Market Access
Regional disparities can arise because some
cities have better access to markets than
others. Proximity to large markets – for final
or intermediate goods – makes a city an
attractive location for production, attracting
population inflow and bidding up prices 
of immobile factors. Capturing this in the
model requires two ingredients. One is 
that the nationally-traded good is subject 
to transport costs. The other is that there 
is some underlying reason why one city 
has better market access than others. 
This could be because of geography (e.g.
proximity to ports or other transport hubs) 
or because the city has some exogenous
advantage making it larger than other cities.
We follow the latter route, supposing that
city 1 has a lower commuting cost per 
unit distance than others (due, for example,
to being historically endowed with an
underground railway system). This has 
the direct effect of making the city larger, 
and this becomes amplified as the good
market access of the large city attracts 
firms and workers. 
The low commuting cost gives city 1 a
relatively large population, and hence a large
market. Because of its good market access,
city 1 is a profitable location in which to
produce the nationally-traded good, and 
its production structure is skewed towards
this good, with several consequences. 
First, since the nationally-traded sector 
is assumed to be skilled labour intensive,
GDP per capita in city 1 is higher than
elsewhere. Second, the nationally-traded
sector crowds out the internationally-traded
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Does this economy
have a ‘regional
problem’? The simple
answer is ‘no’.
Fig 3. Skill Differences: Relative City Values 
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goods sector, by bidding up wages in city 
1 (Fig. 4b). And third, the price index of
nationally traded goods is lower in city 1 than
elsewhere. The wage and price index effects
attract further population until offset by
higher house prices, as illustrated in Fig. 4a. 
Increasing transport costs on nationally-
traded goods increases the market access
advantage of firms in city 1, and amplifies
the disparities just described. This continues
until some point at which transport costs are
so high that production disperses, as each
city has to supply its own local demand.
Wage inequalities are then eliminated, and
city 1 produces internationally-traded as
well as nationally-traded goods, this
accounting for the kinks in the curves.
Table 3 summarizes this case, and indicates
a positive correlation between all variables,
with a question mark over wage rates, these
depending, as we have seen, on the level 
of transport costs. These correlations are
consistent with those observed in the UK.
However, as in the previous section, this
economy does not have an obvious regional
problem. The only barriers to mobility are
transport costs on goods – a real resource
cost not a distortionary wedge – and real
incomes are equalized.
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Fig 4. Transport Costs and market Access 
Table 4. Correlations when cities vary in commuting cost
GDP per Wage House
employee Skills rates Density prices
GDP per employee 1 + +? + +
Skills 1 +? + +
Wage rates 1 +? +?
Density 1 +
House prices 1
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Productivity Differences in the
Internationally-Tradable Good
We turn now to our last experiment, looking
at regional productivity differences in the
internationally-traded good. The source of
these productivity differences will not be
modelled, although they could arise in
several ways. For example, technological 
or pecuniary externalities might lead to
increasing returns to scale, so the sector has
high productivity in cities where it operates
at large scale. However, for present
purposes we simply assume that production
functions differ between cities, giving city 1
an efficiency advantage in this sector.
Figs. 5a and 5b illustrate outcomes. 
The horizontal axis is the cost advantage of
city 1, and we now assume that the
internationally-traded good is skilled labour
abundant, that commuting costs are the
same in all cities, and that there are no
transport costs on nationally-traded goods.
The first effect of the productivity difference
is to cause an equal proportionate increment
to wages in the advantaged city (Fig. 5b). 
Of course, this makes the city less
competitive in the nationally traded good, so
causing this sector to contract and allowing
internationally-traded goods production to
expand. By assumption, the internationally-
traded good is skill-intensive, and as the skill
composition of the cities changes, so their
GDPs per capita diverge as shown inFig.5b.
The nominal wage differential attracts 
in-migration, and we see from Fig. 5a that a
10% productivity differential is associated
with a near doubling of the size of city 1while
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Fig 5. Productivity differences 
Table 4. Correlations when cities vary in productivity
GDP per Wage House
employee Skills rates Density prices
GDP per employee 1 + + + +
Skills 1 + + +
Wage rates 1 + +
Density 1 +
House prices 1
Table 5. Real income changes
Productivity change 5 10 15
Utility gain if productivity change one city 0·74 1·74 3·41
Utility gain if productivity change in all cities 1·90 3·94 6·13
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other cities lose 20%of their population. There
are two forces equilibrating. One is the price
of non-traded goods which rise in line with
wages, so increasing the cost of living 
in the city. The other is the price of housing.
Fig. 5a indicates that a 10% productivity
differential raises house prices in the city 
by around a third, while reducing them
elsewhere by nearly 10%. 
For sufficiently small efficiency differences
between cities, the internationally-traded
good is produced in all locations,
competitiveness being maintained by wages
in other cities remaining at their initial level.
However, the kinks in Figs. 5a and 5b occur
as other cities cease to produce the
internationally-traded good. Further
efficiency differences beyond this point 
bring no further relocation of industry or of
population. Wages in other cities are no
longer constrained by the need to be
competitive in the internationally-traded
good, and start to rise with the real income
of the economy as a whole. 
Summary correlations are given in Table 4,
and we see positive correlations between 
all the variables reported, the same sign
pattern as that found for Britain.
What are the real income implications of
these productivity differences, and is there 
a ‘regional problem’ in this case? The
experiment raises physical productivity in
just one sector (of three equal sized ones) 
in just one location (out of five potentially
different size ones). The real income gains
from this productivity increase are reported
in the first row of Table 5 (at the equilibrium,
these gains accrue to all workers
irrespective of their location). The bottom
row of Table 5 gives the real income gains
that would have arisen had the productivity
increase occurred in all cities, not just one. 
If all five cities had benefited from the 15%
increase in productivity, the aggregate gains
to the economy would have been 2·72%
greater (6·13% - 41% = 2·72%). Of course,
these numbers are only illustrative, but serve
to make several points. Even though there
are ‘equilibrium regional disparities’ and
utility levels are equalized across all cities, a
policy that removes the underlying reason
for the disparity raises aggregate welfare;
there are gains from bringing the productivity
of all cities to the level of the best city. The
example shows how quite small exogenous
differences between areas may be
dominated by much larger endogenous
responses to these differences. A 15%
productivity differential concentrated in one
city causes this city to be more than twice 
as large as others, with house prices more
than 50% higher. However, removing the
underlying source of the disparity (and
consequently moving to a situation where 
all cities are the same size) yields real 
income gain of just 2·7% of income.
Concluding Comments
Regional disparities are commonplace 
and can appear remarkably large, even in
geographically compact and high-income
countries, as demonstrated by the UK
experience. It is tempting to conclude from
the mere observation of such disparities that
there is market failure and a case for economic
policy. This paper suggests that the case for
policy must be made in a more careful way. 
On the one hand, regional disparities are not
necessarily associated with market failure. 
It is quite possible that there are equilibrium
inequalities, and that no welfare gains are 
to be had by seeking to remove these
inequalities. On the other hand, regional
inequalities do have some underlying cause.
Just to dismiss them on the grounds that
markets are working and there are low
barriers to mobility is to fail to diagnose the
reasons for the inequality, and to ask
whether there are gains from addressing
them. As our last example showed, there
may be gains from eliminating the causes 
of regional inequalities.
The model developed in the paper provides
some examples of the way in which
exogenous differences between cities
translate into the differences that we
observe. On the basis of these examples, 
it seems unlikely that skill difference alone
can account for the correlations that are in
the data. However, it is possible that quite
small exogenous differences between
regions – such as the geographical
advantage of section five – can lead to large
differences in per capita income, population,
and house prices. If the advantage impacts
differently on different sectors, then it will
cause variations in the industrial structure 
of regions, these changing the skill
composition of regions and possibly
amplifying regional differences.
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Regional disparities 
are not necessarily
associated with market
failure. It is quite
possible that there are
equilibrium inequalities,
and that no welfare
gains are to be had 
by seeking to remove
these inequalities.
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Of course, the theoretical model of this
paper only explores possibilities, and actual
differences between regions are very much
more complex than those captured in the
model. Our points are, first, that large
apparent disparities can occur in well
functioning market economies that contain
no barriers to mobility or spatial externalities.
And second that rigorous model-based
thinking is needed to establish the bases 
of regional disparities, to separate out
endogenous and exogenous variables, 
and to begin to investigate policy. As noted
in the introduction, the research agenda
requires developing this further to inform
econometric work that can identify the
sources of regional disparities.
ALONSO W. (1964) Location and Land Use. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
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Is Regional Centralism Inevitable? 
The Case of the Welsh Assembly
Martin Laffin
Durham Business School, University of Durham
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This extract was taken from an article
originally published in Regional Studies
(38.2 213-223), Journal of the Regional
Studies Association and is reproduced
here with the permission of the Publisher,
Taylor & Francis Ltd.
Further information on the Regional
Studies Association, and the Regional
Studies journal, is available online from
www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk. 
The key theoretical and policy lesson 
of the Welsh experience is that regional
centralism is not an inevitable consequence
of devolution, indeed that local government
has and can benefit from regional devolution
– and recent Scottish evidence points to a
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Is Regional Centralism Inevitable? 
The Case of the Welsh Assembly
Martin Laffin
Durham Business School, University 
of Durham
‘Partnership’ works 
best where there is a
reasonable power
balance or symmetry
between the two levels
of government yet the
senior partner, the
regional government,
still has that vital threat
of direction.
How might elected regional assemblies in England, 
if any are established, work with local government?
This extract draws lessons from the Welsh
experience, and examines the extent to which English
regional assemblies would follow a similar pattern.
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similar conclusion (BENNETT et al., 2002).
The Welsh experience also indicates that
central–local government relations at the
sub-nation state level are significantly 
less asymmetrical in power terms than
central–local relations at the nation state
level: Welsh local government does enjoy
considerably more influence with the
Assembly, than it had with the old Welsh
Office. The Assembly, too, is much more
dependent on local government than the
Westminster government is on English 
local government.
Nonetheless, regional centralism and
serious regional–local tensions could occur
where the powers of the sub-nation state or
regional authority are very limited. The Welsh
Assembly has many more functions and
powers than are presently envisaged for 
the proposed English assemblies – at best
they would have only indirect influence over
health, education and social services. 
These limited powers are well illustrated 
by the striking contrasts in the size of
budgets between the Welsh and the English
assemblies – for example, the North East
Assembly would have a degree of influence
over spending of about £0·9 billion for 2·5
million people (CABINET OFFICE/DTLR,
2002, para 5.2), while the Welsh Assembly
has a budget ten times greater for 2·9 million
people. Thus such regional assemblies,
focusing on their narrowly defined powers,
are more likely to conflict with local
authorities than assemblies, like the Welsh,
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with a larger portfolio of functions and
powers to occupy the attention of ministers
and members. Such conflicts did occur
between the old Greater London Council
and the London boroughs and appear to be
currently re-emerging in the Greater London
Authority (GLA) (TRAVERS, 2002).
The Welsh comparison, too, raises
questions about the partnership model
underlying the 2002 regions White Paper. 
As JEFFREY 2002, p. 7, points out for the
proposed assemblies, ‘the possibility of
direction, as in Scotland and Wales, will be
severely limited’; thus they will be very, and
perhaps too, dependent on local
authorities. The lesson from Wales is that
‘partnership’ works best where there is a
reasonable power balance or symmetry
between the two levels of government yet
the senior partner, the regional government,
still has that vital threat of direction (not least
through hypothecation), even though it
might never be used, to ensure that local
authorities do engage meaningfully with the
regional level.
Another feature of Welsh devolution, and 
of Scottish devolution, is that a distinctive
party political system emerged post-
devolution. The combination of proportional
representation and a new post-devolution
politics has boosted the electoral fortunes 
of the minority parties and led to a Welsh
Assembly coalition, not a Labour-
dominated government as was generally
expected. Inter-party competition for power
prevents complacent and even arrogant
one-party dominance and, not least,
encouraged Assembly ministers to seek 
a cooperative rather than a coercive
relationship with local government.
However, in Wales and Scotland the
presence of significant electoral support 
for the nationalist parties was critical in
sustaining keen, interparty competition – 
a situation which is unlikely to obtain in any
future English region where such nationalist
parties do not exist. The distinctive Welsh
party political system has also created new
opportunities for pressure group influence.
Some interests, such as in health, have
organized themselves well and are having
an influence, however that influence falls
well short of the ‘capture’ of parts of the
Assembly policy making apparatus. 
A more serious issue is raised by the fact
that a sub-nation state polity, like the Welsh,
is much less competitive than a national
polity as fewer groups are represented.
Thus the question arises of whether regional
governments are more easily captured by
‘producerist’ interests, though as yet the
evidence for or against is very limited.
Finally, devolution does not automatically
resolve other problems of government.
Within the Welsh Assembly, the joined-up
government agenda is proceeding slowly 
as departmentalized, service-based
approaches demonstrate considerable
resilience, reinforced as they are by
ministerial ambitions as well as by inflexible
professional–administrative structures.
BENNETT M., FAIRLEY J. and MCATEER M. (2002)
Devolution in Scotland: The Impact on Local
Government. Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York.
CABINET OFFICE/DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIONS (DTLR)
(2002) Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalising the
English Regions, Cm 5511. The Stationery Office,
London.
JEFFREY C. (2002) Devolution: Challenging Local
Government. Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York.
TRAVERS T. (2002) Decentralization London-style: 
The GLA and London governance, Regional Studies 36,
779–88.
State of Regional Research NEW  22/10/04  5:10 pm  Page 94
The S
tate of R
egional R
eseach
95
The S
tate of R
egional R
esearch
The State of
Regional
Research
Strategic Gaps in Understanding
West Midlands Regional Observatory
Scalable Vector Graphics for Regional 
and Local Statistics
Alan Smith
Office for National Statistics
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This extract is taken from Real Lives – Real
Issues: A State of the Region Report 2004,
published by the West Midlands Regional
Observatory and used with permission.
Our review of interconnections has allowed us
to highlight many of the most important of the
regions needs for further research. However,
there are a number of additional gaps in our
understanding that are of strategic significance,
even if they do not necessarily cut across the
remits of the main regional strategies. 
Widening our understanding 
of regional wealth
Public services are not traded for profit but
paid for indirectly through taxes, and so 
form only a small part of regional GVA.This
creates two important problems for our
understanding of regional wealth creation.
First, the actual scale of the public services’
contribution to our economic well-being 
in terms of services delivered (like health 
and education); and second, the regional
economic dynamic provided by delivery 
of public services to the rest of the country
(like the decentralisation of functions from
Whitehall, being reported on by Sir Michael
Lyons). However, national economic
analysis is increasingly conducted in terms
of Gross Value Added (GVA) – essentially a
measure of profitability and wages. GVA will
also be the basis on which the Treasury will
measure progress in reducing regional
economic disparities.
Two very recent reports have a bearing on
this issue, and also have wider implications
for the future work of the Observatory and 
its regional partners:
The McLean report to ODPM deals with
the regional distribution of Government
expenditure. It indicates that the West
Midlands Region has consistently had the
lowest amount of regionally relevant public
expenditure (i.e. spent in the region or for
that particular region’s benefit – or both) per
head of any UK region since estimates were
first made (in the 1970s); but also that the
source departmental estimates are of very
variable quality. We understand that the
Government will seek both to improve the
statistical base and will also require
departments to break down their spending
proposals by region in preparation for the
2005 Budget. Since around three-quarters
of Government spending is regionally
relevant, this ‘mainstreaming’ of the regional
dimension of their spending decisions is
potentially of great policy significance.
The Allsopp Review reported to the
Chancellor on the information needs of
regional policy, particularly in the light of the
Government’s commitment to reducing
regional disparities. This report endorses 
the McLean report’s findings on the need to
understand overall patterns of expenditure
and investment, but its primary focus is 
on better GVA estimates at regional and
sub-regional levels. A key conclusion is the
need for more of this work to be done in the
regions and in close liaison with regional
agencies, in particular Government Offices,
Regional Development Agencies, Regional
Observatories, local authorities and other
relevant bodies and individuals.
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Strategic Gaps in Understanding
West Midlands Regional Observatory
Regions, for all their research and intelligence, 
are still faced with major gaps in understanding. 
Regional economies are only partially understood, 
as companies don’t keep accounts on a regional
basis, and linkages are not well mapped. Large
national surveys are not robust at small geographical
levels. Some sectors suffer from very poor data
availability. This extract, taken from a publication
packed with regional intelligence, looks at some 
of what we don’t know in the West Midlands.
There are a number of
additional gaps in our
understanding that are
of strategic significance.
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The Government appear to have taken 
up the call by some commentators to
approach regional policy more holistically,
looking at the impact of its programmes
across the board, rather than just those
programmes with a ‘regional policy’ label.
This difference is significant: all regionally
relevant public expenditure accounts for
around 30% of GDP and regional
development programmes only about 
one-tenth of this amount. There is clearly 
an agenda here of long-term strategic
significance, of shared interest to
Government Office, Advantage West
Midlands, WMLGA and the Observatory.
There are other agencies that will also have
important contributions to make, requiring a
process for their involvement to be devised.
Regional economic structure
and dependencies
There is a need for fuller information and
understanding of the contributions to the
regional economic dynamic of the various
sectoral components of GVA. For example
knowledge of the pattern of imports and
exports to and from the region, and of inputs
and outputs between sectors within the
region would help us understand
interdependencies, strengths and
vulnerabilities. Such linkages are particularly
important to our understanding of the
workings of the economic clusters that are 
a fundamental aspect of the RES, and are
crucial to the exploitation of the high
technology corridors. 
A particular new challenge for regional
economic and spatial strategies arises 
from developments in the field of transport
policy. Over recent years companies have
been taking advantage of improving
communications (transport and telecoms) 
to disperse from congested inner cities. 
But increasing road congestion and the
possibility of direct road pricing could
change the balance: how will this affect
business locational choices and what will 
be the implications for clusters? Will the 
sum of commercial choices add up to the
best result for the region? What are the
implications for the high technology
corridors?
The relationship of economic, spatial,
infrastructure and cultural aspects in ‘the
new economic geography’ means that there
would be benefit in wider involvement and
ownership. This could take the form of joint
commissioning of a regional economic
model which would then become a shared
resource. 
Effects of South East growth
areas on RES and RPG
The Government’s proposals for large-scale
Growth Areas in the South-East are likely to
affect the West Midlands Region. The scale
of additional house building implied by the
interim Barker Review could be ten times
that of the Growth Areas, with
correspondingly large-scale consequences.
At present the Growth Area proposals are
still quite sketchy and the Barker Review 
not decided upon, but the effects on
housing and commercial locational choices
(especially in the south east of the region)
and on public resources for infrastructure
and services are potentially very significant.
The need to monitor and engage with these
processes is underlined by the spate of
proposals for implementation of the
Sustainable Communities Plan. Northern
and Midlands Growth Areas have been
proposed as counterparts to the Growth
Areas in the South-East. 
The prospective availability of better regional
and sub-regional information will allow the
implications for the West Midlands Region 
to be better understood, and would provide
the necessary input to a regional economic
model. With or without such tools,
investigation of the effects of rapid growth 
in neighbouring regions to the south and
east is an area of common interest for both
Advantage West Midlands and the Regional
Assembly.
Quality of life indicators
ODPM’s Sustainable Communities report
proposes some general requirements which
were produced by a joint central/local
government working group, and these need
to be translated into a suitable range of
indicators. As an example public transport
accessibility features on this list, and
accessibility of services like healthcare and
schools has a strong bearing on quality 
of life. Measures of public transport
accessibility of a range of facilities are
intended to be developed as part of the
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Regional Transport Strategy and Local
Transport Plans, but because of the need to
link economic, environmental and social
measures this should perhaps be a joint
exercise with a wider remit.
A general problem is the paucity of
information on the influence of environment
on quality of life. Much of what there is has
been gathered with a particular client in mind
(e.g. tourism, culture, etc.), and there are
significant gaps relating to the age of data,
the availability of time-series, and of
consistent regional or sub-regional
comparisons. 
A key component of quality of life in parts of
inner urban areas and some outer estates is
the way in which a social milieu of economic
dependency, poor health, low expectations,
low achievement, limited lifestyles and petty
crime has become ingrained and self-
sustaining. This phenomenon has been
tackled successfully in some areas (e.g.
Castle Vale).
The region needs to develop a clear set of
indicators for the quality of life of both urban
and rural communities. Additionally, we
need to develop a deeper understanding of
attitudes to and experiences of quality of life
and the relationships between these and
locational choice, social polarisation and
deprivation. This will give us the information
to support the coordinated actions across a
broad front necessary for policy success.
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A general problem is the
paucity of information
on the influence of
environment on quality
of life.
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Kindly provided for this publication by
the Office for National Statistics.
Never before has so much data been
freely available to users of Regional and
Local Statistics.  Services such as ONS’
Neighbourhood Statistics are a good
advert for the ability of the Internet to
deliver high volume, small area statistics to
a wide user community.
Images and the Internet
The Internet has always excelled at the
display and linking of textual information –
including the use of statistical tables.
However, the Internet has earned a less
than wonderful reputation for the way it
serves images, particularly the type of
‘data graphics’ often needed by users of
statistics to understand patterns in
datasets.  
Scalable Vector Graphics
Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) is a
relatively new (non-proprietary) file format
based on XML (eXtensible Markup
Language). To view SVG content, you
need to install an appropriate ‘plug-in’ for
your Internet browser. These are free and
links are provided at the end of this article.
Once installed, have a look at a few sites
that contain SVG graphics (links provided
at the end of this article) and the
advantages of the format to the end user
become immediately obvious:
1 File sizes tend to be small – a more
intelligent way of serving images than
traditional pixelated images.
2 Images are scalable – they can be resized
to fit any window and print well at different
sizes.
3 Rapid interactivity within the browser –
there’s no need to wait for a web server 
to keep refreshing the graphic. With SVG,
interactivity can all be pre-loaded into the
browser.
4 SVG allows for different types of graphic 
to be linked together.  For example,
traditional software tools make it very
difficult to produce images that combine 
a map and a chart – SVG makes it easy
and allows both graphics to be driven 
from the same data source.
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Scalable Vector Graphics for Regional
and Local Statistics
Alan Smith
Office for National Statistics
Graphs and maps can make statistics more
accessible. But how best to disseminate data?
Scalable Vector Graphics, as this article explains, can
produce powerful graphs and maps that download
very quickly, offer interactivity, and work well at
different scales. Could this be the future for making
data available over the Internet?
Fig 1. SVG population pyramid – rapid interactivity with a very small file size
Source: Population Estimates Unit, ONS
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There are other advantages which will 
appeal more to the producer of the 
graphical content:
1 SVG graphics can be data driven, either 
by a server or external data file. Producing
revised images using updated data is
therefore easy and encourages a ‘template’-
based approach.
2 SVG can be authored using simple text
editors – there are no expensive proprietary
tools needed to begin making content.
3 SVG is XML - a standards-compliant
language that interfaces nicely with other
web standards (JavaScript, CSS, XSLT etc)
SVG and the Future
Will SVG be around in 5 years time? 
It’s impossible to say – but one thing that 
we can be certain about is that the approach
SVG uses – data driven, vector graphics 
will live on in one form or another.  Our own
experiences at ONS (and the feedback we
have received from our users) have led us to
the conclusion that SVG has a significant
part to play in the data graphics we will be
producing over the coming years. This is 
not to say that it is the perfect solution to all
things graphical – learning where and when
to implement SVG is an important part of 
the process.
Learning More
If you would like to find out more about SVG,
look at more examples and begin to get a
feel for how to develop content, please
contact us on svg@ons.gov.uk – we’ll pop 
a complimentary CD-Rom in the post to you
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Fig 2. ONS Area Classification – combining maps and charts is easy with SVG
if you provide your mailing address. In the
meantime, we have provided a few links
below to whet your appetite.
Office for National Statistics 
– Links
Neighbourhood Statistics
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/
neighbourhood
SVG Population Pyramid
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/population
estimates/svg_pyramid/default.htm
SVG Area Classification map+chart
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/
methodology_by_theme/area_classification
/la/svg/index.html
Other Links
Adobe SVG Viewer software
http://www.adobe.com/svg/viewer/install/
main.html
Official World Wide Web Consortium SVG
pages
http://www.w3c.org/Graphics/SVG/
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Barnett Formula
Used to determine how the size of the
budgets of the devolved administrations in
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are
adjusted following a change in spending
levels in England.
Basic Skills
In the UK, taken as the ‘ability to read, write,
and speak in English/Welsh and to use
mathematics at a level necessary to function
and progress successfully at work and in
society in general’ (Basic Skills Agency).
Business Angel
Private individuals who invest directly in
private companies in return for an equity
stake and perhaps take a seat on the
company's boards.
Business Link
Business support, advice, and information
service, sponsored by the DTI.
Responsibility for running Business Link
transferred to Regional Development
Agencies following Spending Review 2004.
BVCA 
British Venture Capital Association.
Claimant Unemployed
Those claiming unemployment related
benefits, i.e. Jobseeker’s Allowance. This
figure is usually lower than the International
Labour Organisation definition of
unemployment, as it excludes some who
are seeking work but not claiming the
allowance.
CSS 
Cascading Style Sheets, used to control
presentation of computer files on screen and
elsewhere.
DEFRA 
Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs.
DTI 
Department of Trade and Industry.
Economic Census
US Census of companies run every five
years, which aims to provide a detailed
picture of their national economy. 
Equity Gap
Shortage of venture capital that is available
to enterprises seeking to raise funds within a
certain range. For example, an equity gap
between £250000 and £500000 would
mean firms looking to obtain this amount of
capital could expect to have problems
finding a suitable source of finance.
Floor Target
Target for the performance of the worst
performing areas or bodies.
FPE
Factor Price Equalisation is the tendency for
international trade to lead to convergence in
factor prices such as rent, wages, and
interest rates.
GINI Coefficient 
A statistical measure of inequality.
Greater South East
Name used to describe grouping of London,
the South East, and East of England
Government Office Regions. 
GVA
Gross Value Added, defined as Gross
Domestic Product excluding taxes (less
subsidies) on products; the headline
measure of regional economic activity.
Gross Domestic Product is a measure of real
output produced by activities located in a
country (or, for our purposes, region).
HBAI 
Households Below Average Income survey,
run annually by the Department of Work and
Pensions (DWP). The survey gives
information on income distribution in the UK,
using the DWP Family Resources Survey
and the British Household Panel Survey.
HE 
Higher Education.
Higher-Level Qualifications 
Degree or higher degree, NVQ level 4 or 5, or
equivalent.
ILO Unemployment
Unemployment measured using the
International Labour Organisation definition
– those of working age not employed and
seeking work. 
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Super Output Area
2001 Census-based stable statistical
reporting unit, containing an average of 1500
residents at the lower level.
SVG 
Scalable Vector Graphics.
TTWA 
Travel to Work Area.
Working Age
Currently 16-65 for men and 16-60 
for women.
XSLT 
Extensible Style Sheet Language
Transformations.
ODPM 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
OECD 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development
ONS 
The Office for National Statistics
Productivity
Amount of output per unit of input.
Productivity is often expressed in terms 
of labour input (such as hours worked), 
but can look at inputs such as capital or 
land, or at all inputs (total factor productivity).
PSA 
Public Service Agreement.
R&D 
Research and Development.
RDA 
Regional Development Agency.
RES 
Regional Economic Strategy.
RPG 
Regional Planning Guidance.
RSA 
Regional Selective Assistance; this has now
been replaced by Selective Finance for
Investment in England.
SIC 
Standard Industrial Classification.
SME 
Small and Medium Enterprises, defined by
the European Union as those employing
fewer than 250 people.
Spending Review 
Biennial Treasury review of Departmental
spending over a three year period. 
Structural Funds 
European Union funding aimed at the
economic development of sub-regions with
lower than average GVA. 
Index of Multiple Deprivation 
Super Output Area level measure of
deprivation published by the Office of the
Deputy Prime Minister combining individual
measures across seven domains – income,
employment, health and disability,
education, skills and training, housing and
services, the living environment, and crime. 
Inner Region Core
London, South East, and the East of England
Government Office Regions c.f. Greater
South East.
Input-Output 
Study of flows of goods and services
between different sectors of the economy. 
IT 
Information Technology
Less-Favoured Regions
In the English context, used to denote those
regions outside of London, the South East,
and the East of England.
LEVEL 3 Qualifications
NVQ level 3, 2 or more A-levels or equivalent,
GNVQ advanced, or other similar level
qualifications.
LEVEL 4 Qualifications
NVQ level 4, first degree, diploma in higher
education, teaching qualification, or other
similar level qualifications.
LEVEL 5 Qualifications
NVQ level 5, or a higher degree.
Local Strategic Partnership
Non-statutory, multi-agency body, which
matches local authority boundaries, 
and brings together public, private, and non-
profit making organisations, with the primary
aim of promoting local development. 
LSC 
Learning and Skills Council.
Neighbourhood Statistics
A web-based service run by the Office for
National Statistics giving access to statistics
about small areas. 
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